University of IsfahanHistorical Researches2008-625318120260321Amir Kabir and the Problem of Organizing the Government in IranAmir Kabir and the Problem of Organizing the Government in Iran1203013710.22108/jhr.2025.144865.2777FAAlirezaMollaiy TavanyProfessor of History, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250506<strong>Abstract</strong>
Despite the extensive research conducted on Amir Kabir’s political life, performance, and style of governance, disagreements regarding his ideas continue to increase. These disagreements have mainly focused on the model of governance and the type of state that Amir Kabir desired and envisioned. This issue has become a major challenge among researchers of Amir Kabir and scholars of contemporary Iranian history. Consequently, it remains a serious and thought-provoking problem. This study addresses this issue directly. To this end, the author first identifies the most significant ideas proposed regarding Amir Kabir’s style of governance and his desired form of state. The study then presents and critically examines these perspectives. Among the viewpoints discussed are those of Robert Grant Watson, Fereydoun Adamiyat, Mohammad Ali Akbari, and Davoud Fairahi, whose selection is based on the diversity and contradictions among their interpretations. Without fully endorsing any of these positions, the present study seeks to offer an alternative perspective on Amir Kabir’s desired state and model of governance, moving beyond the existing disagreements. The findings of the research indicate that none of the proposed interpretations—namely enlightened autocracy, systematic regular monarchy, authoritarian rule, or constitutional monarchy—were fully applicable to the social conditions of Iran in the early Qajar period. Therefore, the nature of the state and government envisioned by Amir Kabir, as well as his practical performance, must be understood within the framework of the initial steps toward the formation of an absolute state in Iran.
<strong>Keywords</strong>: Amir Kabir, Governance, Absolute Government, Constitutional Government, Regular Government.
<strong>Introduction </strong>
Amir Kabir is remembered as a heroic figure in the collective Iranian consciousness. He is among those historical personalities whose reputation has not been diminished by the passage of time, major political upheavals, revolutions, or the rise and fall of governments. Accordingly, his role in organizing the political system and shaping the concept of the state remains one of the most dynamic and debated topics in Iranian historiography. This article focuses on this particular dimension of Amir Kabir’s thought and action, especially given that the question of the state and government has been at the center of Iranian intellectual debates for the past two centuries. This issue has also been the most controversial aspect of Amir Kabir’s political legacy, leading to divergent interpretations and competing narratives about his role and intentions.
This study examines only those works that have thoughtfully addressed the type of governance and state envisioned by Amir Kabir. The literature on Amir Kabir is vast, and a comprehensive review would require an extensive and separate discussion. However, through careful examination, the author has identified the most influential studies that critically analyze Amir Kabir’s ideas of governance and state-building. These include the views of one orientalist scholar and four Iranian thinkers, each approaching the subject from a distinct theoretical perspective.
Among Orientalists, Robert Grant Watson’s observations on the nature of Amir Kabir’s rule are among the most advanced and controversial. His interpretation situates Amir Kabir’s methods of governance within the framework of “enlightened despotism” or “illuminated tyranny” (Watson, 1977, p. 344). Nearly a century later, Fereydoun Adamiyat elaborated on the nature of Amir Kabir’s rule, largely accepting Watson’s perspective while arguing that Amir Kabir’s governance could be explained within the framework of a “regular monarchy”. Adamiyat’s work has profoundly influenced Iranian scholarship on Amir Kabir for several decades, to the extent that few studies of comparable depth and rigor have been produced since its publication (Adamiyat, 1975, pp. 224–226). In subsequent years, Mohammad Ali Akbari argued that Amir Kabir’s reform programs lacked firm theoretical foundations and stemmed from a limited understanding or neglect of the intellectual foundations of Western civilization (Akbari, 2005, p. 57). He contended that the concept of a regular monarchy entered Iranian political discourse through Malkom Khan after Amir Kabir’s death, and that Mirza Hossein Sepahsalar, rather than Amir Kabir, was the first Iranian prime minister to attempt governance within this framework (Akbari, 2005, p. 177).
Later, the contemporary thinker Javad Tabatabaei significantly reshaped the debate by introducing a new perspective on Amir Kabir’s governance. He argued that Amir Kabir’s political ideas should be understood within the framework of a “constitutional monarchy”, thereby elevating the discussion beyond the notion of regular monarchy (Tabatabaei, 2016, pp. 154–155). Finally, Davoud Fairahi offered a sharply contrasting view, arguing that Amir Kabir’s rule should not be interpreted as a step toward modernization but rather as an extension of traditional governance. He maintained that there was no meaningful evidence of structural change in Amir Kabir’s rule and that it should be categorized within the framework of a “despotic monarchy” (Fairahi, 2010, pp. 347–348).
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
This study seeks to answer the following questions: How should Amir Kabir’s governance be evaluated in light of his reforms and political actions? Should his style of governance be interpreted within the framework of an “independent monarchy”, a “regular monarchy”, or even a “constitutional monarchy”? What were Amir Kabir’s political ambitions, and how can a coherent theoretical explanation of his thought and practice in governance be constructed? By briefly outlining and critically assessing the major interpretations of Amir Kabir’s governance, this article attempts to analyze his political practice within the framework of an absolute state and to open new avenues for scholarly discussion.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
Undoubtedly, elements of truth can be found in the various interpretations proposed by scholars, and traces of these governance models can be observed in Amir Kabir’s political practice. However, none of these approaches alone provides a sufficient theoretical explanation for Amir Kabir’s envisioned model of governance, nor do they resolve the existing scholarly disputes. To address this issue, the study turns to classical theories of the state. From this perspective, Amir Kabir’s rule must be analyzed as an attempt to initiate the formation of an absolute state in Iran. Within the intellectual framework of Qajar-era thinkers, it is difficult to determine whether the absolute state corresponded to an Iranian version of a “regular state”, a “regular absolute monarchy”, or a “regular independent monarchy”, as these concepts do not fully overlap.
Drawing on global political theory, the form of government envisioned by Amir Kabir can best be interpreted as an absolute state. However, this interpretation must acknowledge that Amir Kabir could not directly replicate the absolute state models of Austria, Russia, or Germany. Iran’s distinct historical circumstances required foundational prerequisites that Amir Kabir was attempting to establish. In this sense, his rule represented the initial steps toward the formation of an absolute state, a process that had similarly unfolded in Western contexts.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
Without assessing the substantive content or effectiveness of Amir Kabir’s reforms, this study emphasizes that the nature of those reforms aligns with the reform patterns of absolute governments. These reforms were characterized by the centralization of political power, military modernization, the strengthening of administrative institutions, and the suppression of disorder and insecurity. From the author’s perspective, Amir Kabir’s governance model transcends Watson’s interpretation and is incompatible with the reductionist approaches of Akbari and Fairahi, which confine his rule to its immediate historical context. Such interpretations fail to capture the broader ambitions of Amir Kabir’s political vision, particularly his implicit “imagination of constitutional order”.
Similarly, Adamiyat’s concept of “enlightened tyranny” does not fully align with Amir Kabir’s envisioned governance model. However, if a regular state or a regular absolute monarchy is understood as equivalent to an absolute state, then Adamiyat’s interpretation gains partial validity. Many of the characteristics identified by Adamiyat and Akbari for a regular monarchy overlap with those of an absolute state, provided that the subtle distinctions between a regular monarchy and a Western absolute state are carefully considered. The principal weakness of Adamiyat’s argument lies in his failure to offer a detailed theoretical elaboration of the concept of regular monarchy.
Tabatabaei’s interpretation, which elevates Amir Kabir’s governance beyond historical realities, also encounters limitations. While his argument may appear overly idealistic and detached from the conditions of Amir Kabir’s era, it nevertheless contains an element of truth. Historically, the successful establishment of an absolute state often paved the way for constitutional governance. From this perspective, Amir Kabir’s political vision may be understood as an unrealized but necessary precursor to constitutionalism.
The failure to fully implement Amir Kabir’s reforms should not be interpreted as evidence of their inadequacy. Rather, these reforms were persistently obstructed by anti-modern, anti-development social forces that sought to undermine change and restore pre-reform conditions. Amir Kabir’s efforts, therefore, represent a foundational moment in Iran’s modern political development, even if their ultimate realization was delayed.<strong>Abstract</strong>
Despite the extensive research conducted on Amir Kabir’s political life, performance, and style of governance, disagreements regarding his ideas continue to increase. These disagreements have mainly focused on the model of governance and the type of state that Amir Kabir desired and envisioned. This issue has become a major challenge among researchers of Amir Kabir and scholars of contemporary Iranian history. Consequently, it remains a serious and thought-provoking problem. This study addresses this issue directly. To this end, the author first identifies the most significant ideas proposed regarding Amir Kabir’s style of governance and his desired form of state. The study then presents and critically examines these perspectives. Among the viewpoints discussed are those of Robert Grant Watson, Fereydoun Adamiyat, Mohammad Ali Akbari, and Davoud Fairahi, whose selection is based on the diversity and contradictions among their interpretations. Without fully endorsing any of these positions, the present study seeks to offer an alternative perspective on Amir Kabir’s desired state and model of governance, moving beyond the existing disagreements. The findings of the research indicate that none of the proposed interpretations—namely enlightened autocracy, systematic regular monarchy, authoritarian rule, or constitutional monarchy—were fully applicable to the social conditions of Iran in the early Qajar period. Therefore, the nature of the state and government envisioned by Amir Kabir, as well as his practical performance, must be understood within the framework of the initial steps toward the formation of an absolute state in Iran.
<strong>Keywords</strong>: Amir Kabir, Governance, Absolute Government, Constitutional Government, Regular Government.
<strong>Introduction </strong>
Amir Kabir is remembered as a heroic figure in the collective Iranian consciousness. He is among those historical personalities whose reputation has not been diminished by the passage of time, major political upheavals, revolutions, or the rise and fall of governments. Accordingly, his role in organizing the political system and shaping the concept of the state remains one of the most dynamic and debated topics in Iranian historiography. This article focuses on this particular dimension of Amir Kabir’s thought and action, especially given that the question of the state and government has been at the center of Iranian intellectual debates for the past two centuries. This issue has also been the most controversial aspect of Amir Kabir’s political legacy, leading to divergent interpretations and competing narratives about his role and intentions.
