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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Historical Researches</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-6253</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Rereading the Narrative of “the Liberation of Hormuz” Based on the Historical Text in Persian</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Rereading the Narrative of “the Liberation of Hormuz” Based on the Historical Text in Persian</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>16</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">27229</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/jhr.2022.133280.2343</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hamid</FirstName>
					<LastName>Asadpour</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Persian Gulf University, Bushehr, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Aliakbar</FirstName>
					<LastName>Kajbaf</LastName>
<Affiliation>Full Professor, History Department, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hosein</FirstName>
					<LastName>Eskandari</LastName>
<Affiliation>Ph.D. in the History of Islamic Iran and a researcher in history, Persian Gulf University, Bushehr, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>15</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt;Abstract&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One of the important issues of the Safavid period is their challenges with foreigners, such as the Portuguese, in the Persian Gulf. The Portuguese domination over the Persian Gulf led to some effects regarding economic and social life in this region and destruction of free trade. The Portuguese rullling, which lasted for more than a century, finally ended during the reign of Shah Abbas I. One of the important issues in ending the Portuguese domination over these areas and especially on Hormuz Island was the British role, which has been exaggerated by some Western historians. These battles are considered the most important reason for the defeat of the Portuguese. This research was based on rereading and analysis of this premise by relying on Iranian traditions. The basic question was whether the quality and role of the government and Iranian forces in the liberation of Hormuz had been specified in important Persian texts and traditions for this battle. It seemed that the role and Iranian forces in liberating Hormuz was much greater than that of the British according to Persian historical texts and especially poems. In this research, this issue was investigated through an analytical-descriptive method.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The history of the coastal and post-coastal regions of the Persian Gulf is one of the subjects which has received less attention in the sources of the Safavid period. The lack of the Safavid navy to play a role in these regions on the one hand and the absence of the Safavid kings on the other hand were two important factors. In addition, the presence of powerful enemies, such as the Uzbeks and the Ottomans, caused the sources of the Safavid era not to be much focused on the events of these regions since they dealt with the events in which the Safavid court and especially the kings had played an important role. In this period, the main focus of the Safavid court was on the eastern and western regions of Iran and the conflicts with the Uzbek and Ottomans with an attempt to repel the invasion of these two Sunni Muslim powers. The failure of the Safavid sources to address this issue caused many ambiguities to be raised about the events of the mentioned areas. One of the important issues in this field was the presence of the Portuguese and their control over the social and especially commercial affairs of the areas. The long-term rule of this colonial force was one of the reasons why Safavid historians did not deal with the issue of the Persian Gulf. This domination finally ended with the actions of Imam Qali Khan, the ruler of Fars during the time of Shah Abbas I. The British also played a role in ending the Portuguese rule. However, the quality of their presence in these battles was narrated differently by Western historians and in some Iranian sources. This research made an attempt to explain the role of the British and Iranian forces in the battle against the Portuguese based on Iranian traditions. The basic question of this research was how the quality and role of the British and Iranian forces in the battle against the Portuguese was presented in Persian texts. The second question was what  the consequences of the British presence in these battles were. It seemed that the role and effectiveness of Iranian forces in liberating Hormuz were much greater than those of the British and the ruler of Fars, while no accurate assessment of the strength and power of the native forces of these areas had been made according to Persian historical texts and especially poems. The role of the British in this battle made them more and more present in the future of the Persian Gulf and gave them privileges and exemptions. So far, some studies have dealt with this issue in a very brief way (Vothoqi and Habibi, 1387, 18). Most of the researches were based on the idea that the British forces freed Hormuz from the Portuguese rule and assigned a very small role of the Iranians in this battle. Like Western historians, many Iranian historians had pointed out the essential role of the British in this battle, which had caused most historians to only retell the western traditions in this matter.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this research, the mentioned subject was examined by using library sources and an analytical-descriptive method and referring to various sources, especially Persian poems. Using various sources of the Safavid era, the roles of the Iranians and the British in liberating Hormuz from the Portuguese rule were analyzed.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion, Results, and Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Portuguese influence and domination on the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of ​​Oman, especially the island of Hormuz, led to their monopoly of trade in these areas, disappearance of free trade, and the increasing militarization of the Persian Gulf. This influence and domination of the Portuguese ended with the cooperation of the Safavid and British forces during the reign of Shah Abbas. The ruler of Persia allied with the British without carefully examining the strength of the indigenous forces on the shores of the Persian Gulf, as well as the strength of the Portuguese forces. Although the British took part in the battle against the Portuguese and the conquest of areas, such as Qeshm and Hormuz islands, their role and presence were very small and insignificant. Western sources had described this presence and role with an exaggeration and given the least attention to the role to the Iranians, while the Arab and non-Arab forces native to the shores and back shores of the Persian Gulf played the main role in the defeat of the Portuguese. However, the low presence of British forces in these battles caused more of them to enter the Persian Gulf. It also led to the conclusion of contracts by the Safavid government with them, in which capitulation could be observed and through which exemptions were granted to them. Upon ending the rule of the rulers of Hormuz, the Safavid rule opened the way to riots and separatism in areas, such as Oman, which were previously ruled by the rulers of Hormuz. The Safavids could consolidate their dominance over these areas with the help of the rulers of Hormuz.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;strong&gt;Abstract&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One of the important issues of the Safavid period is their challenges with foreigners, such as the Portuguese, in the Persian Gulf. The Portuguese domination over the Persian Gulf led to some effects regarding economic and social life in this region and destruction of free trade. The Portuguese rullling, which lasted for more than a century, finally ended during the reign of Shah Abbas I. One of the important issues in ending the Portuguese domination over these areas and especially on Hormuz Island was the British role, which has been exaggerated by some Western historians. These battles are considered the most important reason for the defeat of the Portuguese. This research was based on rereading and analysis of this premise by relying on Iranian traditions. The basic question was whether the quality and role of the government and Iranian forces in the liberation of Hormuz had been specified in important Persian texts and traditions for this battle. It seemed that the role and Iranian forces in liberating Hormuz was much greater than that of the British according to Persian historical texts and especially poems. In this research, this issue was investigated through an analytical-descriptive method.