University of Isfahan Historical Researches 2008-6253 18 2 2026 06 22 A Review and Criticism of Sīrah and History of Islam through the lens of Revisionist and moderate Orientalists, drawing upon the works "Hagarism" and "Muhammad and the Empire of Faith" A Review and Criticism of Sīrah and History of Islam through the lens of Revisionist and moderate Orientalists, drawing upon the works "Hagarism" and "Muhammad and the Empire of Faith" 1 14 30268 10.22108/jhr.2026.146164.2823 FA Behnam Nasr Isfahani Ph.D. student of Islamic History, Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran 0009-0009-9247-4169 Asghar Montazerolghaem Ph.D., Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran Ali Akbar Kajbaf Ph.D., Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran Journal Article 2025 07 29 Abstract In the realm of Orientalist scholarship, Islamic studies can be divided into two primary streams: revisionism and moderation. The book Hagarism co-authored by Crone and Cook represents a revisionist perspective, while Sean Anthony's Muhammad and the Empire of Faith adopts a more moderate stance. Both works aim to redefine the Prophet’s Sīrah and the history of Islam for contemporary audiences. This research employed a critical and analytical approach to library sources to re-evaluate the Sīrah and Islamic history from the viewpoints of both revisionist and moderate authors. It addressed the question: What differences and similarities emerge between Hagarism and Muhammad and the Empire of Faith in their redefinitions of the Sīrah and Islamic history? The study operated under the hypothesis that Hagarism as a critical intellectual trend utilized revisionist methodologies in Islamic historical studies, fostering an extreme and skeptical perspective towards Sīrah sources and Islamic history. This trend encompassed both Islamic and non-Islamic sources to construct new narratives. In contrast, Muhammad and the Empire of Faith offered a moderate examination of the Sīrah grounded in historical analysis of its sources. Keywords: Orientalists, Islamic Studies, Revisionist, Moderate, Sīrah and History of Islamic Research. Introduction Since their initial contact with the Islamic world, Western scholars have sought a deeper understanding of the history, culture, and civilization of the East and Islam. This interest has fostered the emergence of fields, such as Oriental studies and Islamic studies, in Europe. In the 9th and 10th centuries CE, European priests and translators engaged with the Islamic world, notably through their travels to Islamic Spain to study in schools. This interaction facilitated the examination and translation of significant Muslim scientific texts. However, non-specialist translators, such as Raymond Armar, often hindered this quest for knowledge. Their inaccurate translations and the proliferation of books filled with myths, distortions, and falsehoods about Islam and the Prophet contributed to the emergence of misleading narratives within Islamic studies. This situation underscored the need for accuracy and rigorous scrutiny in the field as it developed (Najī, 1981, pp. 86-90). Contemporary Islamic studies featured two prominent currents: revisionist and moderate (Rafie, 2017, p. 261). This research adopted an analytical and critical approach to re-examining the Sīrah of the Prophet and the history of Islam as presented in two key works: Hagarism and Muhammad and the Empire of Faith. The objective was to identify the differences and similarities between these two texts regarding the Sīrah and Islamic history. The present study explored varying approaches to Islamic history by comparing Hagarism and Muhammad and the Empire of Faith. The hypothesis posited that Hagarism offered an extreme and skeptical perspective on Islamic history reflective of the revisionist trend, whereas Muhammad and the Empire of Faith aimed to present a balanced and redefined portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad's Sīrah and Islamic history through a moderate lens. Materials & Methods This research employed a critical and analytical approach, utilizing library resources to examine the texts of two significant works in the field of Sīrah studies and Islamic history. It identified notable similarities and differences between the two books, which were discussed under the following headings: a) The study advocated for the incorporation of scientific data from non-Islamic contemporary historical sources pertaining to the Islamic period to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the era; b) It critiqued the perspective that considered the Sīrah (the traditions concerning the life of Prophet Muhammad) as an unreliable historical narrative; c) The research explored the contrasting views of "revisionists" and "moderates" in their evaluations of Islamic history; d) It also addressed the themes of Islamic culture and civilization. Research Findings The findings of this research revealed a prominent revisionist approach within the post-modern discourse of the book Hagarism. The authors of this work struggled to substantiate their claims with scientific evidence, resulting in a disorganized presentation of the Prophet's Sīrah and the history of Islam, largely due to a lack of necessary documentation. In contrast, Muhammad and the Empire of Faith offered a thorough exploration and comparative analysis of historical narratives concerning the Prophet's Sīrah. The author aimed to provide an accurate portrayal of Prophet Muhammad's life and the history of Islam while identifying shortcomings in existing studies, particularly regarding the presentation of Sīrah narrators and the incomplete integration of Shia thought. Shan Anthony's approach represented a novel and integrative framework in Islamic studies, emphasizing a synthesis of traditional and modern methodologies. Scholars advocated for a strategic approach to Islamic studies that embraced a dual perspective on both Sunni and Shia sources, as well as non-Islamic sources. This methodology involved a deep critique and analysis of these sources to foster more positive outcomes in the fields of Sīrah and Islamic history. Discussion of Results & Conclusion Since the initial contact between Europeans and the Islamic world, two prominent intellectual trends—extreme and moderate—have emerged within Islamic studies. Each of these currents possesses distinct characteristics and competes in the academic arena, striving to promote its perspectives through the publication of key works. Starting in the 1970s, as extremist activities intensified, a new movement emerged within this discourse, which was known as the "Revisionist Movement". This movement introduced radical, revisionist, and skeptical ideas, offering a novel approach to Islamic studies. Hagarism authored by Crone and Cook has become a seminal text in the realm of religious critique and represents a stark contrast to moderate approaches as it presents significant studies confronting innovative and modern skeptical viewpoints. In this context, Sean Anthony’s Muhammad and the Empire of Faith stands out as a valuable and influential work, aiming to present a clear and systematic portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad's life and conduct through an integrated study of the tradition. While the book has its shortcomings—particularly in its incomplete introduction to the tradition and its reliance on Shia sources for narratives of the Prophet’s wars—it nonetheless contributes significantly to the discourse. Reviews of Hagarism indicated that it was heavily influenced by post-modern discourse, to the extent that the authors often failed to substantiate their claims with scientific evidence. Consequently, the compilation of the Prophet's Sīrah and the history of Islam in this work appeared chaotic and lacking in proper documentation. In contrast, Sean Anthony’s approach to Islamic studies was both innovative and integrative, emphasizing the fusion of traditional and modern methods. Scholars advocated for a strategic perspective within Islamic studies that encompassed both Sunni and Shia sources, along with non-Islamic sources. This comprehensive approach entailed a deep critique and analysis of these sources to achieve more positive results in the fields of the Sīrah and Islamic history. Abstract In the realm of Orientalist scholarship, Islamic studies can be divided into two primary streams: revisionism and moderation. The book Hagarism co-authored by Crone and Cook represents a revisionist perspective, while Sean Anthony's Muhammad and the Empire of Faith adopts a more moderate stance. Both works aim to redefine the Prophet’s Sīrah and the history of Islam for contemporary audiences. This research employed a critical and analytical approach to library sources to re-evaluate the Sīrah and Islamic history from the viewpoints of both revisionist and moderate authors. It addressed the question: What differences and similarities emerge between Hagarism and Muhammad and the Empire of Faith in their redefinitions of the Sīrah and Islamic history? The study operated under the hypothesis that Hagarism as a critical intellectual trend utilized revisionist methodologies in Islamic historical studies, fostering an extreme and skeptical perspective towards Sīrah sources and Islamic history. This trend encompassed both Islamic and non-Islamic sources to construct new narratives. In contrast, Muhammad and the Empire of Faith offered a moderate examination of the Sīrah grounded in historical analysis of its sources. Keywords: Orientalists, Islamic Studies, Revisionist, Moderate, Sīrah and History of Islamic Research. Introduction Since their initial contact with the Islamic world, Western scholars have sought a deeper understanding of the history, culture, and civilization of the East and Islam. This interest has fostered the emergence of fields, such as Oriental studies and Islamic studies, in Europe. In the 9th and 10th centuries CE, European priests and translators engaged with the Islamic world, notably through their travels to Islamic Spain to study in schools. This interaction facilitated the examination and translation of significant Muslim scientific texts. However, non-specialist translators, such as Raymond Armar, often hindered this quest for knowledge. Their inaccurate translations and the proliferation of books filled with myths, distortions, and falsehoods about Islam and the Prophet contributed to the emergence of misleading narratives within Islamic studies. This situation underscored the need for accuracy and rigorous scrutiny in the field as it developed (Najī, 1981, pp. 86-90). Contemporary Islamic studies featured two prominent currents: revisionist and moderate (Rafie, 2017, p. 261). This research adopted an analytical and critical approach to re-examining the Sīrah of the Prophet and the history of Islam as presented in two key works: Hagarism and Muhammad and the Empire of Faith. The objective was to identify the differences and similarities between these two texts regarding the Sīrah and Islamic history. The present study explored varying approaches to Islamic history by comparing Hagarism and Muhammad and the Empire of Faith. The hypothesis posited that Hagarism offered an extreme and skeptical perspective on Islamic history reflective of the revisionist trend, whereas Muhammad and the Empire of Faith aimed to present a balanced and redefined portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad's Sīrah and Islamic history through a moderate lens. Materials & Methods This research employed a critical and analytical approach, utilizing library resources to examine the texts of two significant works in the field of Sīrah studies and Islamic history. It identified notable similarities and differences between the two books, which were discussed under the following headings: a) The study advocated for the incorporation of scientific data from non-Islamic contemporary historical sources pertaining to the Islamic period to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the era; b) It critiqued the perspective that considered the Sīrah (the traditions concerning the life of Prophet Muhammad) as an unreliable historical narrative; c) The research explored the contrasting views of "revisionists" and "moderates" in their evaluations of Islamic history; d) It also addressed the themes of Islamic culture and civilization. Research Findings The findings of this research revealed a prominent revisionist approach within the post-modern discourse of the book Hagarism. The authors of this work struggled to substantiate their claims with scientific evidence, resulting in a disorganized presentation of the Prophet's Sīrah and the history of Islam, largely due to a lack of necessary documentation. In contrast, Muhammad and the Empire of Faith offered a thorough exploration and comparative analysis of historical narratives concerning the Prophet's Sīrah. The author aimed to provide an accurate portrayal of Prophet Muhammad's life and the history of Islam while identifying shortcomings in existing studies, particularly regarding the presentation of Sīrah narrators and the incomplete integration of Shia thought. Shan Anthony's approach represented a novel and integrative framework in Islamic studies, emphasizing a synthesis of traditional and modern methodologies. Scholars advocated for a strategic approach to Islamic studies that embraced a dual perspective on both Sunni and Shia sources, as well as non-Islamic sources. This methodology involved a deep critique and analysis of these sources to foster more positive outcomes in the fields of Sīrah and Islamic history. Discussion of Results & Conclusion Since the initial contact between Europeans and the Islamic world, two prominent intellectual trends—extreme and moderate—have emerged within Islamic studies. Each of these currents possesses distinct characteristics and competes in the academic arena, striving to promote its perspectives through the publication of key works. Starting in the 1970s, as extremist activities intensified, a new movement emerged within this discourse, which was known as the "Revisionist Movement". This movement introduced radical, revisionist, and skeptical ideas, offering a novel approach to Islamic studies. Hagarism authored by Crone and Cook has become a seminal text in the realm of religious critique and represents a stark contrast to moderate approaches as it presents significant studies confronting innovative and modern skeptical viewpoints. In this context, Sean Anthony’s Muhammad and the Empire of Faith stands out as a valuable and influential work, aiming to present a clear and systematic portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad's life and conduct through an integrated study of the tradition. While the book has its shortcomings—particularly in its incomplete introduction to the tradition and its reliance on Shia sources for narratives of the Prophet’s wars—it nonetheless contributes significantly to the discourse. Reviews of Hagarism indicated that it was heavily influenced by post-modern discourse, to the extent that the authors often failed to substantiate their claims with scientific evidence. Consequently, the compilation of the Prophet's Sīrah and the history of Islam in this work appeared chaotic and lacking in proper documentation. In contrast, Sean Anthony’s approach to Islamic studies was both innovative and integrative, emphasizing the fusion of traditional and modern methods. Scholars advocated for a strategic perspective within Islamic studies that encompassed both Sunni and Shia sources, along with non-Islamic sources. This comprehensive approach entailed a deep critique and analysis of these sources to achieve more positive results in the fields of the Sīrah and Islamic history.