This study examines only those works that have thoughtfully addressed the type of governance and state envisioned by Amir Kabir. The literature on Amir Kabir is vast, and a comprehensive review would require an extensive and separate discussion. However, through careful examination, the author has identified the most influential studies that critically analyze Amir Kabir’s ideas of governance and state-building. These include the views of one orientalist scholar and four Iranian thinkers, each approaching the subject from a distinct theoretical perspective.
Among Orientalists, Robert Grant Watson’s observations on the nature of Amir Kabir’s rule are among the most advanced and controversial. His interpretation situates Amir Kabir’s methods of governance within the framework of “enlightened despotism” or “illuminated tyranny” (Watson, 1977, p. 344). Nearly a century later, Fereydoun Adamiyat elaborated on the nature of Amir Kabir’s rule, largely accepting Watson’s perspective while arguing that Amir Kabir’s governance could be explained within the framework of a “regular monarchy”. Adamiyat’s work has profoundly influenced Iranian scholarship on Amir Kabir for several decades, to the extent that few studies of comparable depth and rigor have been produced since its publication (Adamiyat, 1975, pp. 224–226). In subsequent years, Mohammad Ali Akbari argued that Amir Kabir’s reform programs lacked firm theoretical foundations and stemmed from a limited understanding or neglect of the intellectual foundations of Western civilization (Akbari, 2005, p. 57). He contended that the concept of a regular monarchy entered Iranian political discourse through Malkom Khan after Amir Kabir’s death, and that Mirza Hossein Sepahsalar, rather than Amir Kabir, was the first Iranian prime minister to attempt governance within this framework (Akbari, 2005, p. 177).
Later, the contemporary thinker Javad Tabatabaei significantly reshaped the debate by introducing a new perspective on Amir Kabir’s governance. He argued that Amir Kabir’s political ideas should be understood within the framework of a “constitutional monarchy”, thereby elevating the discussion beyond the notion of regular monarchy (Tabatabaei, 2016, pp. 154–155). Finally, Davoud Fairahi offered a sharply contrasting view, arguing that Amir Kabir’s rule should not be interpreted as a step toward modernization but rather as an extension of traditional governance. He maintained that there was no meaningful evidence of structural change in Amir Kabir’s rule and that it should be categorized within the framework of a “despotic monarchy” (Fairahi, 2010, pp. 347–348).
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
This study seeks to answer the following questions: How should Amir Kabir’s governance be evaluated in light of his reforms and political actions? Should his style of governance be interpreted within the framework of an “independent monarchy”, a “regular monarchy”, or even a “constitutional monarchy”? What were Amir Kabir’s political ambitions, and how can a coherent theoretical explanation of his thought and practice in governance be constructed? By briefly outlining and critically assessing the major interpretations of Amir Kabir’s governance, this article attempts to analyze his political practice within the framework of an absolute state and to open new avenues for scholarly discussion.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
Undoubtedly, elements of truth can be found in the various interpretations proposed by scholars, and traces of these governance models can be observed in Amir Kabir’s political practice. However, none of these approaches alone provides a sufficient theoretical explanation for Amir Kabir’s envisioned model of governance, nor do they resolve the existing scholarly disputes. To address this issue, the study turns to classical theories of the state. From this perspective, Amir Kabir’s rule must be analyzed as an attempt to initiate the formation of an absolute state in Iran. Within the intellectual framework of Qajar-era thinkers, it is difficult to determine whether the absolute state corresponded to an Iranian version of a “regular state”, a “regular absolute monarchy”, or a “regular independent monarchy”, as these concepts do not fully overlap.
Drawing on global political theory, the form of government envisioned by Amir Kabir can best be interpreted as an absolute state. However, this interpretation must acknowledge that Amir Kabir could not directly replicate the absolute state models of Austria, Russia, or Germany. Iran’s distinct historical circumstances required foundational prerequisites that Amir Kabir was attempting to establish. In this sense, his rule represented the initial steps toward the formation of an absolute state, a process that had similarly unfolded in Western contexts.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
Without assessing the substantive content or effectiveness of Amir Kabir’s reforms, this study emphasizes that the nature of those reforms aligns with the reform patterns of absolute governments. These reforms were characterized by the centralization of political power, military modernization, the strengthening of administrative institutions, and the suppression of disorder and insecurity. From the author’s perspective, Amir Kabir’s governance model transcends Watson’s interpretation and is incompatible with the reductionist approaches of Akbari and Fairahi, which confine his rule to its immediate historical context. Such interpretations fail to capture the broader ambitions of Amir Kabir’s political vision, particularly his implicit “imagination of constitutional order”.
Similarly, Adamiyat’s concept of “enlightened tyranny” does not fully align with Amir Kabir’s envisioned governance model. However, if a regular state or a regular absolute monarchy is understood as equivalent to an absolute state, then Adamiyat’s interpretation gains partial validity. Many of the characteristics identified by Adamiyat and Akbari for a regular monarchy overlap with those of an absolute state, provided that the subtle distinctions between a regular monarchy and a Western absolute state are carefully considered. The principal weakness of Adamiyat’s argument lies in his failure to offer a detailed theoretical elaboration of the concept of regular monarchy.
Tabatabaei’s interpretation, which elevates Amir Kabir’s governance beyond historical realities, also encounters limitations. While his argument may appear overly idealistic and detached from the conditions of Amir Kabir’s era, it nevertheless contains an element of truth. Historically, the successful establishment of an absolute state often paved the way for constitutional governance. From this perspective, Amir Kabir’s political vision may be understood as an unrealized but necessary precursor to constitutionalism.
The failure to fully implement Amir Kabir’s reforms should not be interpreted as evidence of their inadequacy. Rather, these reforms were persistently obstructed by anti-modern, anti-development social forces that sought to undermine change and restore pre-reform conditions. Amir Kabir’s efforts, therefore, represent a foundational moment in Iran’s modern political development, even if their ultimate realization was delayed.https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30137_883a8aef8ec4c649d8af31a7aa31502d.pdfUniversity of IsfahanHistorical Researches2008-625318120260321The Importance of Monsha'at and Sukuk by Abdulmomen Ahmad Isfarayini in Historical StudiesThe Importance of Monsha'at and Sukuk by Abdulmomen Ahmad Isfarayini in Historical Studies21393033210.22108/jhr.2026.146883.2855FAIsmailHassanzadehAssistant Professor, Department of History, Faculty of Literature, Alzahra University, Tehran, IranSalimehAfrasiabiPhD in History of Iran, Department of History, Faculty of Literature, Alzahra University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20251002<strong>Abstract </strong>
Islamic documentary writing (wathāʾiq-nigārī) remains an underexplored source for historical research despite its rich economic and social data. This study investigates the late 9th/15th-century Persian treatise <em>Monshātʾ</em> <em>and</em> <em>Ṣukūk</em> by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin Aḥmad Isfarāyini, a little-known Timurid judge-secretary and calligrapher. Using textually grounded historical analysis, the study examines the treatise’s thematic, structural, and content-based significance. The findings reveal that Isfarāyini attempted to hybridize literary epistolography (Monshātʾ) and juridical documentary writing (wathāʾiq). While his <em>Moshātʾ</em> sections are derivative, the <em>Sukūk</em> section presents fourteen model legal deeds focused on commercial and social contracts. These deeds preserve invaluable data on monetary systems, urban topography, material culture, social hierarchy, and the legal treatment of vulnerable populations. Although Isfarāyini failed to fully synthesize the two genres due to their divergent epistemologies, his treatise is a landmark source for Timurid commercial law, social history, and judicial professionalism, filling a critical gap in the history of Islamic legal documentation.
<strong>Keywords</strong>: Timurid Period, <em>Monshāt</em> Writing, Documentary Writing, <em>Ṣukūk Sharʿiyya</em>, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin Aḥmad Isfarāyini.
<strong>Introduction </strong>
Documentary writing (wathāʾiq-nigārī)—the drafting of legally binding deeds and contracts according to Islamic jurisprudence—has received remarkably little attention from mainstream historical scholarship. This neglect is striking because wathāʾiq texts provide empirical data on economic transactions, social relations, and the everyday application of Islamic law—domains largely opaque in court chronicles or literary anthologies. While literary epistolography (Moshātʾ) has been extensively studied for its political and cultural narratives, documentary writing remains confined largely to codicological descriptions.
This study addresses this lacuna by analyzing a late 9th/15th-century Persian treatise: <em>Moshātʾ</em> <em>and</em> <em>Ṣukūk Sharʿiyya</em> (Epistles and Legal Deeds) by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin Aḥmad Isfarāyini. Isfarāyini, a calligrapher and judge-secretary (qāḍī/munshī) of the second rank in Timurid Khurasan, completed this work in 898/1493 at the shrine of Shaykh Abū al-Qāsim Naṣrābādī in Isfizar, near Herat. The treatise exists as a single manuscript (University of Tehran MS No. 5706), written in broken nastaʿliq script. The central research question is: What is the thematic, structural, and content-based significance of Isfarāyini’s treatise within the tradition of Islamic documentary writing? Three objectives guide the study are: (1) situating the work within the historical evolution of wathāʾiq-nigārī, (2) analyzing its tripartite structure and attempt to bridge <em>Moshāt</em> and <em>Wathāʾiq</em>, and (3) demonstrating the value of its fourteen model ḥujat (legal deeds) for economic, social, and legal history. The argument is that while Isfarāyini’s synthesis failed, his <em>Ṣukūk</em> section offers a significant innovation in juridical focus and practical utility.
<strong>Materials and Methods </strong>
The unique manuscript of <em>Moshātʾ</em> <em>and</em> <em>Ṣukūk Sharʿiyya</em> (MS Tehran University No. 5706) comprises 87 folios, measures 12 × 7 cm, uses Samarkand paper, and is written in broken nastaʿliq with black ink and cinnabar headings. The manuscript shows damage, crossings-out, and later marginal annotations. The colophon dates the work to 12 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 898 AH (January 1493 CE). The text has three sections: 1) rules of writing (ādāb va qavāʿid-i kitābat), 2) model letters (mukātabāt) to kings, governors, women, scholars, poets, physicians, and parents, and 3) legal deeds (ṣukūk sharʿiyya) as fourteen model ḥujaj.