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The history of the coastal and post-coastal regions of the Persian Gulf is one of the subjects which has received less attention in the sources of the Safavid period. The lack of the Safavid navy to play a role in these regions on the one hand and the absence of the Safavid kings on the other hand were two important factors. In addition, the presence of powerful enemies, such as the Uzbeks and the Ottomans, caused the sources of the Safavid era not to be much focused on the events of these regions since they dealt with the events in which the Safavid court and especially the kings had played an important role. In this period, the main focus of the Safavid court was on the eastern and western regions of Iran and the conflicts with the Uzbek and Ottomans with an attempt to repel the invasion of these two Sunni Muslim powers. The failure of the Safavid sources to address this issue caused many ambiguities to be raised about the events of the mentioned areas. One of the important issues in this field was the presence of the Portuguese and their control over the social and especially commercial affairs of the areas. The long-term rule of this colonial force was one of the reasons why Safavid historians did not deal with the issue of the Persian Gulf. This domination finally ended with the actions of Imam Qali Khan, the ruler of Fars during the time of Shah Abbas I. The British also played a role in ending the Portuguese rule. However, the quality of their presence in these battles was narrated differently by Western historians and in some Iranian sources. This research made an attempt to explain the role of the British and Iranian forces in the battle against the Portuguese based on Iranian traditions. The basic question of this research was how the quality and role of the British and Iranian forces in the battle against the Portuguese was presented in Persian texts. The second question was what  the consequences of the British presence in these battles were. It seemed that the role and effectiveness of Iranian forces in liberating Hormuz were much greater than those of the British and the ruler of Fars, while no accurate assessment of the strength and power of the native forces of these areas had been made according to Persian historical texts and especially poems. The role of the British in this battle made them more and more present in the future of the Persian Gulf and gave them privileges and exemptions. So far, some studies have dealt with this issue in a very brief way (Vothoqi and Habibi, 1387, 18). Most of the researches were based on the idea that the British forces freed Hormuz from the Portuguese rule and assigned a very small role of the Iranians in this battle. Like Western historians, many Iranian historians had pointed out the essential role of the British in this battle, which had caused most historians to only retell the western traditions in this matter.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this research, the mentioned subject was examined by using library sources and an analytical-descriptive method and referring to various sources, especially Persian poems. Using various sources of the Safavid era, the roles of the Iranians and the British in liberating Hormuz from the Portuguese rule were analyzed.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion, Results, and Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Portuguese influence and domination on the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of ​​Oman, especially the island of Hormuz, led to their monopoly of trade in these areas, disappearance of free trade, and the increasing militarization of the Persian Gulf. This influence and domination of the Portuguese ended with the cooperation of the Safavid and British forces during the reign of Shah Abbas. The ruler of Persia allied with the British without carefully examining the strength of the indigenous forces on the shores of the Persian Gulf, as well as the strength of the Portuguese forces. Although the British took part in the battle against the Portuguese and the conquest of areas, such as Qeshm and Hormuz islands, their role and presence were very small and insignificant. Western sources had described this presence and role with an exaggeration and given the least attention to the role to the Iranians, while the Arab and non-Arab forces native to the shores and back shores of the Persian Gulf played the main role in the defeat of the Portuguese. However, the low presence of British forces in these battles caused more of them to enter the Persian Gulf. It also led to the conclusion of contracts by the Safavid government with them, in which capitulation could be observed and through which exemptions were granted to them. Upon ending the rule of the rulers of Hormuz, the Safavid rule opened the way to riots and separatism in areas, such as Oman, which were previously ruled by the rulers of Hormuz. The Safavids could consolidate their dominance over these areas with the help of the rulers of Hormuz.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Historical Researches</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-6253</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Examining the Changes in the Sheriffs of the Mamasani Javid Tribe in the Qajar Period Based on New Local Documents and Cemetery Petroglyphs</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Examining the Changes in the Sheriffs of the Mamasani Javid Tribe in the Qajar Period Based on New Local Documents and Cemetery Petroglyphs</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>17</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>50</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">27307</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/jhr.2023.134211.2378</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Aref</FirstName>
					<LastName>Eshaghi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Ph.D. in History, Department of History, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Ali Akbar</FirstName>
					<LastName>Jafari</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant professor in History Department, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>07</Month>
					<Day>13</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt;Abstract&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Javid tribe is one of the four tribes of the Lor Mamasani Union of Fars. This clan lived with Rostam, Dushman Ziyari, and Bekash clans in the northwest of Fars. Their tasks were leadership, cohesion, and support of the public in political and social developments. The management system among them somehow showed the tribe&#039;s management style in this union. This system always underwent changes due to reasons, such as the competition for the post of sheriffdom and involvement of central government agents in the selection of sheriffs. Considering the importance of changing the sheriffs of the Javid clan and people’s actions in the mentioned region in the socio-political stances of the Mamasani tribe and the way the events were influenced by their actions, this research aimed to investigate the influence of government officials in the process of changing the sheriffs of the Javid tribe and the people’s reactions. Regarding these governmental changes during the Qajar period, Javid intended to answer this question: which people or families in the post of sheriffdom underwent a rise and fall caused by the change of sheriffs in Javid tribe? The research investigated this issue based on a library method with the help of new documents belonging to some local families and through the comparative study of the gravestones of the families of the management station in this area and interviews with people, who were knowledgeable about the issues of the area.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Throughout history, the tribes and nomadic population of Iran have always been a significant part of Iranian society. Until the middle of the 14&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; century of Hijri, it included about a quarter of Iran&#039;s population. They played an effective role in many political, social, and economic developments. Most of the Iranian governments during the Islamic period were formed by these people. In the contemporary period, tribes have played a major role in political, social, and economic events. The most important reason for this was the tribal military power based on mutual relations between local leaders and common people. In the social structure of tribes, local leaders, Kodkhodayans and Rish Sefids, were the first core of leadership in adopting the strategies and decisions of Ili support. Other classes that played a more social mobilization role in tribal reactions were placed in lower ranks. In this regard, it should be said that when the local leaders moved against the public interests in pursuit of their personal interests, the local social contexts were put in a reactive position and then moved out of the reactive position. Through this collective movement, they adopted a single political behavior based on tribal or regional reaction to achieve cohesion by not following the tribal leaders. The tribal movements of some clans of Mamsani tribe against the Qajar government were a function of such tribal actions. Based on this, the set of conflicts between the governments and the Memsani tribes and tribes caused confrontations with the central government and conflicts between these tribal communities and the policies that the rulers adopted to monitor them. The election of sheriffs in Taifah Javed from among the most influential khans in political, military, economic, and social terms was done by government agents. In fact, the sheriff was the &quot;khan&quot; of the khans and people of every tribe. In Mamsani clans, sheriffs were often appointed. Also, there was no clerical position in this tribe, while its absence was considered a major social political weakness of the tribe system because this structure led to the selection of a single leadership for making the unity and cohesion of the said tribe against external threats and solving problems and disputes within the tribe. Moreover, the security of this province could be ensured. The reason for the absence of the position of Ilkhani in the Mamsani tribe was the policy approach of the Qajar and British governments for leading the collapse of the cohesion and unity of the Mamsani tribe. This disconnection caused overlapping of the language, race, and culture of the Mamseni region with those of the surrounding areas, as well as differences and rivalries within the tribes.