https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30268_0c4d33546206d18a770b69720e2ddc79.pdf

University of Isfahan Historical Researches 2008-6253 18 2 2026 06 22 Shah Ismail I and Albuquerque: Investigating the Possibility of a Strategic Alliance to Capture the Hejaz Shah Ismail I and Albuquerque: Investigating the Possibility of a Strategic Alliance to Capture the Hejaz 15 31 30422 10.22108/jhr.2026.148571.2926 FA Mohammad Hassan Rahimian Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Literature, Jahrom University, Jahrom, Iran Journal Article 2026 03 15 Abstract The early 16th century can be regarded as one of the most sensitive periods of power reconfiguration in the Islamic world and the global trade system. During this era, alongside the consolidation of the Safavid rule under Shah Ismail I in Iran and the expansion of Portuguese naval power in the Indian Ocean under Albuquerque, traditional power structures in Western Asia faced serious challenges. This historical convergence created the possibility of an alliance between the Safavids and Portugal against the Mamluks. In this context, the Hejaz emerged as the center of religious and political legitimacy in the Islamic world, and control over the holy sites of Mecca and Medina represented symbolic capital, which the Safavid rulers claimed through the title of "Servants of the Two Holy Sanctuaries". For Shah Ismail, gaining control over the Hejaz could serve as a tool to redefine legitimacy equations. On the other hand, the Portuguese sought to dominate the Red Sea and weaken the Mamluk state of Egypt in order to monopolize the spice trade and achieve their religious mission of Christianization. Thus, weakening the Mamluks and securing control over the Hejaz became a point of convergence between Shah Ismail and Albuquerque, prompting efforts toward joint action. However, practical limitations arising from the region's complex geopolitics, along with the early intervention of Sultan Selim I, ultimately prevented the realization of this plan. Keywords: Alliance, Albuquerque, Conquest of Hejaz, Shah Ismail, Ottoman, Qansuh. Introduction At the time of the rise of Shah Ismail I, the world was undergoing fundamental transformations. Only a few years had passed since the discovery of the American continent by Cristoforo Colombo; Vasco da Gama had recently opened the European sea route to India by rounding the Cape of Good Hope; and only a short time had elapsed since the expulsion of Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. The expansion of the Portuguese maritime route around the African continent had a direct impact on developments in Iran, as the Portuguese, by establishing themselves in the Persian Gulf, laid the foundations of their maritime and colonial empire, and extended their rivalries and conflicts with the Ottomans and the Mamluks from Europe to Asia. The struggle to control the strategic straits of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal created intense competition among the great powers, the consequences of which directly affected Safavid Iran. Having failed to gain the favor of the Venetians in order to confront the Ottomans, Shah Ismail decided to seek an alliance with the Portuguese. However, was this alliance formed specifically to counter the Ottomans? Previous scholarship has identified opposition to the Ottomans as Ismail’s objective, but the present study contends that Shah Ismail was, in fact, seeking to conquer the holy sites of the Hejaz. This goal is perfectly aligned with the aims of Albuquerque, the Portuguese commander in Asia, who dreamed of weakening the Mamluks and dominating the Red Sea—both to control the main maritime spice routes, which were under Mamluk control, and to realize the messianic religiosity of the Portuguese king. Shah Ismail, who on religious grounds considered it his legitimate right to dominate the Hejaz, accepted Albuquerque’s proposal to launch a joint operation to attack the Hejaz. This endeavor ultimately remained inconclusive due to Ottoman preemption and the death of Albuquerque. Materials and Methods This study employs a comparative historical method based on library research. Primary and secondary sources in three languages—Persian, Italian, and English—formed the core of the investigation. Persian materials included Safavid court chronicles and diplomatic correspondence related to Shah Ismail I. Italian and Portuguese sources comprised letters, naval reports, and memoranda from Alfonso de Albuquerque and his contemporaries, accessed through digital archives of the National Libraries of Portugal and Italy. English-language sources provided secondary analyses and compiled documentary collections. Data collection followed a systematic library-based procedure. All relevant documents were identified through keyword searches in historical databases and physical manuscript collections. Information pertaining to the proposed military cooperation, including dates, locations, troop movements, and diplomatic exchanges between Shah Ismail and Albuquerque, was extracted and organized into thematic tables. The analytical phase consisted of a rigorous cross-comparison of the three source groups. Discrepancies—particularly regarding the chronology of negotiations and the scope of the proposed Hejaz campaign—were examined by evaluating each source's provenance, authorial bias, and internal consistency. A critical synthesis was constructed by prioritizing information corroborated by at least two independent sources from different linguistic traditions, while accounting for the geopolitical context of the early 10th century AH / 16th century CE. All citations follow standard academic formatting. Research Findings The cross-comparative analysis of Persian, Italian, and English sources reveals a coherent yet ultimately failed strategic alignment between Shah Ismail I and Afonso de Albuquerque regarding the Hejaz. The findings confirm that following the establishment of Safavid rule and the officialization of Twelver Shi'ism in Iran, Shah Ismail actively sought religious legitimacy. This pursuit manifested in a territorial ambition toward the Hejaz, particularly the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as controlling these cities was a common aspiration among contemporary Muslim rulers. Evidence from Persian court documents indicates that Ismail directly petitioned the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, claiming rightful succession to Ali ibn Abi Talib as the basis for transferring control of the Hejaz to Safavid authority. Concurrently, Portuguese sources reveal that Albuquerque harbored both religious and political motivations, seeking to capture the Hejaz with the intention of exchanging it for Jerusalem. The comparative synthesis demonstrates a convergence of interests: both leaders independently desired control over the region, leading to a proposed alliance. However, the most significant finding is the chronological disruption caused by external intervention. While Safavid-Portuguese negotiations were underway, Ottoman Sultan Selim I acted preemptively. According to cross-referenced accounts, Selim's campaign resulted in the conquest of Egypt and subsequent Ottoman domination over the Hejaz. This development rendered the proposed Safavid-Portuguese alliance logistically and politically obsolete. No source evidence suggests that any military coordination materialized. The research concludes that although the alliance was strategically rational and mutually beneficial, Ottoman military superiority and rapid expansion permanently foreclosed any possibility of Safavid or Portuguese control over the holy cities during this period. Discussion of Results and Conclusions Shah Ismail and Albuquerque encountered each other at a historical juncture when initial confrontations might have been expected to lead to lasting enmity. However, Shah Ismail, engaged as he was with the Uzbeks and the Ottomans on his northern and western frontiers, had no desire to open a new front against himself in the south, for he lacked the naval force to confront the battle‑hardened Portuguese. On the other hand, Albuquerque—who, owing to negative Ottoman propaganda against the Safavids, regarded Shah Ismail and the Qizilbash as enemies of the (Sunni) Ottomans and Mamluks—nevertheless extended his hand toward an alliance in order to achieve his economic goals and religious messianism. Their common ground could lie in gaining control over the Hejaz and its holy sites, which would confer legitimacy upon Shah Ismail and, for Albuquerque, bring dominance over the Red Sea and the commercial choke point of the Mamluks—although some accounts also suggest that Albuquerque contemplated seizing Mecca and exchanging it for Jerusalem. Shah Ismail endeavored, through correspondence with Qansuh al-Ghawri, to prove, on religious grounds, his legitimacy to rule Egypt and the holy places of the Hejaz and the Levant. Albuquerque, for his part, undertook operations to capture Aden and parts of Yemen, which ended in failure. The joint operation of Ismail and Albuquerque was never launched due to the death of the Portuguese admiral; and when Shah Ismail sought to pursue the plan with Albuquerque’s successors, Sultan Selim I attacked Egypt, overthrew the Mamluks, and assumed full control over Egypt and the Hejaz. He could now claim leadership of the Islamic world under the title of Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn (Servant of the Two Holy Sanctuaries). Abstract The early 16th century can be regarded as one of the most sensitive periods of power reconfiguration in the Islamic world and the global trade system. During this era, alongside the consolidation of the Safavid rule under Shah Ismail I in Iran and the expansion of Portuguese naval power in the Indian Ocean under Albuquerque, traditional power structures in Western Asia faced serious challenges. This historical convergence created the possibility of an alliance between the Safavids and Portugal against the Mamluks. In this context, the Hejaz emerged as the center of religious and political legitimacy in the Islamic world, and control over the holy sites of Mecca and Medina represented symbolic capital, which the Safavid rulers claimed through the title of "Servants of the Two Holy Sanctuaries". For Shah Ismail, gaining control over the Hejaz could serve as a tool to redefine legitimacy equations. On the other hand, the Portuguese sought to dominate the Red Sea and weaken the Mamluk state of Egypt in order to monopolize the spice trade and achieve their religious mission of Christianization. Thus, weakening the Mamluks and securing control over the Hejaz became a point of convergence between Shah Ismail and Albuquerque, prompting efforts toward joint action. However, practical limitations arising from the region's complex geopolitics, along with the early intervention of Sultan Selim I, ultimately prevented the realization of this plan. Keywords: Alliance, Albuquerque, Conquest of Hejaz, Shah Ismail, Ottoman, Qansuh. Introduction At the time of the rise of Shah Ismail I, the world was undergoing fundamental transformations. Only a few years had passed since the discovery of the American continent by Cristoforo Colombo; Vasco da Gama had recently opened the European sea route to India by rounding the Cape of Good Hope; and only a short time had elapsed since the expulsion of Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. The expansion of the Portuguese maritime route around the African continent had a direct impact on