The study draws on earlier and contemporary manuals: <em>Wathāʾiq-i Ghāzānī</em> (late 7th/13th century), Nāmūs Khwārī’s<em> Ḥadāʾiq al-Wathāʾiq</em> (early 8th/14th century), Muḥammad Kāzarūnī’s <em>Kitāb al-Shurūṭ</em> (872/1467), and Ottoman Turkish and Arabic <em>Ṣukūk</em> manuscripts from the 10th/16th century. The research employs textually grounded historical analysis with three levels: 1) codicological and paleographic analysis of the manuscript, 2) structural and thematic comparison with conventions of Moshātʾ and wathāʾiq genres, and 3) content-based juridical-historical analysis of the fourteen Hujat to extract empirical data on monetary systems, urban geography, material culture, legal terminology, and social relations, informed by classical Islamic legal taxonomies of ʿuqūd (contracts) and īqāʿāt (unilateral acts).
<strong>Research Findings </strong>
Islamic documentary writing emerged from a synthesis of Sassanid bureaucratic practices and early Islamic legal needs. The Persian term čuk was Arabized as ṣukk (pl. ṣukūk), originally meaning ration vouchers. By the Timurid period, ṣukūk denoted legal instruments for sales, leases, loans, partnerships, and manumissions. Mongol invasions and political fragmentation created recurring needs for standardization. Frontier provinces developed strong wathāʾiq traditions due to weaker central control. Section One discusses pen trimming, Khurasani versus Iraqi calligraphic styles, and epistolary protocols. Section Two provides fifteen form letters using the five-part structure (praise, eulogy, petition, supplication, closing) but is derivative, using Fulān as a placeholder. Section Three (the core), presents the following Hujat: acknowledgment (iqrār), lease of chattels (ijārat-i asbāb), lease of persons (ijārat-i nafs), sale with delivery (bayʿ taslīm), commercial partnership (muḍāraba), joint ownership (munāṣafa), postponement (tadbīr), contractual manumission (kitāba), immediate manumission (ʿitq), gift (hiba), conditional sale (bayʿ sharṭ), and deferment of payment (hujjat-i muhlat).
Isfarāyini’s attempt to bridge inshāʾ and wathāʾiq fails because the wathīqa writer is confined within a “fortress of legal concepts” with little flexibility, while the munshī enjoys unlimited rhetorical freedom. The two genres operate under different epistemic regimes: one prioritizes legal certainty, the other aesthetic ambiguity. The Hujat preserve concrete data absent from chronicles. On monetary systems, a loan deed records “one hundred dīnār-i ʿadlī of the Kipchak mint of Amīr Shāhrukhī”, specifying that two silver dīnārs equal one and a half mithqāls of pure silver. On urban topography, a land deed specifies “within Herat, in the eastern Niẓāmiyya quarter”. On material culture, a surety deed accepts “one Mongolian gelding” as collateral for a three-year land lease. On social hierarchy, all deeds require the individual’s name, father’s name, and grandfather’s name. On vulnerable populations, manumission deeds ensure enslaved persons are not inherited as chattel, and a minor’s property deed requires the father to provide legal surety.
Compared to Nāmūs Khwārī’s <em>Ḥadāʾiq al-Wathāʾiq</em>, Isfarāyini offers a more focused selection of ḥujaj but greater detail on commercial contracts. Compared to Kāzarūnī’s <em>Kitāb al-Shurūṭ</em>, his work is less comprehensive but more pedagogically streamlined. Ottoman and Arabic <em>Ṣukūk</em> manuscripts show remarkable similarity to Isfarāyini’s models, suggesting a transregional scribal culture.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions </strong>
The analysis yields four principal results. First, Isfarāyini’s treatise is the earliest known systematic attempt to hybridize Moshātʾ and wathāʾiq in Persian. The synthesis failed due to irreconcilable epistemic differences between literary ambiguity and legal certainty. However, this very failure exposes the distinct professional logics of the chancery (munshī) and judiciary (qāḍī) in the late Timurid period—a distinction rarely articulated in theoretical sources but visible through the structural tensions of this hybrid text. Second, the fourteen ḥujaj represent a significant innovation in categorization and thematic focus. By prioritizing commercial and social contracts (muḍāraba, ijāra, munāṣafa, ʿitq) over ritual or family law, Isfarāyini reveals a specialization in economic jurisprudence. This may be the earliest empirical evidence of professional differentiation within the Timurid judiciary, where some judges focused on commercial matters while others handled family law. Third, the empirical data extracted from the deeds provide a unique source for economic, social, and legal history. The deeds challenge monolithic narratives of absolute patriarchal authority by revealing legal protections for children’s property. They also document three distinct legal pathways to manumission (ʿitq, tadbīr, kitāba) with clauses preventing inheritance of enslaved persons as chattel. Fourth, the comparative analysis demonstrates that Isfarāyini’s work belongs to a robust, transregional tradition of wathāʾiq-nigārī stretching from Ilkhanid Iran to Ottoman Anatolia, suggesting a shared scribal curriculum that transcended political boundaries and sectarian differences. The study concludes that despite its author’s marginal status and modest size, Isfarāyini’s <em>Moshātʾ and Ṣukūk</em> is a landmark source for Timurid economic, social, and legal history, filling a critical gap in the history of Islamic legal documentation.
<strong>Abstract </strong>
Islamic documentary writing (wathāʾiq-nigārī) remains an underexplored source for historical research despite its rich economic and social data. This study investigates the late 9th/15th-century Persian treatise <em>Monshātʾ</em> <em>and</em> <em>Ṣukūk</em> by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin Aḥmad Isfarāyini, a little-known Timurid judge-secretary and calligrapher. Using textually grounded historical analysis, the study examines the treatise’s thematic, structural, and content-based significance. The findings reveal that Isfarāyini attempted to hybridize literary epistolography (Monshātʾ) and juridical documentary writing (wathāʾiq). While his <em>Moshātʾ</em> sections are derivative, the <em>Sukūk</em> section presents fourteen model legal deeds focused on commercial and social contracts. These deeds preserve invaluable data on monetary systems, urban topography, material culture, social hierarchy, and the legal treatment of vulnerable populations. Although Isfarāyini failed to fully synthesize the two genres due to their divergent epistemologies, his treatise is a landmark source for Timurid commercial law, social history, and judicial professionalism, filling a critical gap in the history of Islamic legal documentation.
<strong>Keywords</strong>: Timurid Period, <em>Monshāt</em> Writing, Documentary Writing, <em>Ṣukūk Sharʿiyya</em>, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin Aḥmad Isfarāyini.
<strong>Introduction </strong>
Documentary writing (wathāʾiq-nigārī)—the drafting of legally binding deeds and contracts according to Islamic jurisprudence—has received remarkably little attention from mainstream historical scholarship. This neglect is striking because wathāʾiq texts provide empirical data on economic transactions, social relations, and the everyday application of Islamic law—domains largely opaque in court chronicles or literary anthologies. While literary epistolography (Moshātʾ) has been extensively studied for its political and cultural narratives, documentary writing remains confined largely to codicological descriptions.
This study addresses this lacuna by analyzing a late 9th/15th-century Persian treatise: <em>Moshātʾ</em> <em>and</em> <em>Ṣukūk Sharʿiyya</em> (Epistles and Legal Deeds) by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin Aḥmad Isfarāyini. Isfarāyini, a calligrapher and judge-secretary (qāḍī/munshī) of the second rank in Timurid Khurasan, completed this work in 898/1493 at the shrine of Shaykh Abū al-Qāsim Naṣrābādī in Isfizar, near Herat. The treatise exists as a single manuscript (University of Tehran MS No. 5706), written in broken nastaʿliq script. The central research question is: What is the thematic, structural, and content-based significance of Isfarāyini’s treatise within the tradition of Islamic documentary writing? Three objectives guide the study are: (1) situating the work within the historical evolution of wathāʾiq-nigārī, (2) analyzing its tripartite structure and attempt to bridge <em>Moshāt</em> and <em>Wathāʾiq</em>, and (3) demonstrating the value of its fourteen model ḥujat (legal deeds) for economic, social, and legal history. The argument is that while Isfarāyini’s synthesis failed, his <em>Ṣukūk</em> section offers a significant innovation in juridical focus and practical utility.
<strong>Materials and Methods </strong>
The unique manuscript of <em>Moshātʾ</em> <em>and</em> <em>Ṣukūk Sharʿiyya</em> (MS Tehran University No. 5706) comprises 87 folios, measures 12 × 7 cm, uses Samarkand paper, and is written in broken nastaʿliq with black ink and cinnabar headings. The manuscript shows damage, crossings-out, and later marginal annotations. The colophon dates the work to 12 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 898 AH (January 1493 CE). The text has three sections: 1) rules of writing (ādāb va qavāʿid-i kitābat), 2) model letters (mukātabāt) to kings, governors, women, scholars, poets, physicians, and parents, and 3) legal deeds (ṣukūk sharʿiyya) as fourteen model ḥujaj.
The study draws on earlier and contemporary manuals: <em>Wathāʾiq-i Ghāzānī</em> (late 7th/13th century), Nāmūs Khwārī’s<em> Ḥadāʾiq al-Wathāʾiq</em> (early 8th/14th century), Muḥammad Kāzarūnī’s <em>Kitāb al-Shurūṭ</em> (872/1467), and Ottoman Turkish and Arabic <em>Ṣukūk</em> manuscripts from the 10th/16th century. The research employs textually grounded historical analysis with three levels: 1) codicological and paleographic analysis of the manuscript, 2) structural and thematic comparison with conventions of Moshātʾ and wathāʾiq genres, and 3) content-based juridical-historical analysis of the fourteen Hujat to extract empirical data on monetary systems, urban geography, material culture, legal terminology, and social relations, informed by classical Islamic legal taxonomies of ʿuqūd (contracts) and īqāʿāt (unilateral acts).
<strong>Research Findings </strong>
Islamic documentary writing emerged from a synthesis of Sassanid bureaucratic practices and early Islamic legal needs. The Persian term čuk was Arabized as ṣukk (pl. ṣukūk), originally meaning ration vouchers. By the Timurid period, ṣukūk denoted legal instruments for sales, leases, loans, partnerships, and manumissions. Mongol invasions and political fragmentation created recurring needs for standardization. Frontier provinces developed strong wathāʾiq traditions due to weaker central control. Section One discusses pen trimming, Khurasani versus Iraqi calligraphic styles, and epistolary protocols. Section Two provides fifteen form letters using the five-part structure (praise, eulogy, petition, supplication, closing) but is derivative, using Fulān as a placeholder. Section Three (the core), presents the following Hujat: acknowledgment (iqrār), lease of chattels (ijārat-i asbāb), lease of persons (ijārat-i nafs), sale with delivery (bayʿ taslīm), commercial partnership (muḍāraba), joint ownership (munāṣafa), postponement (tadbīr), contractual manumission (kitāba), immediate manumission (ʿitq), gift (hiba), conditional sale (bayʿ sharṭ), and deferment of payment (hujjat-i muhlat).