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this study, library, documentary, and field study methods were used to explain changes of the sheriffs of the Mamasani Javid tribe in the Qajar period based on new local documents and cemetery petroglyphs. To this aim, the researchers used private unclassified documents obtained from local informants besides conducting interviews with them.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The results showed that the administration of the Javid clan was centered on Kodkhoda until the time of Baqer Khan during the Zandiya period. The ancestors of the sheriffs of this district had military careers. However, during the Qajar era, the Mamsani clan&#039;s police system underwent drastic changes under the influence of such factors as enmity with the central government, intervention of the Bushehri family, and rivalry and conflict with the Qashqai leaders. These changes caused the removal of a large number of sheriffs and dependence of the emerging Khanin. In the Javid tribe, with the murder of Baqir Khan Javidi committed by the people of Javid Leh Leh due to the rebellion against Zandiyeh and possible support of the Qajars, a new generation emerged in the family of the sheriff of this district in the field of sociopolitical developments of the tribe. According to the local documents available to the people of the region and comparison of cemetery petroglyphs, the system of administrative sheriff of the Javid clan changed again to the system of codkhodas with the arrival of Qaid Khosrow and implementation of contracts and management of clan affairs in the hands of Kodkhodas and Rish Sefids later. Of course, the police position of the mentioned family continued its political and social life in a weakened state and was respected by the people. The transfer of properties of Momsani region and Javid clan to Moin al-Tajjar Bushehri and his involvement in the political and social developments of the region caused clan differences, social dissension, and competition of the Kalantari family in the appointment of the director of Ili. These differences led to war, bloodshed, and fratricide in this clan. After the end of the Kadkhodasalary era in the competition of the Khani families to reach power following Shahbazkhani&#039;s descendants, the Rostam Khani family entered the managerial position of the clan and Reza Qoli Khan, the son of Azad Khan, was killed in a conspiracy. In the rivalry between the sons of Qaidelhil in the fight between Ismail Khan and Morteza Qoli Khan, this rivalry became more intense. The support of Javid Mahori&#039;s Kadkhodas to Morteza Qoli Khan made this conflict and competition more inflamed and finally led to the murder of Morteza Qoli Khan committed by by Ismail Khan. The Qajars repeatedly changed the number of police positions between Ismail Khan and Khan Baba Khan by taking bribes. In Zali Khan&#039;s fight with Ismail Khan, these same Qajars once again restored Rostam Khan&#039;s descendants to power. As mentioned, the occasional support of the Bushehari family, as well as their discord, led to the split of the Javed clan into two factions, Mahori and Leh. The removal of Iskandar Khan from the circle of power and competition and the leadership of Khalil Khan over the Mahori clan and Fethullah Khan over the Javed Lelah section made the beginning of a social break in the Javid clan. This separation made the future of this clan face a dark horizon when faced with issues, such as British agents, Qajar government agents, and Qashqai leaders.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;strong&gt;Abstract&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Javid tribe is one of the four tribes of the Lor Mamasani Union of Fars. This clan lived with Rostam, Dushman Ziyari, and Bekash clans in the northwest of Fars. Their tasks were leadership, cohesion, and support of the public in political and social developments. The management system among them somehow showed the tribe&#039;s management style in this union. This system always underwent changes due to reasons, such as the competition for the post of sheriffdom and involvement of central government agents in the selection of sheriffs. Considering the importance of changing the sheriffs of the Javid clan and people’s actions in the mentioned region in the socio-political stances of the Mamasani tribe and the way the events were influenced by their actions, this research aimed to investigate the influence of government officials in the process of changing the sheriffs of the Javid tribe and the people’s reactions. Regarding these governmental changes during the Qajar period, Javid intended to answer this question: which people or families in the post of sheriffdom underwent a rise and fall caused by the change of sheriffs in Javid tribe? The research investigated this issue based on a library method with the help of new documents belonging to some local families and through the comparative study of the gravestones of the families of the management station in this area and interviews with people, who were knowledgeable about the issues of the area.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Throughout history, the tribes and nomadic population of Iran have always been a significant part of Iranian society. Until the middle of the 14&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; century of Hijri, it included about a quarter of Iran&#039;s population. They played an effective role in many political, social, and economic developments. Most of the Iranian governments during the Islamic period were formed by these people. In the contemporary period, tribes have played a major role in political, social, and economic events. The most important reason for this was the tribal military power based on mutual relations between local leaders and common people. In the social structure of tribes, local leaders, Kodkhodayans and Rish Sefids, were the first core of leadership in adopting the strategies and decisions of Ili support. Other classes that played a more social mobilization role in tribal reactions were placed in lower ranks. In this regard, it should be said that when the local leaders moved against the public interests in pursuit of their personal interests, the local social contexts were put in a reactive position and then moved out of the reactive position. Through this collective movement, they adopted a single political behavior based on tribal or regional reaction to achieve cohesion by not following the tribal leaders. The tribal movements of some clans of Mamsani tribe against the Qajar government were a function of such tribal actions. Based on this, the set of conflicts between the governments and the Memsani tribes and tribes caused confrontations with the central government and conflicts between these tribal communities and the policies that the rulers adopted to monitor them. The election of sheriffs in Taifah Javed from among the most influential khans in political, military, economic, and social terms was done by government agents. In fact, the sheriff was the &quot;khan&quot; of the khans and people of every tribe. In Mamsani clans, sheriffs were often appointed. Also, there was no clerical position in this tribe, while its absence was considered a major social political weakness of the tribe system because this structure led to the selection of a single leadership for making the unity and cohesion of the said tribe against external threats and solving problems and disputes within the tribe. Moreover, the security of this province could be ensured. The reason for the absence of the position of Ilkhani in the Mamsani tribe was the policy approach of the Qajar and British governments for leading the collapse of the cohesion and unity of the Mamsani tribe. This disconnection caused overlapping of the language, race, and culture of the Mamseni region with those of the surrounding areas, as well as differences and rivalries within the tribes.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this study, library, documentary, and field study methods were used to explain changes of the sheriffs of the Mamasani Javid tribe in the Qajar period based on new local documents and cemetery petroglyphs. To this aim, the researchers used private unclassified documents obtained from local informants besides conducting interviews with them.