developments in Iran, as the Portuguese, by establishing themselves in the Persian Gulf, laid the foundations of their maritime and colonial empire, and extended their rivalries and conflicts with the Ottomans and the Mamluks from Europe to Asia. The struggle to control the strategic straits of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal created intense competition among the great powers, the consequences of which directly affected Safavid Iran. Having failed to gain the favor of the Venetians in order to confront the Ottomans, Shah Ismail decided to seek an alliance with the Portuguese. However, was this alliance formed specifically to counter the Ottomans? Previous scholarship has identified opposition to the Ottomans as Ismail’s objective, but the present study contends that Shah Ismail was, in fact, seeking to conquer the holy sites of the Hejaz. This goal is perfectly aligned with the aims of Albuquerque, the Portuguese commander in Asia, who dreamed of weakening the Mamluks and dominating the Red Sea—both to control the main maritime spice routes, which were under Mamluk control, and to realize the messianic religiosity of the Portuguese king. Shah Ismail, who on religious grounds considered it his legitimate right to dominate the Hejaz, accepted Albuquerque’s proposal to launch a joint operation to attack the Hejaz. This endeavor ultimately remained inconclusive due to Ottoman preemption and the death of Albuquerque. Materials and Methods This study employs a comparative historical method based on library research. Primary and secondary sources in three languages—Persian, Italian, and English—formed the core of the investigation. Persian materials included Safavid court chronicles and diplomatic correspondence related to Shah Ismail I. Italian and Portuguese sources comprised letters, naval reports, and memoranda from Alfonso de Albuquerque and his contemporaries, accessed through digital archives of the National Libraries of Portugal and Italy. English-language sources provided secondary analyses and compiled documentary collections. Data collection followed a systematic library-based procedure. All relevant documents were identified through keyword searches in historical databases and physical manuscript collections. Information pertaining to the proposed military cooperation, including dates, locations, troop movements, and diplomatic exchanges between Shah Ismail and Albuquerque, was extracted and organized into thematic tables. The analytical phase consisted of a rigorous cross-comparison of the three source groups. Discrepancies—particularly regarding the chronology of negotiations and the scope of the proposed Hejaz campaign—were examined by evaluating each source's provenance, authorial bias, and internal consistency. A critical synthesis was constructed by prioritizing information corroborated by at least two independent sources from different linguistic traditions, while accounting for the geopolitical context of the early 10th century AH / 16th century CE. All citations follow standard academic formatting. Research Findings The cross-comparative analysis of Persian, Italian, and English sources reveals a coherent yet ultimately failed strategic alignment between Shah Ismail I and Afonso de Albuquerque regarding the Hejaz. The findings confirm that following the establishment of Safavid rule and the officialization of Twelver Shi'ism in Iran, Shah Ismail actively sought religious legitimacy. This pursuit manifested in a territorial ambition toward the Hejaz, particularly the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as controlling these cities was a common aspiration among contemporary Muslim rulers. Evidence from Persian court documents indicates that Ismail directly petitioned the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, claiming rightful succession to Ali ibn Abi Talib as the basis for transferring control of the Hejaz to Safavid authority. Concurrently, Portuguese sources reveal that Albuquerque harbored both religious and political motivations, seeking to capture the Hejaz with the intention of exchanging it for Jerusalem. The comparative synthesis demonstrates a convergence of interests: both leaders independently desired control over the region, leading to a proposed alliance. However, the most significant finding is the chronological disruption caused by external intervention. While Safavid-Portuguese negotiations were underway, Ottoman Sultan Selim I acted preemptively. According to cross-referenced accounts, Selim's campaign resulted in the conquest of Egypt and subsequent Ottoman domination over the Hejaz. This development rendered the proposed Safavid-Portuguese alliance logistically and politically obsolete. No source evidence suggests that any military coordination materialized. The research concludes that although the alliance was strategically rational and mutually beneficial, Ottoman military superiority and rapid expansion permanently foreclosed any possibility of Safavid or Portuguese control over the holy cities during this period. Discussion of Results and Conclusions Shah Ismail and Albuquerque encountered each other at a historical juncture when initial confrontations might have been expected to lead to lasting enmity. However, Shah Ismail, engaged as he was with the Uzbeks and the Ottomans on his northern and western frontiers, had no desire to open a new front against himself in the south, for he lacked the naval force to confront the battle‑hardened Portuguese. On the other hand, Albuquerque—who, owing to negative Ottoman propaganda against the Safavids, regarded Shah Ismail and the Qizilbash as enemies of the (Sunni) Ottomans and Mamluks—nevertheless extended his hand toward an alliance in order to achieve his economic goals and religious messianism. Their common ground could lie in gaining control over the Hejaz and its holy sites, which would confer legitimacy upon Shah Ismail and, for Albuquerque, bring dominance over the Red Sea and the commercial choke point of the Mamluks—although some accounts also suggest that Albuquerque contemplated seizing Mecca and exchanging it for Jerusalem. Shah Ismail endeavored, through correspondence with Qansuh al-Ghawri, to prove, on religious grounds, his legitimacy to rule Egypt and the holy places of the Hejaz and the Levant. Albuquerque, for his part, undertook operations to capture Aden and parts of Yemen, which ended in failure. The joint operation of Ismail and Albuquerque was never launched due to the death of the Portuguese admiral; and when Shah Ismail sought to pursue the plan with Albuquerque’s successors, Sultan Selim I attacked Egypt, overthrew the Mamluks, and assumed full control over Egypt and the Hejaz. He could now claim leadership of the Islamic world under the title of Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn (Servant of the Two Holy Sanctuaries).

https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30422_22ca50cd07a8b85272f9f7cc1cb5abbd.pdf

University of Isfahan Historical Researches 2008-6253 18 2 2026 06 22 The Role of the Ata'ish Family in the Developments of Ismailism in Iran (Fifth Century AH) The Role of the Ata'ish Family in the Developments of Ismailism in Iran (Fifth Century AH) 33 51 30449 10.22108/jhr.2026.148676.2933 FA Mohamadali Chelongar Professor of History, Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran Mina Tavakoli M.A. in Islamic History, Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran Journal Article 2026 04 19 Abstract This study examines the role of the Attashid family (Abd al-Malik and Ahmad b. Abd al-Malik) in the development of the Ismailis in Iran during the fifth century AH. Relying on a descriptive-analytical method and a critical examination of historical sources, it analyzes how the da’wa was organized within the hostile environment of Isfahan and how limited political structures were formed in Shadhzad. The primary research question asks: How was the Attashid family able to create a network of da’is in the heart of the Seljuk domain, and what were the factors behind the rise and fall of their rule? The findings indicate that Abd al-Malik Attash, through strategies based on taqiyya (dissimulation) and internal organization, succeeded in consolidating the Ismaili presence in Isfahan, although direct evidence regarding the "transfer of the da’wa center" from Egypt to Iran during this period is limited. Ahmad b. Abd al-Malik, leveraging Seljuk crises, established a local emirate in Shadhzad. Although this polity collapsed due to structural weaknesses and religious pressures, it represented a valuable experience of Ismaili governance in Iran. Ultimately, this research concludes that the era of the Attashids was a pivotal period in the localization and politicization of Ismailism in Iran. While it cannot be considered the direct origin of the organizational structure of the Nizari Ismaili state of Alamut, it served as a precursor to the subsequent emergence of Ismailism in Iran by creating favorable social and political conditions. Keywords: Abd alMalik ibn Ata'ish, Ahmad ibn Abd alMalik Ata'ish, Fatimid Caliphate, Ismaili Da'wah Iran, Isfahan. Introduction This research explores the development of Ismailism in 11th-century Iran, focusing on the ‘Attash family’s influence in Isfahan and the Shahdiz fortress. The objective is to explain how the Ismaili da‘wa was organized within a hostile environment and to analyze the factors behind the rise, continuity, and decline of the ‘Attashid network. The central issue is how the ‘Attash family established an effective missionary network in the heart of the Seljuk realm, yet ultimately failed to achieve sustainable political power. This study investigates the mechanisms behind their ascent and the causes of their eventual downfall. The significance of this research lies in clarifying the link between the da‘wa as a social mechanism and practical local authority, providing insights into the subsequent evolution of Ismailism in Iran. The study’s limitations stem from fragmented historical sources and a lack of direct data on the mission’s inner workings. While existing literature focuses on the macro-history of Ismailism, this research offers a critical analysis of the ‘Attash family’s specific role. The research questions are: What were Abd al-Malik ‘Attash’s strategies for stabilizing the mission? How did the ‘Attashids’ relationship with the Fatimid caliphate and the Seljuks shape the orientation and organization of the mission? What factors led to the ‘Attashids’ collapse and influenced the Ismaili movement’s future trajectory? Materials and Methods This research adopts a historical-analytical approach, using a descriptive method to investigate the role and standing of the Attash family within the developments of Persian Ismailism during the 5th century AH. Due to the subject matter and the scarcity of primary sources, the study primarily focuses on analyzing available historical documents and texts, encompassing both contemporary accounts and later scholarly research. The study endeavors to present a holistic view of the Ismaili da’wah structure in Isfahan, detailing the family’s political and religious engagements with the Fatimid Caliphate, the Seljuk state, and the local populace. It will also trace the evolution towards their practical autonomy and subsequent collapse. A comparative methodology will be utilized to juxtapose the interactions and power plays among the Fatimids, Abbasids, and Seljuks, assessing their influence on the destiny of Ismailis in Isfahan. To address the research