Isfarāyini’s attempt to bridge inshāʾ and wathāʾiq fails because the wathīqa writer is confined within a “fortress of legal concepts” with little flexibility, while the munshī enjoys unlimited rhetorical freedom. The two genres operate under different epistemic regimes: one prioritizes legal certainty, the other aesthetic ambiguity. The Hujat preserve concrete data absent from chronicles. On monetary systems, a loan deed records “one hundred dīnār-i ʿadlī of the Kipchak mint of Amīr Shāhrukhī”, specifying that two silver dīnārs equal one and a half mithqāls of pure silver. On urban topography, a land deed specifies “within Herat, in the eastern Niẓāmiyya quarter”. On material culture, a surety deed accepts “one Mongolian gelding” as collateral for a three-year land lease. On social hierarchy, all deeds require the individual’s name, father’s name, and grandfather’s name. On vulnerable populations, manumission deeds ensure enslaved persons are not inherited as chattel, and a minor’s property deed requires the father to provide legal surety.
Compared to Nāmūs Khwārī’s <em>Ḥadāʾiq al-Wathāʾiq</em>, Isfarāyini offers a more focused selection of ḥujaj but greater detail on commercial contracts. Compared to Kāzarūnī’s <em>Kitāb al-Shurūṭ</em>, his work is less comprehensive but more pedagogically streamlined. Ottoman and Arabic <em>Ṣukūk</em> manuscripts show remarkable similarity to Isfarāyini’s models, suggesting a transregional scribal culture.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions </strong>
The analysis yields four principal results. First, Isfarāyini’s treatise is the earliest known systematic attempt to hybridize Moshātʾ and wathāʾiq in Persian. The synthesis failed due to irreconcilable epistemic differences between literary ambiguity and legal certainty. However, this very failure exposes the distinct professional logics of the chancery (munshī) and judiciary (qāḍī) in the late Timurid period—a distinction rarely articulated in theoretical sources but visible through the structural tensions of this hybrid text. Second, the fourteen ḥujaj represent a significant innovation in categorization and thematic focus. By prioritizing commercial and social contracts (muḍāraba, ijāra, munāṣafa, ʿitq) over ritual or family law, Isfarāyini reveals a specialization in economic jurisprudence. This may be the earliest empirical evidence of professional differentiation within the Timurid judiciary, where some judges focused on commercial matters while others handled family law. Third, the empirical data extracted from the deeds provide a unique source for economic, social, and legal history. The deeds challenge monolithic narratives of absolute patriarchal authority by revealing legal protections for children’s property. They also document three distinct legal pathways to manumission (ʿitq, tadbīr, kitāba) with clauses preventing inheritance of enslaved persons as chattel. Fourth, the comparative analysis demonstrates that Isfarāyini’s work belongs to a robust, transregional tradition of wathāʾiq-nigārī stretching from Ilkhanid Iran to Ottoman Anatolia, suggesting a shared scribal curriculum that transcended political boundaries and sectarian differences. The study concludes that despite its author’s marginal status and modest size, Isfarāyini’s <em>Moshātʾ and Ṣukūk</em> is a landmark source for Timurid economic, social, and legal history, filling a critical gap in the history of Islamic legal documentation.
https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30332_acc7446e1ecde0fc98da3fb1fd7621f4.pdfUniversity of IsfahanHistorical Researches2008-625318120260321Economic Diplomacy of Dr. Mossadegh's Government: Transition from Oil Revenues to Foreign Trade Development (1951–1953)Economic Diplomacy of Dr. Mossadegh's Government: Transition from Oil Revenues to Foreign Trade Development (1951–1953)41603024610.22108/jhr.2026.147280.2866FAZahraTalaei HatamPh.D. in History, Department of History, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IranJournal Article20251110<strong>Abstract</strong>
This study examines how Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh’s government (1951–1953), during a critical period of economic crisis, compensated for severe oil revenue shortages through the expansion of foreign trade, thereby transforming oil dependency into an opportunity for structural economic reform. Using a descriptive–analytical methodology and drawing on unpublished documents from the National Archives, records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and official statistics of the Customs Administration, the research analyzes Iran’s foreign trade policies during the oil embargo. The findings indicate that the government implemented an innovative export–import prioritization system, whereby export revenues from each category were allocated exclusively to corresponding imports. Simultaneously, new economic institutions were established, including the Export Development Bank, Chambers of Commerce, and temporary free zones with customs exemptions for domestic products. Furthermore, comprehensive barter agreements with Eastern Bloc and Western European countries—such as the USSR, West Germany, Italy, and Japan—converted cash-based trade into barter arrangements, effectively compensating for foreign currency shortages. In addition, the Point Four Program contributed to agricultural development through extensive well drilling, restoration of traditional qanats, construction of small dams, and agricultural mechanization. Collectively, these measures significantly improved Iran’s trade balance during the crisis period and enhanced economic resilience under sanctions.
<strong>Keywords: </strong>Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh’s Government, Oil Revenues, Iran's Foreign Trade, Non-Oil Exports, Imports.
<strong>Introduction</strong>
The nationalization of Iran’s oil industry on 20 March 1951 marked a turning point in the country’s contemporary economic history. This decision provoked comprehensive British sanctions that plunged Iran into an unprecedented foreign currency crisis. The sudden collapse of oil revenues—the primary pillar of the state budget—necessitated immediate and innovative economic responses.
While most historical studies emphasize the political and military dimensions of the 19 August 1953 coup, systematic research on the economic strategies of Mossadegh’s government during the crisis years remains limited. This study therefore focuses on Mossadegh’s premiership and examines four principal economic strategies: (1) the export–import classification system, (2) institutional development, (3) barter diplomacy, and (4) the Point Four development program.
The central research question is: <em>What strategies and practical measures did Iran adopt for foreign trade management during 1951–1953, and how effective were they?</em> The analysis is based on official documents and statistical data from the Customs Administration.
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
This study employs a descriptive–analytical approach and relies on unpublished documents from the National Archives of Iran, records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official statistics of the Customs Administration, and contemporary newspapers such as <em>Etela'at</em> and <em>Bakhtar Emruz</em>.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
Mossadegh’s four key strategies not only mitigated the foreign currency crisis but also reshaped Iran’s foreign trade structure. These strategies included the export–import prioritization system, institutional reform, barter diplomacy, and agricultural development.
<strong>Export–Import Prioritization System</strong>
The government introduced a two-tier classification system for exports and imports (Tier 1: essential goods; Tier 2: non-essential goods), allocating export revenues from each tier exclusively to the corresponding import category. In 1953, this system expanded into three tiers. This policy ensured the continuous supply of essential goods despite foreign exchange shortages and restricted unnecessary imports, offering an effective model for crisis management in oil-dependent economies.
<strong> </strong>
<strong>Institutional Development</strong>
Mossadegh’s government organized trade policies and established modern and sustainable infrastructure through the Export Promotion and Development Law, the establishment of the Export Development Bank, the creation of chambers of commerce, and the development of free ports. The new framework enhanced coordination among Iranian merchants, strengthened domestic commercial capacity, and improved industrial employment and production by facilitating exports.
<strong>Barter Diplomacy</strong>
The government established extensive barter trade relations with countries such as the USSR, West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. These agreements eliminated reliance on foreign currency and sustained foreign trade through direct commodity exchange. Barter diplomacy enabled Iran to bypass Western sanctions and diversify its trading partners, thereby increasing economic resilience.
<strong>Agricultural Transformation</strong>
Strategic use of Point Four assistance promoted rural development through well drilling, restoration of qanats, dam construction, and agricultural mechanization. These reforms increased agricultural output, strengthened non-oil exports, improved food self-sufficiency, and ensured the economic stability of rural regions.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
Through integrated management and innovative economic policies, Mossadegh’s government transformed the oil embargo from a severe crisis into an opportunity for economic diversification. Key measures included export–import regulation, barter agreements with multiple countries, empowerment of domestic merchants, and agricultural development.
These policies proved effective in stabilizing Iran’s trade balance: exports were strategically managed, imports were strictly controlled, and the vacuum created by the loss of oil revenues was partially compensated. The Mossadegh experience demonstrates that Iran’s economy, even without full access to oil revenues, possessed the capacity to meet foreign exchange needs through non-oil exports and productive sector activation.
Despite structural limitations and external pressures, Mossadegh’s multifaceted economic diplomacy highlights the potential of export diversification and innovative trade management as practical strategies for monocrop economies facing international sanctions.
<strong>Abstract</strong>
This study examines how Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh’s government (1951–1953), during a critical period of economic crisis, compensated for severe oil revenue shortages through the expansion of foreign trade, thereby transforming oil dependency into an opportunity for structural economic reform. Using a descriptive–analytical methodology and drawing on unpublished documents from the National Archives, records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and official statistics of the Customs Administration, the research analyzes Iran’s foreign trade policies during the oil embargo. The findings indicate that the government implemented an innovative export–import prioritization system, whereby export revenues from each category were allocated exclusively to corresponding imports. Simultaneously, new economic institutions were established, including the Export Development Bank, Chambers of Commerce, and temporary free zones with customs exemptions for domestic products. Furthermore, comprehensive barter agreements with Eastern Bloc and Western European countries—such as the USSR, West Germany, Italy, and Japan—converted cash-based trade into barter arrangements, effectively compensating for foreign currency shortages. In addition, the Point Four Program contributed to agricultural development through extensive well drilling, restoration of traditional qanats, construction of small dams, and agricultural mechanization. Collectively, these measures significantly improved Iran’s trade balance during the crisis period and enhanced economic resilience under sanctions.
<strong>Keywords: </strong>Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh’s Government, Oil Revenues, Iran's Foreign Trade, Non-Oil Exports, Imports.