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The results showed that the administration of the Javid clan was centered on Kodkhoda until the time of Baqer Khan during the Zandiya period. The ancestors of the sheriffs of this district had military careers. However, during the Qajar era, the Mamsani clan&#039;s police system underwent drastic changes under the influence of such factors as enmity with the central government, intervention of the Bushehri family, and rivalry and conflict with the Qashqai leaders. These changes caused the removal of a large number of sheriffs and dependence of the emerging Khanin. In the Javid tribe, with the murder of Baqir Khan Javidi committed by the people of Javid Leh Leh due to the rebellion against Zandiyeh and possible support of the Qajars, a new generation emerged in the family of the sheriff of this district in the field of sociopolitical developments of the tribe. According to the local documents available to the people of the region and comparison of cemetery petroglyphs, the system of administrative sheriff of the Javid clan changed again to the system of codkhodas with the arrival of Qaid Khosrow and implementation of contracts and management of clan affairs in the hands of Kodkhodas and Rish Sefids later. Of course, the police position of the mentioned family continued its political and social life in a weakened state and was respected by the people. The transfer of properties of Momsani region and Javid clan to Moin al-Tajjar Bushehri and his involvement in the political and social developments of the region caused clan differences, social dissension, and competition of the Kalantari family in the appointment of the director of Ili. These differences led to war, bloodshed, and fratricide in this clan. After the end of the Kadkhodasalary era in the competition of the Khani families to reach power following Shahbazkhani&#039;s descendants, the Rostam Khani family entered the managerial position of the clan and Reza Qoli Khan, the son of Azad Khan, was killed in a conspiracy. In the rivalry between the sons of Qaidelhil in the fight between Ismail Khan and Morteza Qoli Khan, this rivalry became more intense. The support of Javid Mahori&#039;s Kadkhodas to Morteza Qoli Khan made this conflict and competition more inflamed and finally led to the murder of Morteza Qoli Khan committed by by Ismail Khan. The Qajars repeatedly changed the number of police positions between Ismail Khan and Khan Baba Khan by taking bribes. In Zali Khan&#039;s fight with Ismail Khan, these same Qajars once again restored Rostam Khan&#039;s descendants to power. As mentioned, the occasional support of the Bushehari family, as well as their discord, led to the split of the Javed clan into two factions, Mahori and Leh. The removal of Iskandar Khan from the circle of power and competition and the leadership of Khalil Khan over the Mahori clan and Fethullah Khan over the Javed Lelah section made the beginning of a social break in the Javid clan. This separation made the future of this clan face a dark horizon when faced with issues, such as British agents, Qajar government agents, and Qashqai leaders.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Historical Researches</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-6253</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Validation of the Reports of the Prophet's Wrestling with Rukanah and the Miracle of the Tree Movement in Islamic Sources</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Validation of the Reports of the Prophet&#039;s Wrestling with Rukanah and the Miracle of the Tree Movement in Islamic Sources</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>51</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>68</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">27231</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/jhr.2022.134074.2372</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Seyed Mahdi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Lotfi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate professor, Department of Quran and Hadith Sciences, Faculty of Theology and Ahl-al-Bayt Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>07</Month>
					<Day>02</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt;Abstract&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;According to ibn Ishaq, the Prophet (PBUH) wrestled with Rukana ibn al-Abdu Yazid to invite him to Islam and ordered a tree to come to him and then return to its place. Two consecutive events of wrestling and the tree movement in ibn Ishaq&#039;s report are reflected in Islamic sources in the form of two independent narrations of wrestling and the miracle of the tree movement. In addition to the differences in sources in how the two events are narrated, the accuracy and credibility of these reports need to be considered. Therefore, the present article focused on observing the textual changes and analyzing them and comparing the texts with each other, while validating the documents and examining the decency of the reports. The results of this study showed that the existing reports of wrestling and tree movement were suffering from textual anxiety and had conflicts in terms of time, goals, and the people involved. The results of the dating of the reports also indicated that ibn Ishaq&#039;s report was the oldest available version of this event, which included the two themes of wrestling and the miracle of the tree movement. It had been the source of other subsequent reports. Since ibn Ishaq&#039;s report was distorted in terms of attribution and lacked valid criteria in terms of textual structure, the reports based on it were also considered invalid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One of the miracles of the Prophet of Islam is moving a tree, which is mentioned in some sources, along with the Prophet’s wrestling and fight with Rukanah ibn al-Abdu Yazid. According to ibn Ishaq’s narration (150-151 AH), Rukanah was one of the Arab warriors in the ignorant period, who met the Prophet (PBUH) in one of the valleys of Mecca. To accept Islam, the Prophet (PBUH) offered him wrestling. The Prophet (PBUH) asked Rukanah would believe in his prophethood if he was defeated. Rukanah answered in the affirmative and he was defeated by the Prophet three times. While Rukanah was ashamed and surprised by his failure, the Prophet (PBUH) said that he could do something more wonderful for his. He ordered the tree near them and it came towards them and then returned to its place at the (ibn Hisham, n.d., Vol. 1, pp. 390-391).&lt;br /&gt;This report has been quoted in several historical and narrative sources, and some sources have reproduced it without textual changes (Karajeki, 1410, Vol. 1, p. 211) and some others have made changes to the body of the story and its details (Ravandi, 1409 AH, pp. 297-298). This article dealt with their validations and the correctness of attribution besides dating the existing reports in this field. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Material &amp; Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This article used the method of internal criticism and the external method for analyzing the reports. The reports diverged into the 3 categories of A, B, and C as follows: Text A: The Prophet&#039;s wrestling with Rukanah ibn al-Abdu Yazid and the miracle of the moving tree; Text B: The Prophet&#039;s wrestling with Rukanah; and Text C: The miracle of the moving tree.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1) The three reports of the story of wrestling and the movement of the tree, were related to the period of the second to the fourth century AH in terms of time of compilation in the Islamic sources. Ibn Ishaq’s report (150-151 AH) and the independent report of wrestling were popular in the second century and the report of the tree movement in Shiiah and Sunni sources dated back to the third and fourth centuries AH. Since none of these three texts had credible documents, it was not possible to prove their documentary assignments to the alleged period, i.e., the period of ignorance and the era of prophethood. Ibn Ishaq’s report (150-151 AH) had no documents, the independent report of wrestling was a distorted and weak document, and the report of the miracle of moving a tree also had no valid documents.&lt;br /&gt;2) The three reports about wrestling and the miracle of moving the tree were textually confused and contradictory. The contradiction in time meant the attribution of wrestling to the ignorant or Islamic period, contradiction in the goal, which included the holy goal of calling to Islam and just fighting for entertainment, and the conflict in characters in the miracle of the tree movement, which included focusing on Rukanah’s character or a Bedouin person in the report. Ahl al-Sunnah and the famous Arab physician or Quraysh elders were among these cases in Shiiah reports. Contradictions in detail were also among the other things that existed in the texts of the reports. The number of ships in the ship capture report changed from two to three times.