questions, the historical backdrop of 5th-century Iran and the wider Islamic world will be delineated. Subsequently, the organizational endeavors of Abd al-Malik Attash and his son Ahmad’s attempts to establish a de facto state in Shahidz will be scrutinized, based on historical records. Finally, the research will conclude by analyzing the factors behind their conflicts and the socio-political elements contributing to their downfall. This comprehensive approach aims to yield a profound and thorough understanding of this pivotal era in Ismaili history in Persia. Research Findings The activities of the Attash family (Abdul Malik and Ahmad ibn Abdul Malik) in the 5th century AH represent a pivotal turning point in Iranian Ismaili history, signifying a transition from a covert da’wah (mission) to a quasi-political structure. Research suggests this era was crucial for the “localization and politicization” of the da’wah. Abdul Malik Attash, utilizing taqiyya and organizational prowess, established a stable network of da’is (missionaries) in Isfahan, solidifying the Ismaili presence. While direct evidence of a complete shift in the da’wah’s central leadership from Egypt to Iran is limited for this period, his efforts laid the groundwork for a more localized and politically engaged movement. Ahmad ibn Abdul Malik Attash strategically exploited the Seljuk internal crises to create a quasi-governmental structure in the Shahdez region. This marked a significant practical step towards Ismaili autonomy and early governance experiments in Iran. The downfall of this structure was attributed to several factors. The growing Ismaili influence provoked strong political and religious opposition from the Seljuks and the Sunni population of Isfahan. Furthermore, the siege of Shahdez and internal structural limitations, including a lack of institutional cohesion and insufficient military power, contributed to its collapse. Despite its unfortunate end, the Attashi era was historically vital. It played a crucial role in forging a distinct Iranian Ismaili identity, revealing the community’s political, social, and organizational potential, and paving the way for the later Nizari state of Alamut. Discussion of Results and Conclusions This research highlights the significant role of the Attash family, particularly Abdul Malik and Ahmad ibn Abdul Malik, in Iranian Ismaili developments during the 5th century AH, demonstrating their influence extended beyond a local branch. Abdul Malik Attash, employing taqiyya, organized a da’wah network in the hostile environment of Isfahan, elevating Ismailism from a hidden activity to a cohesive, localized movement. This fostered a more distinct Iranian Ismaili identity and reduced practical reliance on the Fatimid center. Ahmad ibn Abdul Malik Attash further advanced this by establishing a quasi-governmental structure in Shahdez, exploiting Seljuk political weakness. This marked the first instance of practical Ismaili autonomy within Seljuk territory. The research also explains the failure of this experiment: intense opposition from the Sunni and Shi’i communities of Isfahan, religious mobilization against Ismailis, Seljuk political pressure, and internal da’wah limitations all contributed to the Attashis’ fall. However, their historical importance transcends their defeat. This era created the social, political, and ideological foundations for the later emergence of the Nizaris in Iran and the shift of the da’wah’s center to Alamut. Thus, the Attashi era represents a crucial transitional phase, marking a turning point in Ismailism’s evolution from a hidden network to an influential force in Iranian history, establishing the groundwork for Ismaili independence and a unique Iranian identity. Abstract This study examines the role of the Attashid family (Abd al-Malik and Ahmad b. Abd al-Malik) in the development of the Ismailis in Iran during the fifth century AH. Relying on a descriptive-analytical method and a critical examination of historical sources, it analyzes how the da’wa was organized within the hostile environment of Isfahan and how limited political structures were formed in Shadhzad. The primary research question asks: How was the Attashid family able to create a network of da’is in the heart of the Seljuk domain, and what were the factors behind the rise and fall of their rule? The findings indicate that Abd al-Malik Attash, through strategies based on taqiyya (dissimulation) and internal organization, succeeded in consolidating the Ismaili presence in Isfahan, although direct evidence regarding the "transfer of the da’wa center" from Egypt to Iran during this period is limited. Ahmad b. Abd al-Malik, leveraging Seljuk crises, established a local emirate in Shadhzad. Although this polity collapsed due to structural weaknesses and religious pressures, it represented a valuable experience of Ismaili governance in Iran. Ultimately, this research concludes that the era of the Attashids was a pivotal period in the localization and politicization of Ismailism in Iran. While it cannot be considered the direct origin of the organizational structure of the Nizari Ismaili state of Alamut, it served as a precursor to the subsequent emergence of Ismailism in Iran by creating favorable social and political conditions. Keywords: Abd alMalik ibn Ata'ish, Ahmad ibn Abd alMalik Ata'ish, Fatimid Caliphate, Ismaili Da'wah Iran, Isfahan. Introduction This research explores the development of Ismailism in 11th-century Iran, focusing on the ‘Attash family’s influence in Isfahan and the Shahdiz fortress. The objective is to explain how the Ismaili da‘wa was organized within a hostile environment and to analyze the factors behind the rise, continuity, and decline of the ‘Attashid network. The central issue is how the ‘Attash family established an effective missionary network in the heart of the Seljuk realm, yet ultimately failed to achieve sustainable political power. This study investigates the mechanisms behind their ascent and the causes of their eventual downfall. The significance of this research lies in clarifying the link between the da‘wa as a social mechanism and practical local authority, providing insights into the subsequent evolution of Ismailism in Iran. The study’s limitations stem from fragmented historical sources and a lack of direct data on the mission’s inner workings. While existing literature focuses on the macro-history of Ismailism, this research offers a critical analysis of the ‘Attash family’s specific role. The research questions are: What were Abd al-Malik ‘Attash’s strategies for stabilizing the mission? How did the ‘Attashids’ relationship with the Fatimid caliphate and the Seljuks shape the orientation and organization of the mission? What factors led to the ‘Attashids’ collapse and influenced the Ismaili movement’s future trajectory? Materials and Methods This research adopts a historical-analytical approach, using a descriptive method to investigate the role and standing of the Attash family within the developments of Persian Ismailism during the 5th century AH. Due to the subject matter and the scarcity of primary sources, the study primarily focuses on analyzing available historical documents and texts, encompassing both contemporary accounts and later scholarly research. The study endeavors to present a holistic view of the Ismaili da’wah structure in Isfahan, detailing the family’s political and religious engagements with the Fatimid Caliphate, the Seljuk state, and the local populace. It will also trace the evolution towards their practical autonomy and subsequent collapse. A comparative methodology will be utilized to juxtapose the interactions and power plays among the Fatimids, Abbasids, and Seljuks, assessing their influence on the destiny of Ismailis in Isfahan. To address the research questions, the historical backdrop of 5th-century Iran and the wider Islamic world will be delineated. Subsequently, the organizational endeavors of Abd al-Malik Attash and his son Ahmad’s attempts to establish a de facto state in Shahidz will be scrutinized, based on historical records. Finally, the research will conclude by analyzing the factors behind their conflicts and the socio-political elements contributing to their downfall. This comprehensive approach aims to yield a profound and thorough understanding of this pivotal era in Ismaili history in Persia. Research Findings The activities of the Attash family (Abdul Malik and Ahmad ibn Abdul Malik) in the 5th century AH represent a pivotal turning point in Iranian Ismaili history, signifying a transition from a covert da’wah (mission) to a quasi-political structure. Research suggests this era was crucial for the “localization and politicization” of the da’wah. Abdul Malik Attash, utilizing taqiyya and organizational prowess, established a stable network of da’is (missionaries) in Isfahan, solidifying the Ismaili presence. While direct evidence of a complete shift in the da’wah’s central leadership from Egypt to Iran is limited for this period, his efforts laid the groundwork for a more localized and politically engaged movement. Ahmad ibn Abdul Malik Attash strategically exploited the Seljuk internal crises to create a quasi-governmental structure in the Shahdez region. This marked a significant practical step towards Ismaili autonomy and early governance experiments in Iran. The downfall of this structure was attributed to several factors. The growing Ismaili influence provoked strong political and religious opposition from the Seljuks and the Sunni population of Isfahan. Furthermore, the siege of Shahdez and internal structural limitations, including a lack of institutional cohesion and insufficient military power, contributed to its collapse. Despite its unfortunate end, the Attashi era was historically vital. It played a crucial role in forging a distinct Iranian Ismaili identity, revealing the community’s political, social, and organizational potential, and paving the way for the later Nizari state of Alamut. Discussion of Results and Conclusions This research highlights the significant role of the Attash family, particularly Abdul Malik and Ahmad ibn Abdul Malik, in Iranian Ismaili developments during the 5th century AH, demonstrating their influence extended beyond a local branch. Abdul Malik Attash, employing taqiyya, organized a da’wah network in the hostile environment of Isfahan, elevating Ismailism from a hidden activity to a cohesive, localized movement. This fostered a more distinct Iranian Ismaili identity and reduced practical reliance on the Fatimid center. Ahmad ibn Abdul Malik Attash further advanced this by establishing a quasi-governmental structure in Shahdez, exploiting Seljuk political weakness. This marked the first instance of practical Ismaili autonomy within Seljuk territory. The research also explains the failure of this experiment: intense opposition from the Sunni and Shi’i communities of Isfahan, religious mobilization against Ismailis, Seljuk political pressure, and internal da’wah limitations all contributed to the Attashis’ fall. However, their historical importance transcends their defeat. This era created the social, political, and ideological foundations for the later emergence of the Nizaris in Iran and the shift of the da’wah’s center to Alamut. Thus, the Attashi era represents a crucial transitional phase, marking a turning point in Ismailism’s evolution from a hidden network to an influential force in Iranian history, establishing the groundwork for Ismaili independence and a unique Iranian identity.