<strong>Introduction</strong>
The nationalization of Iran’s oil industry on 20 March 1951 marked a turning point in the country’s contemporary economic history. This decision provoked comprehensive British sanctions that plunged Iran into an unprecedented foreign currency crisis. The sudden collapse of oil revenues—the primary pillar of the state budget—necessitated immediate and innovative economic responses.
While most historical studies emphasize the political and military dimensions of the 19 August 1953 coup, systematic research on the economic strategies of Mossadegh’s government during the crisis years remains limited. This study therefore focuses on Mossadegh’s premiership and examines four principal economic strategies: (1) the export–import classification system, (2) institutional development, (3) barter diplomacy, and (4) the Point Four development program.
The central research question is: <em>What strategies and practical measures did Iran adopt for foreign trade management during 1951–1953, and how effective were they?</em> The analysis is based on official documents and statistical data from the Customs Administration.
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
This study employs a descriptive–analytical approach and relies on unpublished documents from the National Archives of Iran, records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official statistics of the Customs Administration, and contemporary newspapers such as <em>Etela'at</em> and <em>Bakhtar Emruz</em>.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
Mossadegh’s four key strategies not only mitigated the foreign currency crisis but also reshaped Iran’s foreign trade structure. These strategies included the export–import prioritization system, institutional reform, barter diplomacy, and agricultural development.
<strong>Export–Import Prioritization System</strong>
The government introduced a two-tier classification system for exports and imports (Tier 1: essential goods; Tier 2: non-essential goods), allocating export revenues from each tier exclusively to the corresponding import category. In 1953, this system expanded into three tiers. This policy ensured the continuous supply of essential goods despite foreign exchange shortages and restricted unnecessary imports, offering an effective model for crisis management in oil-dependent economies.
<strong> </strong>
<strong>Institutional Development</strong>
Mossadegh’s government organized trade policies and established modern and sustainable infrastructure through the Export Promotion and Development Law, the establishment of the Export Development Bank, the creation of chambers of commerce, and the development of free ports. The new framework enhanced coordination among Iranian merchants, strengthened domestic commercial capacity, and improved industrial employment and production by facilitating exports.
<strong>Barter Diplomacy</strong>
The government established extensive barter trade relations with countries such as the USSR, West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. These agreements eliminated reliance on foreign currency and sustained foreign trade through direct commodity exchange. Barter diplomacy enabled Iran to bypass Western sanctions and diversify its trading partners, thereby increasing economic resilience.
<strong>Agricultural Transformation</strong>
Strategic use of Point Four assistance promoted rural development through well drilling, restoration of qanats, dam construction, and agricultural mechanization. These reforms increased agricultural output, strengthened non-oil exports, improved food self-sufficiency, and ensured the economic stability of rural regions.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
Through integrated management and innovative economic policies, Mossadegh’s government transformed the oil embargo from a severe crisis into an opportunity for economic diversification. Key measures included export–import regulation, barter agreements with multiple countries, empowerment of domestic merchants, and agricultural development.
These policies proved effective in stabilizing Iran’s trade balance: exports were strategically managed, imports were strictly controlled, and the vacuum created by the loss of oil revenues was partially compensated. The Mossadegh experience demonstrates that Iran’s economy, even without full access to oil revenues, possessed the capacity to meet foreign exchange needs through non-oil exports and productive sector activation.
Despite structural limitations and external pressures, Mossadegh’s multifaceted economic diplomacy highlights the potential of export diversification and innovative trade management as practical strategies for monocrop economies facing international sanctions.
https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30246_abf4172a310858e5ed4a1e56bfcc6142.pdfUniversity of IsfahanHistorical Researches2008-625318120260321The Political and Religious Role and Influence of the Tabarra'iyan in Safavid GovernanceThe Political and Religious Role and Influence of the Tabarra'iyan in Safavid Governance61773032710.22108/jhr.2026.147637.2882FAAkbarBayatPhD Candidate, Department of History, Islamic Azad University, Najafabad Branch, Najafabad, IranShokouhossadatArabi HashemiAssistant Professor, Department of History, Islamic Azad University, Najafabad Branch, Najafabad, IranFeizollahBoushasb GoushehAssociate Professor, Department of History, Islamic Azad University, Najafabad Branch, Najafabad, IranJournal Article20251203<strong>Abstract</strong>
Following the establishment of the Safavid Kingdom by Shah Ismail I, the utilization of the <em>tabarrā</em> (disavowal/imprecation) to create a religious distinction led to the formation of a group called the Tabarrā’iyyān (or Tabarra'is). Their duty was to express <em>tabarrā</em> and punish those who disobeyed the practice. The behavior of the Tabarrā’iyyān during this period had religious and political impacts both inside and outside the borders of Iran, which require examination. This study addresses this issue by focusing on the central question: What was the political and religious role and impact of the Tabarrā’iyyān in Safavid governance? This research answers this question using a library-based (documentary) method. The findings show that in the early Safavid period, the Tabarrā’iyyān were a group serving the government, pursuing the project of religious conversion in Iran. Their duties included expressing <em>tabarrā</em> alongside the Safavid military forces, in religious and governmental assemblies, and accompanying the ulema (scholars) and amirs (nobles). The actions of the Tabarrā’iyyān in this era gave a religious dimension to the political confrontations between the Safavids and the Uzbeks and Ottomans, and increased persecution of Shias outside the Iranian realm. After a period of prohibition during the reign of Ismail II, the Tabarrā’iyyān gradually lost their governmental role and, due to the delegation of religious affairs to the ulema, they were integrated into the Shia religious society.
<strong>Keywords:</strong> Tabarrā’iyyān, Safavid, Shah Ismail, Tabarra, Shia and Sunni.
<strong>Introduction</strong>
The Tabarrā’iyyān were a group active during the Safavid Kingdom, especially in its initial period of establishment, whose duty was to express <em>tabarrā</em>, and curse and insult the Sunni Caliphs. In fact, the Tabarrā’iyyān during this era were an ideological force that executed the Safavid policy of religious conversion of Iranians by expressing <em>tabarrā</em>.
In addition to the violence and bloodshed they caused inside the Safavid territory, the actions of the Tabarrā’iyyān provoked the anger and enmity of Sunni governments in the West and East of Iran, giving a religious appearance to their rivalry and wars with the Safavids. During this time, the cursing and imprecations of the Tabarrā’iyyān increased the <em>takfīrī</em> (excommunication) fatwas against the Shia among Sunni scholars. Consequently, the mass murder and looting of Shias intensified during the attacks of the Uzbeks in the East and the Ottomans in the West of Iran.
Based on this, the aim of this research is to examine the political and religious role of the Tabarrā’iyyān in Safavid governance, addressing this research question: What was the political and religious role and impact of the Tabarrā’iyyān in Safavid governance? To answer this question, we collect and analyze information using the library (documentary) method. In examining the research background, we only found the article "<em>The Tabarra’iyan and the Early Safavids</em>" by Rosemary Stanfield-Johnson, which describes the Tabarrā’iyyān and their activities at the beginning of the Safavid period. However, it focuses less on their political and religious role and impact, and only covers the early Safavid period. Aside from this article, we did not find any research that directly examines the political and religious role of the Tabarrā’iyyān in Safavid governance.
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
This research is of the fundamental research type, which uses a descriptive-interpretive method to analyze and interpret historical information. This research relies on historical sources of Safavid proponents for data collection, with historical books written during the Safavid era holding priority. <em>Khulāṣat al-Tawārīkh</em>, <em>Aḥsan al-Tawārīkh</em>, and <em>Rawḍat al-Ṣafawiyya</em> are among the most important of these sources.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
Based on the findings of this research, the Tabarrā’iyyān were a popular and Sufi-leaning group serving the Safavid Kingdom. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, the Tabarrā’iyyān transformed into an organized group and a powerful institution within the court and Safavid society, receiving special attention from the Shah. They had specific duties and were allocated salaries and stipends by the King. The actions of the Tabarrā’iyyān, alongside other actions such as the killing of Sunnis and the destruction of the tombs of Sunni scholars, intensified the enmity of the Uzbeks and Ottomans toward the Safavids and gave a religious color to their political rivalry. In the religious dimension, the behaviors of the Tabarrā’iyyān also highlighted the fatwas of <em>takfīr</em> (excommunication) against the Shia during this period.
From the middle to the end of the Safavid reign, due to the prominence of the role of Shia ulema in holding religious rituals and in relations with the Ottomans and peace treaties with them, the Tabarrā’iyyān, as a governmental movement, suffered a decline. Nevertheless, during this period, the culture of <em>tabarrā</em> and the Shia rituals that the Tabarrā’iyyān played a role in shaping continued in the form of religious ceremonies and <em>ta'ziyeh</em> (passion plays), but under the supervision of the ulema and not in the form of the street activities of the Tabarrā’iyyān.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
During the establishment period of the Safavid government, the Tabarrā’iyyān were their executive and propaganda arm for implementing the policy of religious conversion in Iran. Some of their actions during this period did not comply with religious and jurisprudential principles. The compulsion of Sunni scholars to perform <em>tabarrā</em> and their execution were primarily based on the spirit and motivations of Shah Ismail Safavi, who sought to establish dominance over the Iranian realm and achieve its political and religious unification.
The actions of the Tabarrā’iyyān during this era intensified religious enmities. The Uzbeks and Ottomans justified war against the Iranians and the Safavids by citing these behaviors and obtaining <em>takfīr</em> fatwas against the Shia from some Sunni scholars.
As this period passed, the Safavid government gained more stability and rationality, and religious scholars gained more influence in the religious affairs of the Safavid government. This led to the Safavids moving away from violent acts concerning <em>tabarrā</em>. During the brief reign of Shah Ismail II, the Tabarrā’iyyān faced a prohibition of activity and restriction, which was lifted after his death. However, the influence of Shia ulema in the Safavid court, the delegation of religious programs to them, and the diplomatic relations between the Safavids and the Ottomans—including the commitment to refrain from <em>tabarrā</em> in their peace treaties—led the Tabarrā’iyyān to be removed from the special group under the government. They gradually integrated into the Shia religious society and lost their political prominence.