&lt;br /&gt;3) The languages of the reports had become more technical from the second to the fourth century AH. In the report of the tree movement in the attributed commentary to Imam Hasan al-Askari (AS), the use of words, testifying to the period of Ali’s Imamate, the mention of the principle of Tawali and Tabarri, had made the language of the text appropriate to the late Shiite discourse in the third century AH. In ibn Ishaq’s text (150-151 AH), the language of the text had an obvious change from ibn Ishaq (150-151 AH) to Qutbuddin Rawandi and the verbal strains were prominent in his text.&lt;br /&gt;4) Based on the historical precedence of ibn Ishaq&#039;s report (Text A) over others, his text was the source of other texts and the textual changes that had taken place were the result of separating his report into two independent reports and adding further details to the original text. Since ibn Ishaq&#039;s report (150-151 AH) lacked the necessary authenticity and credibility, the authenticity and credibility of the other texts could not be proven on the same basis and based on the languages of the texts and their later discourses.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;strong&gt;Abstract&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;According to ibn Ishaq, the Prophet (PBUH) wrestled with Rukana ibn al-Abdu Yazid to invite him to Islam and ordered a tree to come to him and then return to its place. Two consecutive events of wrestling and the tree movement in ibn Ishaq&#039;s report are reflected in Islamic sources in the form of two independent narrations of wrestling and the miracle of the tree movement. In addition to the differences in sources in how the two events are narrated, the accuracy and credibility of these reports need to be considered. Therefore, the present article focused on observing the textual changes and analyzing them and comparing the texts with each other, while validating the documents and examining the decency of the reports. The results of this study showed that the existing reports of wrestling and tree movement were suffering from textual anxiety and had conflicts in terms of time, goals, and the people involved. The results of the dating of the reports also indicated that ibn Ishaq&#039;s report was the oldest available version of this event, which included the two themes of wrestling and the miracle of the tree movement. It had been the source of other subsequent reports. Since ibn Ishaq&#039;s report was distorted in terms of attribution and lacked valid criteria in terms of textual structure, the reports based on it were also considered invalid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One of the miracles of the Prophet of Islam is moving a tree, which is mentioned in some sources, along with the Prophet’s wrestling and fight with Rukanah ibn al-Abdu Yazid. According to ibn Ishaq’s narration (150-151 AH), Rukanah was one of the Arab warriors in the ignorant period, who met the Prophet (PBUH) in one of the valleys of Mecca. To accept Islam, the Prophet (PBUH) offered him wrestling. The Prophet (PBUH) asked Rukanah would believe in his prophethood if he was defeated. Rukanah answered in the affirmative and he was defeated by the Prophet three times. While Rukanah was ashamed and surprised by his failure, the Prophet (PBUH) said that he could do something more wonderful for his. He ordered the tree near them and it came towards them and then returned to its place at the (ibn Hisham, n.d., Vol. 1, pp. 390-391).&lt;br /&gt;This report has been quoted in several historical and narrative sources, and some sources have reproduced it without textual changes (Karajeki, 1410, Vol. 1, p. 211) and some others have made changes to the body of the story and its details (Ravandi, 1409 AH, pp. 297-298). This article dealt with their validations and the correctness of attribution besides dating the existing reports in this field. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Material &amp; Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This article used the method of internal criticism and the external method for analyzing the reports. The reports diverged into the 3 categories of A, B, and C as follows: Text A: The Prophet&#039;s wrestling with Rukanah ibn al-Abdu Yazid and the miracle of the moving tree; Text B: The Prophet&#039;s wrestling with Rukanah; and Text C: The miracle of the moving tree.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1) The three reports of the story of wrestling and the movement of the tree, were related to the period of the second to the fourth century AH in terms of time of compilation in the Islamic sources. Ibn Ishaq’s report (150-151 AH) and the independent report of wrestling were popular in the second century and the report of the tree movement in Shiiah and Sunni sources dated back to the third and fourth centuries AH. Since none of these three texts had credible documents, it was not possible to prove their documentary assignments to the alleged period, i.e., the period of ignorance and the era of prophethood. Ibn Ishaq’s report (150-151 AH) had no documents, the independent report of wrestling was a distorted and weak document, and the report of the miracle of moving a tree also had no valid documents.&lt;br /&gt;2) The three reports about wrestling and the miracle of moving the tree were textually confused and contradictory. The contradiction in time meant the attribution of wrestling to the ignorant or Islamic period, contradiction in the goal, which included the holy goal of calling to Islam and just fighting for entertainment, and the conflict in characters in the miracle of the tree movement, which included focusing on Rukanah’s character or a Bedouin person in the report. Ahl al-Sunnah and the famous Arab physician or Quraysh elders were among these cases in Shiiah reports. Contradictions in detail were also among the other things that existed in the texts of the reports. The number of ships in the ship capture report changed from two to three times.&lt;br /&gt;3) The languages of the reports had become more technical from the second to the fourth century AH. In the report of the tree movement in the attributed commentary to Imam Hasan al-Askari (AS), the use of words, testifying to the period of Ali’s Imamate, the mention of the principle of Tawali and Tabarri, had made the language of the text appropriate to the late Shiite discourse in the third century AH. In ibn Ishaq’s text (150-151 AH), the language of the text had an obvious change from ibn Ishaq (150-151 AH) to Qutbuddin Rawandi and the verbal strains were prominent in his text.&lt;br /&gt;4) Based on the historical precedence of ibn Ishaq&#039;s report (Text A) over others, his text was the source of other texts and the textual changes that had taken place were the result of separating his report into two independent reports and adding further details to the original text. Since ibn Ishaq&#039;s report (150-151 AH) lacked the necessary authenticity and credibility, the authenticity and credibility of the other texts could not be proven on the same basis and based on the languages of the texts and their later discourses.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Prophet (PBUH)</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">prophet’s miracles</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">prophet's wrestling</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">tree movement</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Rukanah ibn al-Abdu Yazid</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_27231_c2292afd95cb44f371f50c217a527dee.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Historical Researches</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-6253</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Resistance against the Policy of Banning the Hijab by Reza Shah's Government (Case Study: Lack of Support of the New Middle Class in Azerbaijan</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Resistance against the Policy of Banning the Hijab by Reza Shah&#039;s Government (Case Study: Lack of Support of the New Middle Class in Azerbaijan</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>69</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>82</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">27217</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/jhr.2022.134210.2379</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Jafar</FirstName>
					<LastName>Gholipor</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate professor, Department of History, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Gholamali</FirstName>
					<LastName>Pashazadeh</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate professor, Department of History, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>07</Month>