https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30449_3394b680098fd9e7fde359996e95eab0.pdf

University of Isfahan Historical Researches 2008-6253 18 2 2026 06 22 The Historical Process of the Zionist Regime's Domination over Palestinian Water Resources The Historical Process of the Zionist Regime's Domination over Palestinian Water Resources 53 69 30461 10.22108/jhr.2026.148296.2907 FA Seyyed Reza Mahdinejad Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Civilization History, Faculty of History, Biography and Islamic Civilization, Al-Mustafa International University, Qom, Iran 0000-0002-9828-7120 Ramadan Ali Shirzad PhD Student in Contemporary History of the Islamic World, Department of Islamic Civilization History, Faculty of History, Biography and Islamic Civilization, Al-Mustafa International University, Qom, Iran Journal Article 2026 02 08 Abstract Water, land, and manpower constitute the three main pillars of the Zionist regime’s national security. Therefore, since the beginning of the formation of this illegitimate regime, special plans and programs have been on the agenda of this regime to dominate the water resources of Palestine and the surrounding areas, and it has progressed step by step in this direction. In this study, using a descriptive-analytical method, we attempt to answer this question: how and in what historical process did the Zionist regime gain control over the water resources of Palestine and its surrounding region? The findings of the study show that Israel’s water dominance over the water resources of Palestine and its surrounding area is rooted in the ideology of Zionism, and its preliminaries began with Zionist plans and programs during the Mandate period, expanded and consolidated after the establishment of Israel and the 1948 war with territorial control and property plans and laws, and reached its peak through military laws after the 1967 war. The Oslo Accords of the 1990s not only failed to rectify the existing situation but, on the contrary, institutionalized it in a new legal framework. Finally, from 2000 onwards, the structural discrimination and water apartheid that had been formed in the previous stages became much more widespread. The ultimate goal of this process is to impose increasing restrictions and pressure on the Palestinians and to pave the way for the completion of the Zionist colonial project and the complete occupation of the Palestinian land. Keywords: Palestine, Zionist Regime, Water, Hydropolitics, Hydro-Hegemony, Environmental Colonialism, Water Apartheid. Introduction The Zionist regime has, from the outset, defined the management and control of water as one of the fundamental pillars of its survival and as a tool for expanding its regional hegemony. This policy has been shaped based on several simultaneous layers: first, the ideological and identity layer; second, the legal and structural layer. Alongside these, military and geographical tools have also played a decisive role. At another level, technological and diplomatic capacities have been employed on a regional scale. This process began even before the establishment of the Zionist regime with the formation of Zionist hydro-ideology and has since passed through several stages, progressively augmenting this regime's domination over Palestinian water resources. The main research question of the present study is: How and through what historical-operational process has the Zionist regime established its domination over the water resources of Palestine and its surrounding region? A review of the literature indicates that foreign studies have primarily focused on the role of water in Middle East peace negotiations, economic-environmental dimensions, and Israel's internal security. In contrast, a significant portion of domestic works have criticized Israel's water policies and their consequences for regional security and the Islamic world. None of the aforementioned works has examined the historical process and how the Zionist regime's domination over Palestinian water resources. The present study attempts to examine and analyze how the Zionist regime's domination over Palestinian water resources occurred within a historical process. Materials and Methods The present research has been developed using a descriptive, analytical, and historical approach. In this research, an attempt has been made to use first-hand and reliable sources. Written works and views of Zionist leaders, as well as reliable research conducted in English or Persian in this field, have been the main sources and documents used in this research. Research Findings According to the findings of this study, the Zionist regime's domination over Palestinian water resources has occurred in five stages: Preparations for Water Domination (Pre-1948): In this phase, which began after the Balfour Declaration and the beginning of the Mandate period, water was defined as a vital element in Zionist ideology and the borders of occupied Palestine were determined with special attention to water resources. Subsequently, with the support of British colonialism, laws were passed to centralize water ownership by the Mandate government and institutions such as Mekorot (Israel National Water Company) were established to manage and control water resources, and the purchase of land with water resources and the planning of water transfer projects began. Consolidating Ownership Structures and Control over Water Resources (1948 to 1967): After the official establishment of the State of Israel, according to the Partition Resolution of Palestine, the main water resources were placed in the territory of the Jewish state, paving the way for control of vital resources and the foundation of Israel's water supremacy in the following decades. The 1948 war led to fundamental changes in the water map of the region and provided the necessary infrastructure for the concentration of water resources in the hands of the Zionist regime. Subsequently, the government’s ownership and control over water resources were expanded and consolidated with the passage of laws such as the Land Expropriation Law of 1953 and the Water Resources Law of 1959. The implementation of the National North-South Water Transfer Project between 1953 and 1964 was part of a broader Israeli plan to control regional water resources. With the passage of the Water Law of 1959, ownership of all water resources was transferred to the Israeli government, and much stricter restrictions were imposed on the Palestinians. Complete Concentration of Water Resources (1967 to 1993): The 1967 war was a turning point in the completion of Israel’s water dominance project. By occupying the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, Israel not only expanded its territorial influence but also took complete control of the region’s most important water resources. During this period, Israel, through numerous military decrees, exercised exclusive control over all water resources and projects. At the same time as it developed its water infrastructure, it greatly expanded the exploitation of water resources, putting additional pressure on the Palestinians. Legalizing Inequality and Water Apartheid (1993 to 2000): The Oslo Accords institutionalized existing inequality by establishing a “Joint Water Committee” and Israel’s veto power. The wide gap in per capita water consumption, monopoly control over infrastructure, the water blockade of Gaza, and the sale of water to Palestinians at high prices constitute a “water apartheid” that undermines Palestinian survival and development. Exposing Water Apartheid (2000 to Present): Since the beginning of the 21st century, the water situation in Palestine, especially in the Gaza Strip, has transformed from a structural challenge to a humanitarian disaster. The multi-layered blockade, the environmental crisis, and the use of water technologies as a tool of control have given a new face to Israel’s water dominance, and water apartheid has been revealed in a most gruesome way in occupied Palestine. In summary, this trajectory demonstrates the transformation of water into a strategic tool for consolidating domination over Palestine, altering the demographic fabric, and creating an institutionalized system of discrimination and oppression that has been implemented step by step. Discussion of Results and Conclusions The historical course of the Zionist regime’s domination of Palestinian water resources is a clear example of the expansion of the regime’s occupation and colonization of Palestine. This hegemony, which is rooted in the ideology of Zionism and the thinking of its leaders and pioneers, began with the Zionist plans and programs during the mandate period, was consolidated after the establishment of the regime and the 1948 war, and reached its peak through the martial law after the 1967 war. The Oslo Accords also helped to consolidate and institutionalize this situation through a showy management structure. An analysis of the historical process of the Zionist regime's water dominance shows that this issue has been defined as a cornerstone of Israel's national security from the beginning, and over time, it has transformed from a purely geographical strategy into a multidimensional and institutionalized structure. From the integration of historical and religious narratives, to the hardware development of transmission networks, the military seizure of resources, the legal control of property, and finally the use of advanced technologies, all have advanced towards the consolidation of Israel's water dominance. Israel’s water dominance is one of the main axes of the development and evolution of the occupation of Palestine. By adopting the approach of dominating water resources, the Zionist regime has full control over infrastructure and water allocation policies and has used this tool to consolidate settlements and create structural inequality. The current situation, called water apartheid, has led to a deep gap between Palestinians and Zionists in water consumption. As a result, it has not only changed the amount and method of water consumption, but also the pattern of settlement, agriculture and development in a structural way, leading to the increasing deprivation of Palestinians from water, while the increasing domination of the occupying Zionists over Palestinian water resources. Abstract Water, land, and manpower constitute the three main pillars of the Zionist regime’s national security. Therefore, since the beginning of the formation of this illegitimate regime, special plans and programs have been on the agenda of this regime to dominate the water resources of Palestine and the surrounding areas, and it has progressed step by step in this direction. In this study, using a descriptive-analytical method, we attempt to answer this question: how and in what historical process did the Zionist regime gain control over the water resources of Palestine and its surrounding region? The findings of the study show that Israel’s water dominance over the water resources of Palestine and its surrounding area is rooted in the ideology of Zionism, and its preliminaries began with Zionist plans and programs during the Mandate period, expanded and consolidated after the establishment of Israel and the 1948 war with territorial control and property plans and laws, and reached its peak through military laws after the 1967 war. The Oslo Accords of the 1990s not only failed to rectify the existing situation but, on the contrary, institutionalized it in a new legal framework. Finally, from 2000 onwards, the structural discrimination and water apartheid that had been formed in the previous stages became much more widespread. The ultimate goal of this process is to impose increasing restrictions and pressure on the Palestinians and to pave the way for the completion of the Zionist colonial project and the complete occupation of the Palestinian land. Keywords: Palestine, Zionist Regime, Water, Hydropolitics, Hydro-Hegemony, Environmental Colonialism, Water Apartheid. Introduction The Zionist regime has, from the outset, defined the management and control of water as one of the fundamental pillars of its survival and as a tool for expanding its regional hegemony. This policy has been shaped based on several simultaneous layers: first, the ideological and identity layer; second, the legal and structural layer. Alongside these, military and geographical tools have also played a decisive role. At another level, technological and diplomatic capacities have been employed on a regional scale. This process began even before the establishment of the Zionist regime with the formation of Zionist hydro-ideology and has since passed through several stages, progressively augmenting this regime's domination over Palestinian water resources. The main research question of the present study is: How and through what historical-operational process has the Zionist regime established its domination over the water resources of Palestine and its surrounding region? A review of the literature indicates that foreign studies have primarily focused on the role of water in Middle East peace negotiations, economic-environmental dimensions, and Israel's internal security. In contrast, a significant portion of domestic works have criticized Israel's water policies and their consequences for regional security and the Islamic world. None of the aforementioned works has examined the historical process and how the Zionist regime's domination over Palestinian water resources. The present study attempts to examine and analyze how the Zionist regime's domination over Palestinian water resources occurred within a historical process. Materials and Methods The present research has been developed using a descriptive, analytical, and historical approach. In this research, an attempt has been made to use first-hand and reliable sources. Written works and views of Zionist leaders, as well as reliable research conducted in English or Persian in this field, have been the main sources and documents used in this research. Research Findings According to the findings of this study, the Zionist regime's domination over Palestinian water resources has occurred in five stages: Preparations for Water Domination (Pre-1948): In this phase, which began after the Balfour Declaration and the beginning of the Mandate period, water was defined as a vital element in Zionist ideology and the borders of occupied Palestine were determined with special attention to water resources. Subsequently, with the support of British colonialism, laws were passed to centralize water ownership by the Mandate government and institutions such as Mekorot (Israel National Water Company) were established to manage and control water resources, and the purchase of land with water resources and the planning of water transfer projects began. Consolidating Ownership Structures and Control over Water Resources (1948 to 1967): After the official establishment of the State of Israel, according to the Partition Resolution of Palestine, the main water resources were placed in the territory of the Jewish state, paving the way for control of vital resources and the foundation of Israel's water supremacy in the following decades. The 1948 war led to fundamental changes in the water map of the region and provided the necessary infrastructure for the concentration of water resources in the hands of the Zionist regime. Subsequently, the government’s ownership and control over water resources were expanded and consolidated with the passage of laws such as the Land Expropriation Law of 1953 and the Water Resources Law of 1959. The implementation of the National North-South Water Transfer Project between 1953 and 1964 was part of a broader Israeli plan to control regional water resources. With the passage of the Water Law of 1959, ownership of all water resources was transferred to the Israeli government, and much stricter restrictions were imposed on the Palestinians. Complete Concentration of Water Resources (1967 to 1993): The 1967 war was a turning point in the completion of Israel’s water dominance project. By occupying the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, Israel not only expanded its territorial influence but also took complete control of the region’s most important water resources. During this period, Israel, through numerous military decrees, exercised exclusive control over all water resources and projects. At the same time as it developed its water infrastructure, it greatly expanded the exploitation of water resources, putting additional pressure on the Palestinians. Legalizing Inequality and Water Apartheid (1993 to 2000): The Oslo Accords institutionalized existing inequality by establishing a “Joint Water Committee” and Israel’s veto power. The wide gap in per capita water consumption, monopoly control over infrastructure, the water blockade of Gaza, and the sale of water to Palestinians at high prices constitute a “water apartheid” that undermines Palestinian survival and development. Exposing Water Apartheid (2000 to Present): Since the beginning of the 21st century, the water situation in Palestine, especially in the Gaza Strip, has transformed from a structural challenge to a humanitarian disaster. The multi-layered blockade, the environmental crisis, and the use of water technologies as a tool of control have given a new face to Israel’s water dominance, and water apartheid has been revealed in a most gruesome way in occupied Palestine. In summary, this trajectory demonstrates the transformation of water into a strategic tool for consolidating domination over Palestine, altering the demographic fabric, and creating an institutionalized system of discrimination and oppression that has been implemented step by step. Discussion of Results and Conclusions The historical course of the Zionist regime’s domination of Palestinian water resources is a clear example of the expansion of the regime’s occupation and colonization of Palestine. This hegemony, which is rooted in the ideology of Zionism and the thinking of its leaders and pioneers, began with the Zionist plans and programs during the mandate period, was consolidated after the establishment of the regime and the 1948 war, and reached its peak through the martial law after the 1967 war. The Oslo Accords also helped to consolidate and institutionalize this situation through a showy management structure. An analysis of the historical process of the Zionist regime's water dominance shows that this issue has been defined as a cornerstone of Israel's national security from the beginning, and over time, it has transformed from a purely geographical strategy into a multidimensional and institutionalized structure. From the integration of historical and religious narratives, to the hardware development of transmission networks, the military seizure of resources, the legal control of property, and finally the use of advanced technologies, all have advanced towards the consolidation of Israel's water dominance. Israel’s water dominance is one of the main axes of the development and evolution of the occupation of Palestine. By adopting the approach of dominating water resources, the Zionist regime has full control over infrastructure and water allocation policies and has used this tool to consolidate settlements and create structural inequality. The current situation, called water apartheid, has led to a deep gap between Palestinians and Zionists in water consumption. As a result, it has not only changed the amount and method of water consumption, but also the pattern of settlement, agriculture and development in a structural way, leading to the increasing deprivation of Palestinians from water, while the increasing domination of the occupying Zionists over Palestinian water resources.