<strong>Abstract</strong>
Following the establishment of the Safavid Kingdom by Shah Ismail I, the utilization of the <em>tabarrā</em> (disavowal/imprecation) to create a religious distinction led to the formation of a group called the Tabarrā’iyyān (or Tabarra'is). Their duty was to express <em>tabarrā</em> and punish those who disobeyed the practice. The behavior of the Tabarrā’iyyān during this period had religious and political impacts both inside and outside the borders of Iran, which require examination. This study addresses this issue by focusing on the central question: What was the political and religious role and impact of the Tabarrā’iyyān in Safavid governance? This research answers this question using a library-based (documentary) method. The findings show that in the early Safavid period, the Tabarrā’iyyān were a group serving the government, pursuing the project of religious conversion in Iran. Their duties included expressing <em>tabarrā</em> alongside the Safavid military forces, in religious and governmental assemblies, and accompanying the ulema (scholars) and amirs (nobles). The actions of the Tabarrā’iyyān in this era gave a religious dimension to the political confrontations between the Safavids and the Uzbeks and Ottomans, and increased persecution of Shias outside the Iranian realm. After a period of prohibition during the reign of Ismail II, the Tabarrā’iyyān gradually lost their governmental role and, due to the delegation of religious affairs to the ulema, they were integrated into the Shia religious society.
<strong>Keywords:</strong> Tabarrā’iyyān, Safavid, Shah Ismail, Tabarra, Shia and Sunni.
<strong>Introduction</strong>
The Tabarrā’iyyān were a group active during the Safavid Kingdom, especially in its initial period of establishment, whose duty was to express <em>tabarrā</em>, and curse and insult the Sunni Caliphs. In fact, the Tabarrā’iyyān during this era were an ideological force that executed the Safavid policy of religious conversion of Iranians by expressing <em>tabarrā</em>.
In addition to the violence and bloodshed they caused inside the Safavid territory, the actions of the Tabarrā’iyyān provoked the anger and enmity of Sunni governments in the West and East of Iran, giving a religious appearance to their rivalry and wars with the Safavids. During this time, the cursing and imprecations of the Tabarrā’iyyān increased the <em>takfīrī</em> (excommunication) fatwas against the Shia among Sunni scholars. Consequently, the mass murder and looting of Shias intensified during the attacks of the Uzbeks in the East and the Ottomans in the West of Iran.
Based on this, the aim of this research is to examine the political and religious role of the Tabarrā’iyyān in Safavid governance, addressing this research question: What was the political and religious role and impact of the Tabarrā’iyyān in Safavid governance? To answer this question, we collect and analyze information using the library (documentary) method. In examining the research background, we only found the article "<em>The Tabarra’iyan and the Early Safavids</em>" by Rosemary Stanfield-Johnson, which describes the Tabarrā’iyyān and their activities at the beginning of the Safavid period. However, it focuses less on their political and religious role and impact, and only covers the early Safavid period. Aside from this article, we did not find any research that directly examines the political and religious role of the Tabarrā’iyyān in Safavid governance.
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
This research is of the fundamental research type, which uses a descriptive-interpretive method to analyze and interpret historical information. This research relies on historical sources of Safavid proponents for data collection, with historical books written during the Safavid era holding priority. <em>Khulāṣat al-Tawārīkh</em>, <em>Aḥsan al-Tawārīkh</em>, and <em>Rawḍat al-Ṣafawiyya</em> are among the most important of these sources.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
Based on the findings of this research, the Tabarrā’iyyān were a popular and Sufi-leaning group serving the Safavid Kingdom. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, the Tabarrā’iyyān transformed into an organized group and a powerful institution within the court and Safavid society, receiving special attention from the Shah. They had specific duties and were allocated salaries and stipends by the King. The actions of the Tabarrā’iyyān, alongside other actions such as the killing of Sunnis and the destruction of the tombs of Sunni scholars, intensified the enmity of the Uzbeks and Ottomans toward the Safavids and gave a religious color to their political rivalry. In the religious dimension, the behaviors of the Tabarrā’iyyān also highlighted the fatwas of <em>takfīr</em> (excommunication) against the Shia during this period.
From the middle to the end of the Safavid reign, due to the prominence of the role of Shia ulema in holding religious rituals and in relations with the Ottomans and peace treaties with them, the Tabarrā’iyyān, as a governmental movement, suffered a decline. Nevertheless, during this period, the culture of <em>tabarrā</em> and the Shia rituals that the Tabarrā’iyyān played a role in shaping continued in the form of religious ceremonies and <em>ta'ziyeh</em> (passion plays), but under the supervision of the ulema and not in the form of the street activities of the Tabarrā’iyyān.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
During the establishment period of the Safavid government, the Tabarrā’iyyān were their executive and propaganda arm for implementing the policy of religious conversion in Iran. Some of their actions during this period did not comply with religious and jurisprudential principles. The compulsion of Sunni scholars to perform <em>tabarrā</em> and their execution were primarily based on the spirit and motivations of Shah Ismail Safavi, who sought to establish dominance over the Iranian realm and achieve its political and religious unification.
The actions of the Tabarrā’iyyān during this era intensified religious enmities. The Uzbeks and Ottomans justified war against the Iranians and the Safavids by citing these behaviors and obtaining <em>takfīr</em> fatwas against the Shia from some Sunni scholars.
As this period passed, the Safavid government gained more stability and rationality, and religious scholars gained more influence in the religious affairs of the Safavid government. This led to the Safavids moving away from violent acts concerning <em>tabarrā</em>. During the brief reign of Shah Ismail II, the Tabarrā’iyyān faced a prohibition of activity and restriction, which was lifted after his death. However, the influence of Shia ulema in the Safavid court, the delegation of religious programs to them, and the diplomatic relations between the Safavids and the Ottomans—including the commitment to refrain from <em>tabarrā</em> in their peace treaties—led the Tabarrā’iyyān to be removed from the special group under the government. They gradually integrated into the Shia religious society and lost their political prominence.
https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30327_6de7931799787f03effeef8e75e067c3.pdfUniversity of IsfahanHistorical Researches2008-625318120260321A Comparative Study of the African Slave Trade in the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic within the Context of Britain’s Colonial Policy (18th-20th Centuries)A Comparative Study of the African Slave Trade in the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic within the Context of Britain’s Colonial Policy (18th-20th Centuries)791003035210.22108/jhr.2026.147708.2884FAJamshidNorooziAssociate Professor of History, Department of History, Faculty of Literature, Alzahra University, Tehran, IranMasoumehHanifehPostdoctoral Researcher, Department of History, Faculty of Literature, Alzahra University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20251210<strong>Abstract</strong>
The Persian Gulf and the Atlantic played significant roles in the global system of slavery during the 18th to the 20th centuries, with merchants in both regions engaged in the slave trade from East and West Africa. However, the slave trade in these regions exhibited fundamental differences in economic, political-military, and geographical contexts, leading to the formation of distinct patterns in the structure and functioning of this trade. Britain was a decisive actor in the slave trade of both regions. Accordingly, the present study aims to examine Britain’s approach to the slave trade in these regions, seeking to analyze and compare the models of trading, pricing, living conditions and rights of slaves, routes, and Britain’s approach in both areas. The main question is: How did the differences between the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic lead to Britain’s differentiated approach to controlling the slave trade in Africa? Using the historical method and an analytical-comparative approach, this study examines historical data and evidence through written sources and official documents. Britain’s policy in both regions was shaped by its colonial interests, economic-military objectives, and the political-economic characteristics of each region. In the Atlantic, Britain’s direct presence stemmed from economic competition with other European powers and the demand for labor, whereas in the Persian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent, Britain’s strategic and political-military motives led it toward an intermediary and controlling role. Differences in the political-economic and geopolitical structures of the two regions resulted in significant variation in Britain’s mode of intervention, policymaking, and conduct regarding the slave trade.
<strong>Keywords:</strong> Atlantic, Africa, Britain, Slave Trade, Persian Gulf.
<strong>Introduction</strong>
The African Slave Trade began in very early times and continued until the mid-20th century. Despite anti-slavery activities during the 19th and 20th centuries, slave traders continued this trade through smuggling and illegal sales. African slaves were captured from regions in East, West, and Southern Africa. The African slave trade can generally be examined along two routes: 1) the Atlantic route, involving the transfer of West African slaves to markets in the Caribbean and the Americas; and 2) the Persian Gulf and Red Sea route, involving the transfer of East African slaves toward the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian subcontinent. The African slave trade in these regions is among the significant subjects within the field of slave trade studies.
This research, aiming to provide a comparative analysis of the African slave trade in these two regions and to examine trade routes, the conditions of enslaved individuals, as well as Britain’s approach—as one of the major actors in the global slave trade—seeks to investigate the points of convergence and divergence and the distinct British policies in the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic, which constituted the primary destinations of African slaves. Although numerous studies have been conducted by international scholars on this topic, they have predominantly focused on the West African slave trade within the Atlantic world, while Eastern slaves and their trade in the Persian Gulf have received comparatively little scholarly attention. Moreover, Persian researchers have also scarcely addressed this subject, which has resulted in a limited scholarly background.
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
The present study employs the historical method and an analytical-comparative approach to examine the points of divergence and convergence in the African slave trade across the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic. Conducted in two principal stages—data collection, followed by their evaluation and comparative analysis—the research draws upon British reports and those of its affiliated companies, non-Persian primary sources on the slave trade, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century British studies, through which the core data pertaining to this phenomenon were extracted. Subsequently, with the aim of identifying similarities and differences in the slave trade across the eastern and western regions of Africa, and of assessing Britain’s role in this commerce, a comparative study of slavery in Africa within the broader context of British colonial policies was undertaken.
The existing sources in this field are predominantly in English, and Persian primary sources and documents do not provide comprehensive <strong>or</strong> systematically classified data on the African slave trade in the Persian Gulf and Atlantic, nor on its eastern and western routes. For this reason, in examining the slave trade of East and West Africa, non-Persian documents and reports—such as British governmental records and those of the East India Company—along with primary sources, nineteenth- and twentieth-century British studies, and related notes, constitute the most essential and indispensable materials available.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
West African slaves were transported via the Atlantic Ocean to various parts of the Americas, where they were employed in different sectors, often with a productive purpose. The Atlantic slave trade initially began in southeastern Africa (Mozambique and Madagascar); however, the remoteness of this region from the northern parts of the continent and major shipping routes, along with its hazards, hindered the expansion of the southeastern trade, and the capture of slaves for the Atlantic trade flourished from West and Central Africa. East African slaves were brought into the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent, and the Red Sea regions, where they were sold. Generally, slaves residing on the coasts of the Persian Gulf were divided into two groups: transit slaves and those born there.