					<Day>09</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&lt;strong&gt;Abstract&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The present article examined the resistance formed against the policy of removing the hijab during Reza Shah’s Period and the lack of support of the new middle-class employees in Azerbaijan.&lt;br /&gt;These kinds of studies focus on the importance of designing the types of policies by the government and political system in the cultural field of the society, especially the ethnic area of the country and adopting strategies to advance them.&lt;br /&gt;The purpose of this study was to find the answer to the question of what factors led to the lack of cooperation by the government employees in Azerbaijan as an important force against advance of the policy of removing the hijab in this region.&lt;br /&gt;The obtained results showed that many factors had caused the lack of support and people’s resistance in the different strata of Azerbaijan, including the new middle class, against the policy of banning the hijab.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction    &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The plan to remove the hijab or the law of &quot;forbidding Iranian women from wearing veils, headscarves&quot; was one of the controversial programs designed to improve the social status of Iranian women and unify the society by rejecting the outward distinctions of the different classes of people. It started on January 8, 1936 by removing from the head of Iranian women what, according to Reza Shah, was the cause of women&#039;s frustration in the society and backwardness of Iranians.&lt;br /&gt;One of the regions where implementation of the hijab ban was followed even before the official announcement was Azerbaijan. Therefore, as soon as the law of banning the hijab was announced to be implemented in the country&#039;s illegal areas, the local officials of Reza Shah’s government in Tabriz tried to promote the policy of banning the hijab by mobilizing the available resources and using various methods of encouragement and punishment.&lt;br /&gt;One of the strategies used by the government to promote and expand prohibition of the hijab in different regions of the country was using the capacity of the new middle class. According to the official orders, the employees of the government offices were obliged to implement this change and advertise and promote it in the society. The middle class was required to appear as the most important reference group in the family, workplace, and most importantly in public as a model and symbol of the new change.&lt;br /&gt;The government employees had a mission to attend the celebrations and ceremonies organized with their wives and daughters without hijab under various pretexts so as to be role models for other women in this field. Furthermore, through several circulars, they were forced to participate in such celebrations and ceremonies.&lt;br /&gt;However, examination of the documents of that period regarding the performance of the new middle class in different regions of the country showed that there was an important difference and distinction in the performance of the new middle class of Azerbaijan, while this group of people was reluctant to play this role as one of the influential factors in the prohibition process. There were many reports that the heads of the departments and their employees had refused to do this in different ways.&lt;br /&gt;Therefore, the question that was specifically considered in the current research was as follows: What factors caused the lack of support and resistance of the government employees of Azerbaijan to the policy of banning women&#039;s hijab during Reza Shah&#039;s era?&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Material &amp; Methods  &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This research was based on a descriptive-analytical approach. The evidence and examples taken from the studies, left over from that period and reviews of historical documents helped us  to analyze the reasons for the resistance of the mentioned class as one of the effective social classes in the process of banning the hijab.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results &amp; Conclusions  &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The obtained results showed that various factors led to the formation of the people’s resistance and different strata of the Azerbaijan region, including its new middle class, against the hijab ban, among which the following could be mentioned:&lt;br /&gt;- Contrast of this change with the people’s current culture&lt;br /&gt;- Lack of belief in the need to implement it&lt;br /&gt;- Failure to create a harmony between removing the hijab of Azerbaijani women and the norms and elements of the people’s local culture&lt;br /&gt;- Indifference of the government officials to the norms and elements of the people’s native and local culture&lt;br /&gt;- Trying to take advantage of various propaganda methods to spread the hijab prohibition among the people of Azerbaijan without providing the necessary cultural and social infrastructure&lt;br /&gt;- Insistence of the government to promote the policy of banning hijab by resorting to coercion</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&lt;strong&gt;Abstract&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The present article examined the resistance formed against the policy of removing the hijab during Reza Shah’s Period and the lack of support of the new middle-class employees in Azerbaijan.&lt;br /&gt;These kinds of studies focus on the importance of designing the types of policies by the government and political system in the cultural field of the society, especially the ethnic area of the country and adopting strategies to advance them.&lt;br /&gt;The purpose of this study was to find the answer to the question of what factors led to the lack of cooperation by the government employees in Azerbaijan as an important force against advance of the policy of removing the hijab in this region.&lt;br /&gt;The obtained results showed that many factors had caused the lack of support and people’s resistance in the different strata of Azerbaijan, including the new middle class, against the policy of banning the hijab.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction    &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The plan to remove the hijab or the law of &quot;forbidding Iranian women from wearing veils, headscarves&quot; was one of the controversial programs designed to improve the social status of Iranian women and unify the society by rejecting the outward distinctions of the different classes of people. It started on January 8, 1936 by removing from the head of Iranian women what, according to Reza Shah, was the cause of women&#039;s frustration in the society and backwardness of Iranians.&lt;br /&gt;One of the regions where implementation of the hijab ban was followed even before the official announcement was Azerbaijan. Therefore, as soon as the law of banning the hijab was announced to be implemented in the country&#039;s illegal areas, the local officials of Reza Shah’s government in Tabriz tried to promote the policy of banning the hijab by mobilizing the available resources and using various methods of encouragement and punishment.&lt;br /&gt;One of the strategies used by the government to promote and expand prohibition of the hijab in different regions of the country was using the capacity of the new middle class. According to the official orders, the employees of the government offices were obliged to implement this change and advertise and promote it in the society. The middle class was required to appear as the most important reference group in the family, workplace, and most importantly in public as a model and symbol of the new change.&lt;br /&gt;The government employees had a mission to attend the celebrations and ceremonies organized with their wives and daughters without hijab under various pretexts so as to be role models for other women in this field. Furthermore, through several circulars, they were forced to participate in such celebrations and ceremonies.&lt;br /&gt;However, examination of the documents of that period regarding the performance of the new middle class in different regions of the country showed that there was an important difference and distinction in the performance of the new middle class of Azerbaijan, while this group of people was reluctant to play this role as one of the influential factors in the prohibition process. There were many reports that the heads of the departments and their employees had refused to do this in different ways.&lt;br /&gt;Therefore, the question that was specifically considered in the current research was as follows: What factors caused the lack of support and resistance of the government employees of Azerbaijan to the policy of banning women&#039;s hijab during Reza Shah&#039;s era?&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Material &amp; Methods  &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This research was based on a descriptive-analytical approach. The evidence and examples taken from the studies, left over from that period and reviews of historical documents helped us  to analyze the reasons for the resistance of the mentioned class as one of the effective social classes in the process of banning the hijab.