https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30461_e5b570547d4b3f0c0da8260719bfe05f.pdf

University of Isfahan Historical Researches 2008-6253 18 2 2026 06 22 Imārat-e Yuluq in the Late Khwarazmshah Period and the Qara-Khitais of Kerman: Sudden Emergence, Qara-Khitai Origin, and Institutional Transformation Imārat-e Yuluq in the Late Khwarazmshah Period and the Qara-Khitais of Kerman: Sudden Emergence, Qara-Khitai Origin, and Institutional Transformation 71 86 30468 10.22108/jhr.2026.148730.2935 FA Yazdan Farrokhi Associate Professor of History, Department of History, Payame Noor University (PNU), Tehran, Iran 0000-0002-0874-4253 Journal Article 2026 04 25 Abstract In the Khwarazmshah period, "Imārat-e Yuluq" and the "Yuluq" court have often been identified with the ancient "Maẓālim" court and have sometimes even been equated with "Yārghu." Although, at least during the Seljuk and Khwarazmshah periods (at least until the time of Muhammad Khwarazmshah), the term "Maẓālim" was common, the new term "Yuluq" for the court and its associated offices suddenly appeared in the late Khwarazmshah period. The question that arises is: what historical factor caused this lexical transformation, and was it merely a change at the level of terminology, or did it reflect deeper transformations in the structure of power and administrative tradition? The research hypothesis considers this linguistic change to be a late, sudden, and episodic phenomenon that emerged during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah in connection with the arrival of Qara-Khitai amirs. This study, using a historical method and a descriptive-analytical approach, examines administrative and historiographical texts from the 6th to 8th centuries AH, extracting, categorizing, and analyzing references to "Yuluq." The findings show that the earliest reference to "Imārat-e Yuluq" in Simṭ al-ʿUlā goes back to the appointment of Baraq Ḥājib, whereas in earlier texts (such as Atabat al-katabah, al-Tawassul ilā al-Tarassul, etc.) there is no trace of it. Equating these three institutions—Islamic, Qara-Khitai, and Mongol (Maẓālim, Yuluq, and Yārghu)—by Nasawī and Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī falls into the category of "explanation for the unfamiliar reader," and disregarding the substantive differences among the three institutions is controversial. Their equation, according to some researchers, requires reconsideration. Furthermore, an examination of historical instances shows that Yuluq cases fell into three main categories (political accusations, embezzlement of state property, and complaints by subjects against officials), and their basis was customary (non-Sharia), although toward the end of the period, it gradually underwent a process of Islamization. Keywords: Yūlūq, Maẓālim, Baraq Ḥājib, Khwārazmshāhian, Qara-Khitais of Kerman. Introduction In the administrative system of the Khwarazmshahs (ca. 470–628 AH), a supreme judicial court known as Yuluq Aʿzam existed, headed by an official called Imārat-e Yuluq. Scholars have generally accepted that this court was essentially the same as the earlier Maẓālim court, which had been prevalent during the Great Seljuk period. However, while their judicial function appears similar, it remains unclear why the Arabic-Persian term Maẓālim was replaced by the Turkic term Yuluq under the Khwarazmshahs, who were themselves Turkic Muslims. Understanding the reason for this lexical transformation is a difficult historical problem. Although many researchers have confidently equated the Seljuk Maẓālim with the Khwarazmshah Yuluq, the necessity and timing of this change remain obscure. This study argues that the transformation likely occurred during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah and is closely linked to the appointment of Baraq Ḥājib, a Qara-Khitai commander, as the first holder of the Yuluq office. Apart from a few instances under Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn, the office of Yuluq appears mainly in the Qara-Khitai domain of Kerman, passed down among Baraq Ḥājib’s descendants. This suggests the influence of Qara-Khitai administrative traditions. Early research by Russian-German orientalists, such as Radloff, traced the etymology of Yuluq to the Old Turkic verb yol- (to free) and the noun yulu (ransom/tribute). Horst systematically analyzed Yuluq as a secular court comparable to the Maẓālim and noted that the term appears only in late Khwarazmshah documents. Doerfer confirmed its Turkic root and added the meaning of "special court" or "court of appeal." Later Persian lexicons, including Dehkhodā’s, sometimes misinterpreted the term as "messenger" or "courier." Despite these valuable contributions, none of the previous studies have adequately explained why the term Yuluq suddenly emerged in the late Khwarazmshah period. Most scholars have treated it merely as a synonym for Maẓālim or as an intermediate stage in the evolution of secular courts, without linking it to the political context of Qara-Khitai elites entering Khwarazmshah service. The present study distinguishes itself by arguing that Yuluq was not an internal, organic development but rather an exogenous phenomenon resulting from the employment of Qara-Khitai administrators. Materials and Methods This is a historical study employing a descriptive-analytical method. Data were collected from primary sources, including administrative manuals (Atabat al-katabah, al-Tawassul, Munshaʾāt), court chronicles (Sumṭ al-ʿAlī, Sīrat Jalāl al-Dīn, Jahāngushāy), and biographical dictionaries. The collected data were analyzed qualitatively, focusing on the context of each mention of “Yūlūq”, the profile of its holder, and the functions described. Comparative analysis was used to distinguish Yūlūq from Maẓālim and Yārghū. Research Findings A systematic examination of administrative texts from the period before Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah—including Atabat al-katabah, al-Tawassul ilā al-Tarassul, and the epistles of Rashid al-Din Vatvat—reveals no mention of the word "Yuluq" or the office of "Imārat-e Yuluq." The earliest evidence appears in Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī's Simṭ al-ʿUlā, which records the appointment of Baraq Ḥājib, a former courtier of the Qara-Khitai Gurkhān, to the position of "Imārat-e Yuluq" by Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah. Thus, it can be concluded with relative certainty that this term and its associated institution were a late and sudden phenomenon (emerging at least after ca. 607 AH/1210 CE), rather than a gradual development within the Khwarazmshah administrative tradition. Historical sources attempted to explain "Yuluq" to their audiences using familiar terms: Nasawī called it "the Maẓālim court in the language of the Turks," while Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī equated it with both "Maẓālim" and "Great Yārghu." However, a functional examination shows that Yuluq operated in three main areas: investigating political accusations against officials, prosecuting embezzlement of state funds, and hearing subjects' complaints against government agents. Its basis was customary and non-Sharia, which led Nasawī to compare it to Maẓālim and Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī to liken it to Yārghu. Nevertheless, the gradual appointment of religious scholars to this position demonstrates a process of Islamization, resulting from the Qara-Khitai rulers of Kerman's need for legitimacy in Muslim society. Discussion of Results and Conclusions After the death of Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah, two distinct trajectories for "Imārat-e Yuluq" can be identified. In the realm of Jalāl al-Dīn Khwarazmshah, at least two high-ranking military amirs were appointed to this office during the years 621–628 AH. In the Qara-Khitai territory of Kerman, Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī reports the continuation of "Yuluq justice" during the reign of Qutlugh Turkan Khatun (655–682 AH) and the appointment of a religious figure, indicating a gradual transformation of the office from a military-amiral position to a judicial-religious one. Based on this evidence, it can be argued that "Yuluq" emerged not from the internal evolution of the Islamic-Persian administrative tradition but as a result of Qara-Khitai elites entering Khwarazmshah service. The recurring pattern of appointing Qara-Khitai amirs to this position supports this hypothesis. However, three limitations must be acknowledged: first, the earliest detailed report (Simṭ al-ʿUlā) was written nearly a century after the events; second, Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī, as a bureaucrat affiliated with the Qara-Khitai of Kerman, may have exaggerated Baraq Ḥājib's role; third, definitive judgments about Yuluq's judicial nature require the discovery or reexamination of unknown manuscripts from the Khwarazmshah period. In