Three main routes were used in the trade of African slaves to the Persian Gulf: (1) from Africa to Musandam, (2) from Africa to Ras al-Hadd and Sur, and (3) from Africa to Socotra and Al-Mukalla. Britain and its agents—from the East India Company to the Royal African Company and the South Sea Company—played a major and decisive role in both the Atlantic and Persian Gulf regions and their surrounding areas. Nevertheless, the British government’s approach and operational methods differed and produced varied outcomes. In the Atlantic region and the trade of West African slaves, Britain exercised direct control over slavery; this trade formed a fundamental pillar of Britain’s economy and a primary instrument of influence in its colonies. In contrast, in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean regions, although Britain possessed influence and dominance, the central role in the slave trade was held by local brokers and merchants, and the trade was conducted through them.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
In the Persian Gulf region, Britain primarily sought mediation and the acquisition of favorable positions and high political-military influence; for this reason, British intervention in the Persian Gulf slave system and the Atlantic slave trade had fundamental differences. These differences were also evident in the efforts to abolish slavery. In the Atlantic trade, Britain used military force and strict laws extensively, taking direct control over the trade and smuggling of slaves. In the Persian Gulf, however, it pursued a policy of conciliation with local sheikhs and rulers, engaging central governments such as the Qajar state and signing multiple treaties regarding the prohibition of slavery, thereby reducing its military expenditures in the Persian Gulf compared to the Atlantic and American colonies while expanding its influence in the region.
Overall, a comparison of the East and West African slave trades in the Persian Gulf and Atlantic regions indicates that Britain’s approach to the slave trade—and ultimately to its suppression—was guided more by its objectives and regional interests than by humanitarian concerns. In the Atlantic world, economic interests were paramount, and the campaign against slavery functioned largely as a tool to counter the expansion of other European powers in West Africa, to protect vital natural resources and gold mines, and to control the wealth of the continent. In the Persian Gulf, Britain’s priorities were primarily strategic and political; based on these political-military objectives and its relations with local rulers, Britain assumed an intermediary and mediating role in the regional slave trade.<strong>Abstract</strong>
The Persian Gulf and the Atlantic played significant roles in the global system of slavery during the 18th to the 20th centuries, with merchants in both regions engaged in the slave trade from East and West Africa. However, the slave trade in these regions exhibited fundamental differences in economic, political-military, and geographical contexts, leading to the formation of distinct patterns in the structure and functioning of this trade. Britain was a decisive actor in the slave trade of both regions. Accordingly, the present study aims to examine Britain’s approach to the slave trade in these regions, seeking to analyze and compare the models of trading, pricing, living conditions and rights of slaves, routes, and Britain’s approach in both areas. The main question is: How did the differences between the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic lead to Britain’s differentiated approach to controlling the slave trade in Africa? Using the historical method and an analytical-comparative approach, this study examines historical data and evidence through written sources and official documents. Britain’s policy in both regions was shaped by its colonial interests, economic-military objectives, and the political-economic characteristics of each region. In the Atlantic, Britain’s direct presence stemmed from economic competition with other European powers and the demand for labor, whereas in the Persian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent, Britain’s strategic and political-military motives led it toward an intermediary and controlling role. Differences in the political-economic and geopolitical structures of the two regions resulted in significant variation in Britain’s mode of intervention, policymaking, and conduct regarding the slave trade.
<strong>Keywords:</strong> Atlantic, Africa, Britain, Slave Trade, Persian Gulf.
<strong>Introduction</strong>
The African Slave Trade began in very early times and continued until the mid-20th century. Despite anti-slavery activities during the 19th and 20th centuries, slave traders continued this trade through smuggling and illegal sales. African slaves were captured from regions in East, West, and Southern Africa. The African slave trade can generally be examined along two routes: 1) the Atlantic route, involving the transfer of West African slaves to markets in the Caribbean and the Americas; and 2) the Persian Gulf and Red Sea route, involving the transfer of East African slaves toward the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian subcontinent. The African slave trade in these regions is among the significant subjects within the field of slave trade studies.
This research, aiming to provide a comparative analysis of the African slave trade in these two regions and to examine trade routes, the conditions of enslaved individuals, as well as Britain’s approach—as one of the major actors in the global slave trade—seeks to investigate the points of convergence and divergence and the distinct British policies in the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic, which constituted the primary destinations of African slaves. Although numerous studies have been conducted by international scholars on this topic, they have predominantly focused on the West African slave trade within the Atlantic world, while Eastern slaves and their trade in the Persian Gulf have received comparatively little scholarly attention. Moreover, Persian researchers have also scarcely addressed this subject, which has resulted in a limited scholarly background.
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
The present study employs the historical method and an analytical-comparative approach to examine the points of divergence and convergence in the African slave trade across the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic. Conducted in two principal stages—data collection, followed by their evaluation and comparative analysis—the research draws upon British reports and those of its affiliated companies, non-Persian primary sources on the slave trade, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century British studies, through which the core data pertaining to this phenomenon were extracted. Subsequently, with the aim of identifying similarities and differences in the slave trade across the eastern and western regions of Africa, and of assessing Britain’s role in this commerce, a comparative study of slavery in Africa within the broader context of British colonial policies was undertaken.
The existing sources in this field are predominantly in English, and Persian primary sources and documents do not provide comprehensive <strong>or</strong> systematically classified data on the African slave trade in the Persian Gulf and Atlantic, nor on its eastern and western routes. For this reason, in examining the slave trade of East and West Africa, non-Persian documents and reports—such as British governmental records and those of the East India Company—along with primary sources, nineteenth- and twentieth-century British studies, and related notes, constitute the most essential and indispensable materials available.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
West African slaves were transported via the Atlantic Ocean to various parts of the Americas, where they were employed in different sectors, often with a productive purpose. The Atlantic slave trade initially began in southeastern Africa (Mozambique and Madagascar); however, the remoteness of this region from the northern parts of the continent and major shipping routes, along with its hazards, hindered the expansion of the southeastern trade, and the capture of slaves for the Atlantic trade flourished from West and Central Africa. East African slaves were brought into the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent, and the Red Sea regions, where they were sold. Generally, slaves residing on the coasts of the Persian Gulf were divided into two groups: transit slaves and those born there.
Three main routes were used in the trade of African slaves to the Persian Gulf: (1) from Africa to Musandam, (2) from Africa to Ras al-Hadd and Sur, and (3) from Africa to Socotra and Al-Mukalla. Britain and its agents—from the East India Company to the Royal African Company and the South Sea Company—played a major and decisive role in both the Atlantic and Persian Gulf regions and their surrounding areas. Nevertheless, the British government’s approach and operational methods differed and produced varied outcomes. In the Atlantic region and the trade of West African slaves, Britain exercised direct control over slavery; this trade formed a fundamental pillar of Britain’s economy and a primary instrument of influence in its colonies. In contrast, in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean regions, although Britain possessed influence and dominance, the central role in the slave trade was held by local brokers and merchants, and the trade was conducted through them.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
In the Persian Gulf region, Britain primarily sought mediation and the acquisition of favorable positions and high political-military influence; for this reason, British intervention in the Persian Gulf slave system and the Atlantic slave trade had fundamental differences. These differences were also evident in the efforts to abolish slavery. In the Atlantic trade, Britain used military force and strict laws extensively, taking direct control over the trade and smuggling of slaves. In the Persian Gulf, however, it pursued a policy of conciliation with local sheikhs and rulers, engaging central governments such as the Qajar state and signing multiple treaties regarding the prohibition of slavery, thereby reducing its military expenditures in the Persian Gulf compared to the Atlantic and American colonies while expanding its influence in the region.
Overall, a comparison of the East and West African slave trades in the Persian Gulf and Atlantic regions indicates that Britain’s approach to the slave trade—and ultimately to its suppression—was guided more by its objectives and regional interests than by humanitarian concerns. In the Atlantic world, economic interests were paramount, and the campaign against slavery functioned largely as a tool to counter the expansion of other European powers in West Africa, to protect vital natural resources and gold mines, and to control the wealth of the continent. In the Persian Gulf, Britain’s priorities were primarily strategic and political; based on these political-military objectives and its relations with local rulers, Britain assumed an intermediary and mediating role in the regional slave trade.https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30352_6cf5a593e5545a05c470a52ee077913f.pdfUniversity of IsfahanHistorical Researches2008-625318120260321A Comparative Study of the Pishdad Dynasty in the Texts of Ancient Iran and the Historical Writings of the Safavid PeriodA Comparative Study of the Pishdad Dynasty in the Texts of Ancient Iran and the Historical Writings of the Safavid Period1011163033310.22108/jhr.2026.147853.2893FAHamidHajianpourAssociate Professor, Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Shiraz University, Shiraz, IranMojtabaMmeftahMA in Iranology, Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Shiraz University, Shiraz, IranJournal Article20251227<strong>Abstract</strong>
The land of Iran is among the most ancient and significant cradles of human civilization. The concepts of creation and the endurance of the homeland serve as symbols through which Iranians, by conforming to convention and drawing upon the valor of their heroes, have strived to protect their land. By engaging with these themes, they have taken meaningful steps to preserve their history. This comparative study, based on library research, aims to portray Iranian myths and epics, with a focus on the Pishdadian dynasty as reflected in historical texts from two periods: ancient times and the Safavid era. The findings reveal that the element of religion played a fundamental role in shaping ontological thought in historical writings across both periods, altering certain descriptions of the kings and their reigns. At the same time, the overall framework and narrative themes remained consistent. The study highlights key elements, including the role of heredity in the continuity of kingship, the symbolic representation of the Pishdadian rulers, the Iranians’ civilizing influence, and the actions of individuals as determinants of their destiny.
<strong>Keywords:</strong> Myth, Pishdadian Dynasty, Ancient Period, Safavid Era, Epic.