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results &amp; Conclusions  &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The obtained results showed that various factors led to the formation of the people’s resistance and different strata of the Azerbaijan region, including its new middle class, against the hijab ban, among which the following could be mentioned:&lt;br /&gt;- Contrast of this change with the people’s current culture&lt;br /&gt;- Lack of belief in the need to implement it&lt;br /&gt;- Failure to create a harmony between removing the hijab of Azerbaijani women and the norms and elements of the people’s local culture&lt;br /&gt;- Indifference of the government officials to the norms and elements of the people’s native and local culture&lt;br /&gt;- Trying to take advantage of various propaganda methods to spread the hijab prohibition among the people of Azerbaijan without providing the necessary cultural and social infrastructure&lt;br /&gt;- Insistence of the government to promote the policy of banning hijab by resorting to coercion</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Reza Shah's government</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">ban</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">hijab of women</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Resistance</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">new middle class</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Azerbaijan</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Historical Researches</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-6253</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The bread crisis and its management in the first era of the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt (358-487 A.H)</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The bread crisis and its management in the first era of the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt (358-487 A.H)</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>83</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>101</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">27459</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/jhr.2023.135616.2442</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Vajiheh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Golmakani</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Student of Islamic History, Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Fatemeh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Janahmadi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Professor, Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, the Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Abbas</FirstName>
					<LastName>Bromand  Aala</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor of , Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>13</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>One of the basic crises faced by the Fatimid government since their arrival in Egypt is the bread crisis and its shortage. They applied several strategies to control and manage the consequences of the bread crisis. This article wants to answer this question: What economic policy did the Fatimids adopt to control the shortage or high cost of bread or the resulting crises? The findings of the research show that the bread crisis management measures in the Fatimid government were focused on &quot;supply control&quot; as the control of human factors disrupting the bread market instead of &quot;demand control&quot;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In addition, in the management of the bread crisis, depending on the causes of its occurrence, measures such as: Reducing or temporarily stopping grain exports, planning to increase grain imports, allocating cash subsidies to flour and bread and its direct distribution, reforming the distribution network and reducing the share of middlemen in the production and distribution cycle, direct involvement in determining the price of bread, controlling monopoly and hoarding in Bread supply and distribution network and dealing with disruptive and profit-seeking human factors, credit purchase of grain from production and distribution, activation of economic institutions regulating the market and cancellation of all types of grain purchase and sale taxes. The research method in this article is the description and analysis of data collected from historical sources.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">One of the basic crises faced by the Fatimid government since their arrival in Egypt is the bread crisis and its shortage. They applied several strategies to control and manage the consequences of the bread crisis. This article wants to answer this question: What economic policy did the Fatimids adopt to control the shortage or high cost of bread or the resulting crises? The findings of the research show that the bread crisis management measures in the Fatimid government were focused on &quot;supply control&quot; as the control of human factors disrupting the bread market instead of &quot;demand control&quot;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In addition, in the management of the bread crisis, depending on the causes of its occurrence, measures such as: Reducing or temporarily stopping grain exports, planning to increase grain imports, allocating cash subsidies to flour and bread and its direct distribution, reforming the distribution network and reducing the share of middlemen in the production and distribution cycle, direct involvement in determining the price of bread, controlling monopoly and hoarding in Bread supply and distribution network and dealing with disruptive and profit-seeking human factors, credit purchase of grain from production and distribution, activation of economic institutions regulating the market and cancellation of all types of grain purchase and sale taxes. The research method in this article is the description and analysis of data collected from historical sources.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">The bread crisis</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Fatimid Caliphate</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Egypt</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Manage of the bread crisis</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jhr.ui.ac.ir/article_27459_aa7910f418456c8a8a5714f0fd52a3e7.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Historical Researches</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-6253</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Arsacid Cult of Ancestors: Its Origin and Religious-Political Nature</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Arsacid Cult of Ancestors: Its Origin and Religious-Political Nature</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>103</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>115</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">27548</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/jhr.2023.135694.2444</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hamidreza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Peighambari</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Department of History, Persian Gulf University, Bushehr, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Zohreh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Taghipour Birgani</LastName>
<Affiliation>Ph.D. Student of Ancient History of Iran, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>12</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>One of the problems raised regarding the influence of Hellenism on the ideology of the Arsacid kingship is the cult of king. Most of the researchers have taken this assumption for granted that the Parthians have followed the customs of the Seleucid kingship and elevated the founder of this dynasty to divinity by following them. The available information includes some historical sources and some archaeological and numismatic evidence. Did the Parthians worship their ancestors by imitating the Hellenistic culture?&lt;br /&gt;This article aimed to revises the existing assumption with an emphasis on Iranian traditions. Undoubtedly, Parthians used Hellenistic artistic traditions, but there is no evidence to specifically confirm the Cult of living kings in this dynasty unlike the Seleucids and Ptolemies. This research which is carried out with a descriptive-analytical method and is based on Iranian documents, i.e. Zoroastrian texts and Ostraca of Nisa, also shows that the divinity of Arsaces in the sources and monuments of old Nisa refers to the custom of sanctifying and honoring royal ancestors, its main origin is not Hellenism but ancient and pure Iranian/Zoroastrian beliefs in the worship of Fravahars.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Arshak (Arsaces I) (217-247 BC), who established an independent state in the region by expelling the Seleucids from Parthia (Parθava/Pahlaw), had such a respect and dignity that all his successors adopted his name according to classical historians (Justin xli.5.6) and as evidenced by the coins of the kings of this dynasty (Sellwood, 1980). This is a special and unique case in the history of Iran, but some of the historical traditions have gone beyond; they reported about the kings’ divinity and cult of the deceased kings among the Parthians (Amm. Marc, xxiii, 6; Josephus, &lt;em&gt;Antiq&lt;/em&gt;. Xviii. 9.5). How should these reports be interpreted?