short, the short-lived rise and fall of "Imārat-e Yuluq" reflects not merely a lexical change but the broader transition of power from the Seljuk and early Khwarazmshah administrative tradition to the emerging Mongol-Ilkhanate order, mediated by the brief but significant experience of Qara-Khitai governance within the Khwarazmshah realm. Abstract In the Khwarazmshah period, "Imārat-e Yuluq" and the "Yuluq" court have often been identified with the ancient "Maẓālim" court and have sometimes even been equated with "Yārghu." Although, at least during the Seljuk and Khwarazmshah periods (at least until the time of Muhammad Khwarazmshah), the term "Maẓālim" was common, the new term "Yuluq" for the court and its associated offices suddenly appeared in the late Khwarazmshah period. The question that arises is: what historical factor caused this lexical transformation, and was it merely a change at the level of terminology, or did it reflect deeper transformations in the structure of power and administrative tradition? The research hypothesis considers this linguistic change to be a late, sudden, and episodic phenomenon that emerged during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah in connection with the arrival of Qara-Khitai amirs. This study, using a historical method and a descriptive-analytical approach, examines administrative and historiographical texts from the 6th to 8th centuries AH, extracting, categorizing, and analyzing references to "Yuluq." The findings show that the earliest reference to "Imārat-e Yuluq" in Simṭ al-ʿUlā goes back to the appointment of Baraq Ḥājib, whereas in earlier texts (such as Atabat al-katabah, al-Tawassul ilā al-Tarassul, etc.) there is no trace of it. Equating these three institutions—Islamic, Qara-Khitai, and Mongol (Maẓālim, Yuluq, and Yārghu)—by Nasawī and Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī falls into the category of "explanation for the unfamiliar reader," and disregarding the substantive differences among the three institutions is controversial. Their equation, according to some researchers, requires reconsideration. Furthermore, an examination of historical instances shows that Yuluq cases fell into three main categories (political accusations, embezzlement of state property, and complaints by subjects against officials), and their basis was customary (non-Sharia), although toward the end of the period, it gradually underwent a process of Islamization. Keywords: Yūlūq, Maẓālim, Baraq Ḥājib, Khwārazmshāhian, Qara-Khitais of Kerman. Introduction In the administrative system of the Khwarazmshahs (ca. 470–628 AH), a supreme judicial court known as Yuluq Aʿzam existed, headed by an official called Imārat-e Yuluq. Scholars have generally accepted that this court was essentially the same as the earlier Maẓālim court, which had been prevalent during the Great Seljuk period. However, while their judicial function appears similar, it remains unclear why the Arabic-Persian term Maẓālim was replaced by the Turkic term Yuluq under the Khwarazmshahs, who were themselves Turkic Muslims. Understanding the reason for this lexical transformation is a difficult historical problem. Although many researchers have confidently equated the Seljuk Maẓālim with the Khwarazmshah Yuluq, the necessity and timing of this change remain obscure. This study argues that the transformation likely occurred during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah and is closely linked to the appointment of Baraq Ḥājib, a Qara-Khitai commander, as the first holder of the Yuluq office. Apart from a few instances under Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn, the office of Yuluq appears mainly in the Qara-Khitai domain of Kerman, passed down among Baraq Ḥājib’s descendants. This suggests the influence of Qara-Khitai administrative traditions. Early research by Russian-German orientalists, such as Radloff, traced the etymology of Yuluq to the Old Turkic verb yol- (to free) and the noun yulu (ransom/tribute). Horst systematically analyzed Yuluq as a secular court comparable to the Maẓālim and noted that the term appears only in late Khwarazmshah documents. Doerfer confirmed its Turkic root and added the meaning of "special court" or "court of appeal." Later Persian lexicons, including Dehkhodā’s, sometimes misinterpreted the term as "messenger" or "courier." Despite these valuable contributions, none of the previous studies have adequately explained why the term Yuluq suddenly emerged in the late Khwarazmshah period. Most scholars have treated it merely as a synonym for Maẓālim or as an intermediate stage in the evolution of secular courts, without linking it to the political context of Qara-Khitai elites entering Khwarazmshah service. The present study distinguishes itself by arguing that Yuluq was not an internal, organic development but rather an exogenous phenomenon resulting from the employment of Qara-Khitai administrators. Materials and Methods This is a historical study employing a descriptive-analytical method. Data were collected from primary sources, including administrative manuals (Atabat al-katabah, al-Tawassul, Munshaʾāt), court chronicles (Sumṭ al-ʿAlī, Sīrat Jalāl al-Dīn, Jahāngushāy), and biographical dictionaries. The collected data were analyzed qualitatively, focusing on the context of each mention of “Yūlūq”, the profile of its holder, and the functions described. Comparative analysis was used to distinguish Yūlūq from Maẓālim and Yārghū. Research Findings A systematic examination of administrative texts from the period before Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah—including Atabat al-katabah, al-Tawassul ilā al-Tarassul, and the epistles of Rashid al-Din Vatvat—reveals no mention of the word "Yuluq" or the office of "Imārat-e Yuluq." The earliest evidence appears in Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī's Simṭ al-ʿUlā, which records the appointment of Baraq Ḥājib, a former courtier of the Qara-Khitai Gurkhān, to the position of "Imārat-e Yuluq" by Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah. Thus, it can be concluded with relative certainty that this term and its associated institution were a late and sudden phenomenon (emerging at least after ca. 607 AH/1210 CE), rather than a gradual development within the Khwarazmshah administrative tradition. Historical sources attempted to explain "Yuluq" to their audiences using familiar terms: Nasawī called it "the Maẓālim court in the language of the Turks," while Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī equated it with both "Maẓālim" and "Great Yārghu." However, a functional examination shows that Yuluq operated in three main areas: investigating political accusations against officials, prosecuting embezzlement of state funds, and hearing subjects' complaints against government agents. Its basis was customary and non-Sharia, which led Nasawī to compare it to Maẓālim and Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī to liken it to Yārghu. Nevertheless, the gradual appointment of religious scholars to this position demonstrates a process of Islamization, resulting from the Qara-Khitai rulers of Kerman's need for legitimacy in Muslim society. Discussion of Results and Conclusions After the death of Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah, two distinct trajectories for "Imārat-e Yuluq" can be identified. In the realm of Jalāl al-Dīn Khwarazmshah, at least two high-ranking military amirs were appointed to this office during the years 621–628 AH. In the Qara-Khitai territory of Kerman, Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī reports the continuation of "Yuluq justice" during the reign of Qutlugh Turkan Khatun (655–682 AH) and the appointment of a religious figure, indicating a gradual transformation of the office from a military-amiral position to a judicial-religious one. Based on this evidence, it can be argued that "Yuluq" emerged not from the internal evolution of the Islamic-Persian administrative tradition but as a result of Qara-Khitai elites entering Khwarazmshah service. The recurring pattern of appointing Qara-Khitai amirs to this position supports this hypothesis. However, three limitations must be acknowledged: first, the earliest detailed report (Simṭ al-ʿUlā) was written nearly a century after the events; second, Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī, as a bureaucrat affiliated with the Qara-Khitai of Kerman, may have exaggerated Baraq Ḥājib's role; third, definitive judgments about Yuluq's judicial nature require the discovery or reexamination of unknown manuscripts from the Khwarazmshah period. In short, the short-lived rise and fall of "Imārat-e Yuluq" reflects not merely a lexical change but the broader transition of power from the Seljuk and early Khwarazmshah administrative tradition to the emerging Mongol-Ilkhanate order, mediated by the brief but significant experience of Qara-Khitai governance within the Khwarazmshah realm.