<strong>Introduction</strong>
Throughout history, Iran has been recognized as one of the founders of human civilization. The roots of this civilization date to an era when myths and epics played a vital role in shaping the beliefs of its people. Myths, by expressing the phenomena surrounding creation, reveal aspects of a nation’s endurance. This endurance gains greater depth and coherence through the heroic and epic deeds of the great figures of that land. Regarding the mythological background of Iran, the most extensive and detailed accounts can be found in texts such as the <em>Yasna</em><strong>, </strong><em>Bundahishn</em><strong>, </strong><em>Denkard</em>, and <em>Yashts</em>. With the transition from ancient Iran to the Islamic era, the narration of Iranian stories continued to hold importance. Themes such as justice-seeking and heroism among certain Iranian warriors remained prominent. During the Safavid period (907–1135 AH), the inclination toward ancient Iran and its myths took a new form, manifesting in historiographical and epic depictions of Iran’s legendary past. The main question of this study concerns the similarities and differences in the narratives of the Pishdadian dynasty as presented in ancient texts and Safavid-era writings, and how these narratives influenced ontological thought—particularly religious perspectives—across these periods. To date, little scholarly attention has been paid to examining the Pishdadian rule comparatively in ancient Iranian sources and Safavid historical writings; therefore, this study aims to fill that research gap and provide a foundation for further investigation in this field.
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
This study employs a historical method with a descriptive-analytical approach, drawing on library sources and synthesized data. The research seeks to examine and compare the historiography of the Pishdadian dynasty as reflected in ancient Iranian texts and in Safavid-period historiography, with a particular focus on the role of religion in the narration of historical events.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
The examination of texts from the ancient and Safavid periods shows that, while the general accounts of events in both eras are relatively similar, there are authentic differences in content and detail, some of which are fundamental. A study of Safavid historical works reveals that most of their material is derived from writers such as <em>al-Ṭabarī</em> (224–310 AH), <em>Qāḍī Bayḍāwī</em> (d. 685 AH), <em>Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī</em><strong> </strong>(680–750 AH), and <em>Mīrkhvānd Ḥusaynī</em> (837–903/904 AH), whose writings are considered primary sources of Islamic Iranian history. In Safavid historiography, the narrative of the Pishdadian dynasty—mostly in summary form—emphasizes its epic and heroic dimensions, the role of family and Iranian lineage, the human transcendence pursued by certain Pishdadian rulers, and the spread of knowledge, particularly in industry and urban development.
In ancient Iranian texts such as the <em>Avesta</em> and <em>Selections of Zadsparam</em>, the Pishdadians are described in relation to aspects such as the behavioral traits and actions of Pishdadian nobles, the role of religion and the forces of good and evil in their rule, the importance of <em>Farr-e Izadi</em> (divine glory) during this period, the place of family and Iranian lineage, the symbolic portrayal of Pishdadian deeds, the significance of Iranian civilization, and the Mazdaean worldview. A comparative review of texts from the ancient and Safavid eras concerning the Pishdadians reveals significant differences, the most important of which include reflections on religious beliefs, interpretations of certain narratives, and engagement with ontological concepts.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
In ancient writings, the active role of Iranian myths and epics served to express the teachings of Mazdayasnian belief, most evident in the victories of righteous kings over malevolent figures. In contrast, the historical works of the Safavid period—where accounts of the Pishdadian era are largely summarized—depict all beings as creations of a single Creator, and there is no mention of Ahriman (the Evil Spirit). Safavid historians, reflecting the transformation of religious beliefs, removed this aspect of Zoroastrian ideology; yet the epic elements in Safavid historiography maintain a thematic resemblance to those of ancient writings. In ancient manuscripts, the concept of inheritance is closely tied to <em>Farr‑e Izadi</em> (divine glory), whose nature is expressed through the bestowal of <em>Farr</em> upon noble Iranian kings. By contrast, in Safavid chronicles, the nobility of Iranian lineage endures through the moral righteousness and virtuous conduct of the Iranian people.
In ancient texts, the family is portrayed as a genealogical institution that forms the foundation of enduring Iranian thought. In both the ancient and Safavid periods, individuals defined themselves within the framework of their family, and the continuity of Pishdadian rule is established on this very foundation. Symbolic expression in the actions of kings is clearly evident in ancient sources—most notably during the reigns of Jamshid and Fereydun. Similarly, in Safavid historiography, symbolic representations of Pishdadian kings continue to portray them as inspirational figures leading the society forward. In ancient writings, the Pishdadian civilization’s achievements are regarded as fundamental, and the creation of mythic structures during this period reflects the Mazdaean worldview. In the Safavid era, however, this concept manifests primarily in scientific and intellectual contexts, emphasizing the Pishdadians’ role in fostering knowledge-based and scholarly thought among the Iranian people. Differences in calendrical calculation and, likely, in the historical sources used across the two periods have led to variations and inconsistencies in the recorded reigns of some kings.
<strong>Abstract</strong>
The land of Iran is among the most ancient and significant cradles of human civilization. The concepts of creation and the endurance of the homeland serve as symbols through which Iranians, by conforming to convention and drawing upon the valor of their heroes, have strived to protect their land. By engaging with these themes, they have taken meaningful steps to preserve their history. This comparative study, based on library research, aims to portray Iranian myths and epics, with a focus on the Pishdadian dynasty as reflected in historical texts from two periods: ancient times and the Safavid era. The findings reveal that the element of religion played a fundamental role in shaping ontological thought in historical writings across both periods, altering certain descriptions of the kings and their reigns. At the same time, the overall framework and narrative themes remained consistent. The study highlights key elements, including the role of heredity in the continuity of kingship, the symbolic representation of the Pishdadian rulers, the Iranians’ civilizing influence, and the actions of individuals as determinants of their destiny.
<strong>Keywords:</strong> Myth, Pishdadian Dynasty, Ancient Period, Safavid Era, Epic.
<strong>Introduction</strong>
Throughout history, Iran has been recognized as one of the founders of human civilization. The roots of this civilization date to an era when myths and epics played a vital role in shaping the beliefs of its people. Myths, by expressing the phenomena surrounding creation, reveal aspects of a nation’s endurance. This endurance gains greater depth and coherence through the heroic and epic deeds of the great figures of that land. Regarding the mythological background of Iran, the most extensive and detailed accounts can be found in texts such as the <em>Yasna</em><strong>, </strong><em>Bundahishn</em><strong>, </strong><em>Denkard</em>, and <em>Yashts</em>. With the transition from ancient Iran to the Islamic era, the narration of Iranian stories continued to hold importance. Themes such as justice-seeking and heroism among certain Iranian warriors remained prominent. During the Safavid period (907–1135 AH), the inclination toward ancient Iran and its myths took a new form, manifesting in historiographical and epic depictions of Iran’s legendary past. The main question of this study concerns the similarities and differences in the narratives of the Pishdadian dynasty as presented in ancient texts and Safavid-era writings, and how these narratives influenced ontological thought—particularly religious perspectives—across these periods. To date, little scholarly attention has been paid to examining the Pishdadian rule comparatively in ancient Iranian sources and Safavid historical writings; therefore, this study aims to fill that research gap and provide a foundation for further investigation in this field.
<strong>Materials and Methods</strong>
This study employs a historical method with a descriptive-analytical approach, drawing on library sources and synthesized data. The research seeks to examine and compare the historiography of the Pishdadian dynasty as reflected in ancient Iranian texts and in Safavid-period historiography, with a particular focus on the role of religion in the narration of historical events.
<strong>Research Findings</strong>
The examination of texts from the ancient and Safavid periods shows that, while the general accounts of events in both eras are relatively similar, there are authentic differences in content and detail, some of which are fundamental. A study of Safavid historical works reveals that most of their material is derived from writers such as <em>al-Ṭabarī</em> (224–310 AH), <em>Qāḍī Bayḍāwī</em> (d. 685 AH), <em>Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī</em><strong> </strong>(680–750 AH), and <em>Mīrkhvānd Ḥusaynī</em> (837–903/904 AH), whose writings are considered primary sources of Islamic Iranian history. In Safavid historiography, the narrative of the Pishdadian dynasty—mostly in summary form—emphasizes its epic and heroic dimensions, the role of family and Iranian lineage, the human transcendence pursued by certain Pishdadian rulers, and the spread of knowledge, particularly in industry and urban development.
In ancient Iranian texts such as the <em>Avesta</em> and <em>Selections of Zadsparam</em>, the Pishdadians are described in relation to aspects such as the behavioral traits and actions of Pishdadian nobles, the role of religion and the forces of good and evil in their rule, the importance of <em>Farr-e Izadi</em> (divine glory) during this period, the place of family and Iranian lineage, the symbolic portrayal of Pishdadian deeds, the significance of Iranian civilization, and the Mazdaean worldview. A comparative review of texts from the ancient and Safavid eras concerning the Pishdadians reveals significant differences, the most important of which include reflections on religious beliefs, interpretations of certain narratives, and engagement with ontological concepts.
<strong>Discussion of Results and Conclusions</strong>
In ancient writings, the active role of Iranian myths and epics served to express the teachings of Mazdayasnian belief, most evident in the victories of righteous kings over malevolent figures. In contrast, the historical works of the Safavid period—where accounts of the Pishdadian era are largely summarized—depict all beings as creations of a single Creator, and there is no mention of Ahriman (the Evil Spirit). Safavid historians, reflecting the transformation of religious beliefs, removed this aspect of Zoroastrian ideology; yet the epic elements in Safavid historiography maintain a thematic resemblance to those of ancient writings. In ancient manuscripts, the concept of inheritance is closely tied to <em>Farr‑e Izadi</em> (divine glory), whose nature is expressed through the bestowal of <em>Farr</em> upon noble Iranian kings. By contrast, in Safavid chronicles, the nobility of Iranian lineage endures through the moral righteousness and virtuous conduct of the Iranian people.
In ancient texts, the family is portrayed as a genealogical institution that forms the foundation of enduring Iranian thought. In both the ancient and Safavid periods, individuals defined themselves within the framework of their family, and the continuity of Pishdadian rule is established on this very foundation. Symbolic expression in the actions of kings is clearly evident in ancient sources—most notably during the reigns of Jamshid and Fereydun. Similarly, in Safavid historiography, symbolic representations of Pishdadian kings continue to portray them as inspirational figures leading the society forward. In ancient writings, the Pishdadian civilization’s achievements are regarded as fundamental, and the creation of mythic structures during this period reflects the Mazdaean worldview. In the Safavid era, however, this concept manifests primarily in scientific and intellectual contexts, emphasizing the Pishdadians’ role in fostering knowledge-based and scholarly thought among the Iranian people. Differences in calendrical calculation and, likely, in the historical sources used across the two periods have led to variations and inconsistencies in the recorded reigns of some kings.
https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_30333_13af80138d47a086198ebc15ef9a2144.pdf