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Material &amp; Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The available information includes some historical sources and archaeological and numismatic evidence. These data are often considered as a sign of the effect of the idea of the Hellenistic kingship on the Parthians (Dabrowa, 2011: 247-253). This view has been especially emphasized by Italian archaeologists’ interpretations of findings such as royal tombs and statues of Greek gods from the site of old Nisa in Turkmenistan (Invernizzi, 2011: 650-650). However, due to the focus on classical texts and traditional understanding of the ideology of the Hellenistic kingship, the mentioned view does not care about the nature and religious origins of Parthian cult of ancestors. Therefore, it seems necessary considering the respect and importance that ancient Iranians have attached to their ancestors’ soul. The upcoming research deals with this subject by using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on Iranian documents, i.e. Zoroastrian texts and Ostraca from old Nisa.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the Hellenistic period, the royal legitimacy was defined by a close and relative relationship with the gods (Wiesehöfer, 1996: 55). In case of the Parthians, on the one hand, like Alexander, who traced his lineage to Heracles, and the Seleucids, who traced their lineage to Apollo, they were introduced as descendants of Arsaces, who had reached the divinity according to ancient historians. On the other hand, continuation of the name of Arsaces as the ancestor of this dynasty in the Parthian coins besides establishment of fire and altar for his soul, shows his prominent position among the Arsacids. This dynasty was an Iranian dynasty; According to the available evidence, it seems that they followed at least a form of Zoroastrianism (Boyce, 1986: 541). Hence, respect for Fravahar of the ancestors in Zoroastrianism (see: Farvardin Yasht) could support the idea that Fravahar of Arsaces was consecrated, but not as a deity in the Iranian/Parthian pantheon. This shows the continuation of the ancient Iranian tradition of worshiping the ancestors among the Arsacid kings. It seems that here we are facing a similar ritual that was understood and implemented in a different way in the Iranian and Greek worlds.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results &amp; Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ancient political ideologies cannot be understood separately from mythological and religious beliefs. The definition of the position and dignity of the king and ideology of the kingship among the Parthians have also had a religious origin. According to Iranian traditions, there is no custom of divine kingship and what gives power and legitimacy to the kings is Farrah, a mystical splendor or glory given by God. In the ancient Iranian culture, kings sought to instill the idea that their power was a divine gift and that they were God’s representatives on earth. During the Achaemenid period, the status of the “great king” was like this. The first Parthian kings, especially Mithridates I, who was in conflict with the Seleucids and local rulers in different regions, for consolidating their kingdom and enjoying the supports of local rulers and made peaceful relations with Greek and non-Greek residents, and avoid tension among these different cultures, resorted to another political way: the use of the divine titles of the Hellenistic kingship on the coins. However, despite the use of divine titles, they did not establish their own cult in the way of Seleucids. Therefore, it is simplistic to interpret the royal titles of the Parthians as a sign of complete adherence of the Hellenistic culture.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">One of the problems raised regarding the influence of Hellenism on the ideology of the Arsacid kingship is the cult of king. Most of the researchers have taken this assumption for granted that the Parthians have followed the customs of the Seleucid kingship and elevated the founder of this dynasty to divinity by following them. The available information includes some historical sources and some archaeological and numismatic evidence. Did the Parthians worship their ancestors by imitating the Hellenistic culture?&lt;br /&gt;This article aimed to revises the existing assumption with an emphasis on Iranian traditions. Undoubtedly, Parthians used Hellenistic artistic traditions, but there is no evidence to specifically confirm the Cult of living kings in this dynasty unlike the Seleucids and Ptolemies. This research which is carried out with a descriptive-analytical method and is based on Iranian documents, i.e. Zoroastrian texts and Ostraca of Nisa, also shows that the divinity of Arsaces in the sources and monuments of old Nisa refers to the custom of sanctifying and honoring royal ancestors, its main origin is not Hellenism but ancient and pure Iranian/Zoroastrian beliefs in the worship of Fravahars.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Arshak (Arsaces I) (217-247 BC), who established an independent state in the region by expelling the Seleucids from Parthia (Parθava/Pahlaw), had such a respect and dignity that all his successors adopted his name according to classical historians (Justin xli.5.6) and as evidenced by the coins of the kings of this dynasty (Sellwood, 1980). This is a special and unique case in the history of Iran, but some of the historical traditions have gone beyond; they reported about the kings’ divinity and cult of the deceased kings among the Parthians (Amm. Marc, xxiii, 6; Josephus, &lt;em&gt;Antiq&lt;/em&gt;. Xviii. 9.5). How should these reports be interpreted?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Material &amp; Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The available information includes some historical sources and archaeological and numismatic evidence. These data are often considered as a sign of the effect of the idea of the Hellenistic kingship on the Parthians (Dabrowa, 2011: 247-253). This view has been especially emphasized by Italian archaeologists’ interpretations of findings such as royal tombs and statues of Greek gods from the site of old Nisa in Turkmenistan (Invernizzi, 2011: 650-650). However, due to the focus on classical texts and traditional understanding of the ideology of the Hellenistic kingship, the mentioned view does not care about the nature and religious origins of Parthian cult of ancestors. Therefore, it seems necessary considering the respect and importance that ancient Iranians have attached to their ancestors’ soul. The upcoming research deals with this subject by using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on Iranian documents, i.e. Zoroastrian texts and Ostraca from old Nisa.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the Hellenistic period, the royal legitimacy was defined by a close and relative relationship with the gods (Wiesehöfer, 1996: 55). In case of the Parthians, on the one hand, like Alexander, who traced his lineage to Heracles, and the Seleucids, who traced their lineage to Apollo, they were introduced as descendants of Arsaces, who had reached the divinity according to ancient historians. On the other hand, continuation of the name of Arsaces as the ancestor of this dynasty in the Parthian coins besides establishment of fire and altar for his soul, shows his prominent position among the Arsacids. This dynasty was an Iranian dynasty; According to the available evidence, it seems that they followed at least a form of Zoroastrianism (Boyce, 1986: 541). Hence, respect for Fravahar of the ancestors in Zoroastrianism (see: Farvardin Yasht) could support the idea that Fravahar of Arsaces was consecrated, but not as a deity in the Iranian/Parthian pantheon. This shows the continuation of the ancient Iranian tradition of worshiping the ancestors among the Arsacid kings. It seems that here we are facing a similar ritual that was understood and implemented in a different way in the Iranian and Greek worlds.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results &amp; Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ancient political ideologies cannot be understood separately from mythological and religious beliefs. The definition of the position and dignity of the king and ideology of the kingship among the Parthians have also had a religious origin. According to Iranian traditions, there is no custom of divine kingship and what gives power and legitimacy to the kings is Farrah, a mystical splendor or glory given by God. In the ancient Iranian culture, kings sought to instill the idea that their power was a divine gift and that they were God’s representatives on earth. During the Achaemenid period, the status of the “great king” was like this. The first Parthian kings, especially Mithridates I, who was in conflict with the Seleucids and local rulers in different regions, for consolidating their kingdom and enjoying the supports of local rulers and made peaceful relations with Greek and non-Greek residents, and avoid tension among these different cultures, resorted to another political way: the use of the divine titles of the Hellenistic kingship on the coins. However, despite the use of divine titles, they did not establish their own cult in the way of Seleucids. Therefore, it is simplistic to interpret the royal titles of the Parthians as a sign of complete adherence of the Hellenistic culture.</OtherAbstract>
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