https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30468_dc0f54ea8373414d59047ffecf19be26.pdf

University of Isfahan Historical Researches 2008-6253 18 2 2026 06 22 Administrative Records of Karabakh Region and the Reflection of Political and Social Transformations during Iranian, Ottoman, and Russian Domination (1595–1897) Administrative Records of Karabakh Region and the Reflection of Political and Social Transformations during Iranian, Ottoman, and Russian Domination (1595–1897) 87 111 30334 10.22108/jhr.2026.148058.2900 FA Sina Hosseinpour Asl Ph.D. student, Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Goodarz Rashtiani Assistant professor, Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2026 01 07 Abstract The region of Karabakh situated at the nexus of political and social conflicts over the past three centuries experienced diverse administrative systems under Iranian, Ottoman, and Russian rule, which has given rise to competing historical narratives. This study uniquely analyzed 4 sequential administrative records spanning the Safavid (Ijmāl Register, 1595 CE), Ottoman (Mufaṣṣal Register, 1727 CE), and Russian periods (Reports of 1823 and Censuses of 1886/1897). Together, these documents provided an unparalleled continuous dataset for regional historical analysis. The research aimed to determine the nature and methodology of these records, trace their structural and content evolution, and correlate their data with contemporary socio-political events. The findings indicated that each record reflected the administrative logic and state policies of its time, mirroring shifts in governance and population structure. Discrepancies in the data were primarily attributable to the differing objectives and implementation mechanisms of each era. Through comparative analysis, this study offered a deeper understanding of the administrative and social history of Karabakh. Keywords: Karabakh, Census, Caucasus, Iran, Ottoman, Russia. Introduction Locally, Karabakh witnessed a fundamental tension between two opposing social orders: one rooted in the Iranian bureaucratic tradition and Turkman tribal culture and another based on Armenian church authority and feudal aristocracy. Translocally, the region oscillated between the dominance of three major powers: Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia. Consequently, historical source descriptions of Karabakh were often fragmented, numerous, and sometimes contradictory. The surviving administrative registers were thus pivotal, offering precise data for cross-verification with other historical accounts. Their exceptional continuity—providing structured administrative data from the late 16th to the late 19th century—was unmatched for Iranian provinces and offered a unique opportunity to study political, administrative, and demographic transformations. Historical historiography concerning Karabakh generally fell into 3 categories: official external histories, local Armenian chronicles, and the Qarabağnāmes. Official histories offered limited internal details, often focusing solely on military roles. Armenian sources, while significant, frequently lacked precision due to their authors' aristocratic backgrounds and inherent bias against Iranian rule—particularly against the Javanshir dynasty. The Qarabağnāmes written under Javanshir patronage (though published later under Russian oversight) provided detailed geographical accounts but contained exaggerations. The administrative registers overcame these limitations by offering precise social, political, and economic data, thereby enabling the verification of contemporary historical works and reflecting the region's administrative and bureaucratic framework. Materials & Methods This research was based on a comparative analysis of 4 key administrative records related to Karabakh Province: the Ottoman registers (Ijmāl of 1003 AH/1595 CE, Mufaṣṣal of 1137 AH/1727 CE, and Ijmāl of 1144 AH/1732 CE) and the Russian surveys (Report of 1823 and the Censuses of 1886/1897). Each register was compiled within a distinct administrative and bureaucratic framework, resulting in fundamental structural and content differences. The analysis focused on comparing the fiscal focus of the Ottoman records, the tribal categorization of the Safavid period, and the modern ethnic and religious categorization of the Russian era. The study traced the evolution from land-based taxation methods to modern population enumeration techniques across these three imperial epochs. Research Findings The Ottoman Ijmāl Register of 1595 CECreated after the Ottoman Conquest: This register was primarily fiscal in nature, detailing annual taxes based on land tenure types (khāṣṣ, zaʿāmat, tīmār, or milk). It organized data geographically into six līwās, encompassing qaḍās and nāḥiyas. Crucially, the register revealed demographic upheaval following the Safavid collapse: approximately 14.7% (161 villages) were marked as "empty and ruined", heavily concentrated in the Dizak/Arasbar region, reflecting the migration of pro-Safavid groups. Data on Muslims, particularly tribal affiliations (such as Qajar, Otuziki, and Duzdhar), were detailed. However, Armenian demographic data were notably vague. Calculations based on the non-Muslim head tax suggested only 6,435 individuals, and only 16 villages were explicitly marked as "Armenian", ignoring known centers like Gandzasar. The Safavid Daftar-e Mofarradāt-e Ajam: Although not extant and known only through Ottoman documents, this register suggested a more granular census methodology, meticulously recording men over 15, family members, and even Christian clergy. This indicated an advanced administrative accounting system in place prior to the Ottoman takeover. The Ottoman Mufaṣṣal (1727) and Ijmāl (1732) Registers: These registers showed a more organized fiscal structure but also documented severe damage, particularly in Ganja. They noted the migration of tribes, such as the Kabirli to Russia, as a result of ensuing insecurity. The Ijmāl of 1732 also separately recorded taxes from regions not submitting to Ottoman administration—such as Khachen-Gerger—indicating ongoing local resistance. The 1823 Russian Compiled Report of Karabakh Province: This report reflected a transitional system organized by mahāll (districts or tribal units). Based on interviews with local begs and meliks (who may have understated figures to evade taxes), the report detailed the newly founded city of Shusha. Contrary to later Armenian histories that claimed Armenian dominance, the overwhelming majority of household heads listed in the section of Shusha were Muslim or Turkman, with the largest quarter being "Tabrizli" (162 households), reflecting recent resettlement policies under the Javanshir Khans. The report also documented population cleansing in highland areas following 18th-century unrest, showing formerly mixed villages (such as Hasan Qaya) becoming exclusively Armenian. The Russian Censuses of 1886 and 1897: These censuses employed a modern, detailed methodology based on ethnicity and religion. The 1886 data for the Shusha Uyezd (district), which incorporated key Karabakh areas, showed a total population of 352,858. In Shusha city, the population was 126,246 comprising 73,081 Armenians (58.36%) and 52,887 Tatars (Azeris), marking a significant demographic shift in the urban center compared to the 1823 findings. The 1897 census confirmed this urban trend but showed a marked decrease in the recorded Kurdish population across the region. Discussion of Results & Conclusion The comparative analysis traced several clear demographic waves: negative migration following the collapse of Safavid authority; population displacement and ethnic cleansing in the highlands during the instability of the 18th century (as evidenced by the loss of Muslim populations in Dizak/Arasbar); organized resettlement policies under the Javanshir Khans, which led to an initial Muslim majority in the newly established city of Shusha; forced migration during the subsequent Russo-Persian Wars; and finally, a pronounced demographic shift under Russian rule, resulting in significant growth of the Armenian population in urban hubs like Shusha. While the macro‑structure—Muslims predominating in the lowlands (Aran) and Armenians concentrated in the highlands—largely persisted, the most critical and discernible change documented across these sources was the accelerated move toward "spatial and ethnic polarization" marked by the drastic reduction of mixed villages throughout the province. Abstract The region of Karabakh situated at the nexus of political and social conflicts over the past three centuries experienced diverse administrative systems under Iranian, Ottoman, and Russian rule, which has given rise to competing historical narratives. This study uniquely analyzed 4 sequential administrative records spanning the Safavid (Ijmāl Register, 1595 CE), Ottoman (Mufaṣṣal Register, 1727 CE), and Russian periods (Reports of 1823 and Censuses of 1886/1897). Together, these documents provided an unparalleled continuous dataset for regional historical analysis. The research aimed to determine the nature and methodology of these records, trace their structural and content evolution, and correlate their data with contemporary socio-political events. The findings indicated that each record reflected the administrative logic and state policies of its time, mirroring shifts in governance and population structure. Discrepancies in the data were primarily attributable to the differing objectives and implementation mechanisms of each era. Through comparative analysis, this study offered a deeper understanding of the administrative and social history of Karabakh. Keywords: Karabakh, Census, Caucasus, Iran, Ottoman, Russia. Introduction Locally, Karabakh witnessed a fundamental tension between two opposing social orders: one rooted in the Iranian bureaucratic tradition and Turkman tribal culture and another based on Armenian church authority and feudal aristocracy. Translocally, the region oscillated between the dominance of three major powers: Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia. Consequently, historical source descriptions of Karabakh were often fragmented, numerous, and sometimes contradictory. The surviving administrative registers were thus pivotal, offering precise data for cross-verification with other historical accounts. Their exceptional continuity—providing structured administrative data from the late 16th to the late 19th century—was unmatched for Iranian provinces and offered a unique opportunity to study political, administrative, and demographic transformations. Historical historiography concerning Karabakh generally fell into 3 categories: official external histories, local Armenian chronicles, and the Qarabağnāmes. Official histories offered limited internal details, often focusing solely on military roles. Armenian sources, while significant, frequently lacked precision due to their authors' aristocratic backgrounds and inherent bias against Iranian rule—particularly against the Javanshir dynasty. The Qarabağnāmes written under Javanshir patronage (though published later under Russian oversight) provided detailed geographical accounts but contained exaggerations. The administrative registers overcame these limitations by offering precise social, political, and economic data, thereby enabling the verification of contemporary historical works and reflecting the region's administrative and bureaucratic framework. Materials & Methods This research was based on a comparative analysis of 4 key administrative records related to Karabakh Province: the Ottoman registers (Ijmāl of 1003 AH/1595 CE, Mufaṣṣal of 1137 AH/1727 CE, and Ijmāl of 1144 AH/1732 CE) and the Russian surveys (Report of 1823 and the Censuses of 1886/1897). Each register was compiled within a distinct administrative and bureaucratic framework, resulting in fundamental structural and content differences. The analysis focused on comparing the fiscal focus of the Ottoman records, the tribal categorization of the Safavid period, and the modern ethnic and religious categorization of the Russian era. The study traced the evolution from land-based taxation methods to modern population enumeration techniques across these three imperial epochs. Research Findings The Ottoman Ijmāl Register of 1595 CECreated after the Ottoman Conquest: This register was primarily fiscal in nature, detailing annual taxes based on land tenure types (khāṣṣ, zaʿāmat, tīmār, or milk). It organized data geographically into six līwās, encompassing qaḍās and nāḥiyas. Crucially, the register revealed demographic upheaval following the Safavid collapse: approximately 14.7% (161 villages) were marked as "empty and ruined", heavily concentrated in the Dizak/Arasbar region, reflecting the migration of pro-Safavid groups. Data on Muslims, particularly tribal affiliations (such as Qajar, Otuziki, and Duzdhar), were detailed. However, Armenian demographic data were notably vague. Calculations based on the non-Muslim head tax suggested only 6,435 individuals, and only 16 villages were explicitly marked as "Armenian", ignoring known centers like Gandzasar. The Safavid Daftar-e Mofarradāt-e Ajam: Although not extant and known only through Ottoman documents, this register suggested a more granular census methodology, meticulously recording men over 15, family members, and even Christian clergy. This indicated an advanced administrative accounting system in place prior to the Ottoman takeover. The Ottoman Mufaṣṣal (1727) and Ijmāl (1732) Registers: These registers showed a more organized fiscal structure but also documented severe damage, particularly in Ganja. They noted the migration of tribes, such as the Kabirli to Russia, as a result of ensuing insecurity. The Ijmāl of 1732 also separately recorded taxes from regions not submitting to Ottoman administration—such as Khachen-Gerger—indicating ongoing local resistance. The 1823 Russian Compiled Report of Karabakh Province: This report reflected a transitional system organized by mahāll (districts or tribal units). Based on interviews with local begs and meliks (who may have understated figures to evade taxes), the report detailed the newly founded city of Shusha. Contrary to later Armenian histories that claimed Armenian dominance, the overwhelming majority of household heads listed in the section of Shusha were Muslim or Turkman, with the largest quarter being "Tabrizli" (162 households), reflecting recent resettlement policies under the Javanshir Khans. The report also documented population cleansing in highland areas following 18th-century unrest, showing formerly mixed villages (such as Hasan Qaya) becoming exclusively Armenian. The Russian Censuses of 1886 and 1897: These censuses employed a modern, detailed methodology based on ethnicity and religion. The 1886 data for the Shusha Uyezd (district), which incorporated key Karabakh areas, showed a total population of 352,858. In Shusha city, the population was 126,246 comprising 73,081 Armenians (58.36%) and 52,887 Tatars (Azeris), marking a significant demographic shift in the urban center compared to the 1823 findings. The 1897 census confirmed this urban trend but showed a marked decrease in the recorded Kurdish population across the region. Discussion of Results & Conclusion The comparative analysis traced several clear demographic waves: negative migration following the collapse of Safavid authority; population displacement and ethnic cleansing in the highlands during the instability of the 18th century (as evidenced by the loss of Muslim populations in Dizak/Arasbar); organized resettlement policies under the Javanshir Khans, which led to an initial Muslim majority in the newly established city of Shusha; forced migration during the subsequent Russo-Persian Wars; and finally, a pronounced demographic shift under Russian rule, resulting in significant growth of the Armenian population in urban hubs like Shusha. While the macro‑structure—Muslims predominating in the lowlands (Aran) and Armenians concentrated in the highlands—largely persisted, the most critical and discernible change documented across these sources was the accelerated move toward "spatial and ethnic polarization" marked by the drastic reduction of mixed villages throughout the province.

https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30334_179e9c95b96c780e425940366904f01c.pdf